Maimonides prefaces this chapter with a comment (which was alluded to in the Introduction) about the fact that metaphysical knowledge — which he terms part of “the secrets of the Law” — were deliberately not written down by the ancient Sages of the religion. This principle, Maimonides said, was appropriate for matters of Law because it avoided problems like

great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written words, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new sects

but when it came to metaphysics, Maimonides considers this reluctance to write things down to have been unfortunate. Because of it,

our nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing but a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the Midrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk, that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that it encloses a kernel.

In this chapter, Maimonides mounts a strong criticism on the practice of kalam. His main criticism is that the practitioners of kalam — in their zeal to defend faith against philosophy — get ahead of themselves and use incomplete proofs. At one point, he says that they

did not investigate the real properties of things: first of all they considered what must be the properties of the things which should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the identical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they either supported or refuted a certain opinion.

His response to this is a sober philospher’s response:

I tell you, however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that the properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.

He later says disparagingly:

the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their propositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of future generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books have been written

He also takes issue with the way that mutakallemin weigh in on the debate about the eternity of the world. He says that

they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and establish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have been employed which have never been proved.

He is sympathetic to the theological need for creatio ex nihilo, but because the debate has been raging “for the last three thousand years”, he believes that the best which can be hoped for is

to expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has accomplished a great deed!

Thus, Maimonides reveals where his sympathies lie, but he strongly believes that one cannot base a philosophical defense of religion on an unproven premise (i.e., that of creatio ex nihilo). He proposes, instead, to prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God under the assumption that the Universe is eternal — not because he believes this to be the case, but because he thinks that it is important for a proof for God’s existence be admissible to all: both those who believe in Creation and those who believe in the Eternity of the Universe.

  • The Universe is either eternal or it had a beginning
    • “if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense”
    • “If on the other hand the Universe were eternal, it could in various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and immutable. That being is God”

Only with this rigorous process does he believe that a proof for the existence of God is truly complete. Maimonides is at pains to explain that he himself does not believe in the Eternity of the Universe; he merely accepts that position for the sake of argument in order to build an airtight proof for the existence of God. After all, if the Universe had a beginning — so his logic goes — it would be trivial to prove that God exists. At this moment, he does not actually weigh in on whether the universe is eternal or created; he simply admits that this question has been the subject of philosophical debate and that not all scientifically-minded people are fully convinced by either side.

When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a special chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the same end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view [i.e., the correctness of creatio ex nihilo], yet I shall not contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct.

A proof is necessary because

nothing exists except God and this universe, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but this universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently the universe must be examined as it is: the propositions must be derived from those properties of the universe which are clearly perceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature. Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a being not included therein

Commentary

In this chapter, Maimonides sets out, perhaps for the first time in the Guide, his unadulterated commitment to a rational, logically-consistent understanding of the Universe even if it leads him on a collision course with the literal reading of Scripture. For most religious people in his milieu, the doctrine of the Eternity of the Universe must have been anathema (as it certainly was to al-Ghazali) and a non-starter. But Maimonides believes that for our understanding of God has to start from “the real properties of things”, not from the revealed texts of Scripture.