Chapter Summaries

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3

Part 1

Part 1, Introduction to Part I

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The Introduction, which is formally part of ‘Part I’, is a striaghtforward account of Maimonides’ reasons for writing this book. Addressed to a promising young pupil, Maimonides states:

The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who conscientiously fulfills his moral and religious duries, and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law … . Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and renounce his previous views which are based on those [i.e., literal] expressions, he would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious convictions had suffered loss and injury.

This passage shows that Maimonides is concerned primarily with the relationship between ‘philosophy’ and the ‘Law’. He goes on to identify the expression Ma’ase Bereshit (account of the creation, from Genesis 1) with ‘Natural Science’, and the expression Ma’aseh Mercabah (description of the Chariot, from Ezekiel 1) with ‘Metaphysics’. At this stage, Maimonides reminds the reader of the Talmudic rule that ‘One may not expound … upon Genesis 1 in front of two students, and upon Ezekiel 1 in front of even one, unless he is wise and already understands it on his own.’ (Mishnah Hagiga 2:1)

The body of Ma’aseh Mercabah literature arose out of the rabbinical analysis of esoteric visions of the supernatural. The prototypical account is explicated in Ezekiel 1: Ezekiel sees an eldritch chariot comprised of incomprehensible beings, as well as a representation of the divine Presence. This narrative lends the genre its name, Ma’aseh Mercabah, which translates to “work of the Chariot.” (source).

The sages have repeatedly discouraged the public from studying Ma’aseh Mercabah. Ecclesiasticus 3:22 commands:

Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability: but the things that God hath commanded thee, think on them always, and in many of his works be not curious.

The Talmud (Chagigah 13a) interprets this admonition as pertaining to Ma’aseh Mercabah:

The Gemara comments: Until here, you have permission to speak; from this point forward you do not have permission to speak, as it is written in the book of Ben Sira: Seek not things concealed from you, nor search those hidden from you. Reflect on that which is permitted to you; you have no business with secret matters. It is taught in a baraita: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: What response did the Divine Voice provide to that wicked man, Nebuchadnezzar, when he said: “I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High” (Isaiah 14:14), thereby intending to rise to heaven? A Divine Voice came and said to him: Wicked man, son of a wicked man, descendant, i.e., follower of the ways, of Nimrod the wicked, who caused the entire world to rebel against Him during the time of his reign. […] It is taught in the mishna, according to the Gemara’s explanation: Nor may one expound the Design of the Divine Chariot to an individual. Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: But one may transmit to him, an individual, the outlines of this topic, leaving him to comprehend the rest on his own.

In light of these matters, Maimonides states:

The Ma‘aseh Mercabah must not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student, unless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you should merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of the subject. (Babyl. Talm. Ḥagigah, fol. II b). You must, therefore, not expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been methodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been, on the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics which we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at another time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the Divine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from the multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according to the words, “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him” (Ps. 25:14).

Similar interdictions were issued regarding Ma’aseh Bereshit, which comprises certain mystical topics associated with the Genesis creation account. For example, the Talmud (Chagigah 11b) says:

One may not expound the topic of forbidden sexual relations before three or more individuals; nor may one expound the act of Creation and the secrets of the beginning of the world before two or more individuals; nor may one expound by oneself the Design of the Divine Chariot, a mystical teaching with regard to the ways God conducts the world, unless he is wise and understands most matters on his own.

As a result, Maimonides continues:

Know that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be fully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule, “The Ma‘aseh Bereshith must not be expounded in the presence of two.” If an author were to explain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding them unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these subjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture, speak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form part of its mysteries.

In this fashion, Maimonides claims that some truths of Natural Science and Metaphysics are hidden within his work. What Maimonides meant by this sort of claim has created some debate in modern scholarship.

Maimonides notes that certain passages in the Talmud (Midrash) “appear to be inconsistent with truth and common sense”, but that if

an ill-informed Theologian reads these Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, he will not reject statemtents which involved impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he takes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind…

Maimonides states that the material to come has, in fact, been passed down the generations as part of the religious tradition of Judaism, and does not take credit for coming up with something entirely new. However, what is new is his effort to write these things down, an activity about which he is quite conflicted because of the Talmudic dictum to never discuss these subjects in front of lay people, and to take great care even when discussing them with specialized students. He says that the contents of this book include “topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been treated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings”. He expounds further on this subject in the first few paragraphs of GP.I.71.

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Part 1, Chapter 1

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In chapter 1, Maimonides begins with a discussion of the phrase “Let us make man in our image” from Genesis 1:26, and writes about how the use of the word “image” (Arabic: صورة ; Hebrew: צלם) misleads people into thinking that the Bible describes a corporeal God. In other words, a literal reading of the Torah seems to suggest that God has a body with a face and limbs.

Maimonides is at pains to explain that this literal reading is wrong, not least because it denies the greatness of God. It is in this chapter that he sets out his tripartite skeleton for a theology that is consistent with the Law: that God exists, that he is One, and that he is Incorporeal. In fact, he insists, “there is no real unity without incorporeality”.

The words of the Bible must mean, of course, that man is “similar” to God for some meaning of the word “similar” (with apologies to the author for using a word he would undoubtedly have disapproved of). For Maimonides, the way in which man has been created “in God’s image” is by virtue of his ability to intellect (“إدراك الإنساني” or “إدراك العقلي”). This is what sets man apart from all other living things, and also accounts for why God said “نَعْمَلُ الانْسَانَ عَلَى صُورَتِنَا كَشَبَهِنَا” in Genesis 1.26.

It is interesting to compare Maimonides’ perspective on what “image” means with others.

Radak:

Basically, whether we speak of “the image of G’d,” or of “an angel,” the common denominator is that we speak of disembodied spiritual beings. G’d is distinguished by the fact that none of the other disembodied intelligent beings (angels) amounts to anything at all, seeing none of them can understand their Creator’s essence. This is an axiom, seeing that G’d is the ultimate cause of their existence. He is the Creator, whereas they are merely creatures. This is why Moses added the word אלוקים, when mentioning צלם, to make sure that we get the point that if man is compared to something celestial, he is compared to a creature in the celestial regions, not to the Creator himself.

Rav Kook, writing in For the Perplexed of the Generation:

The foundation of the Torah is that man was created “in the image of God”. The essential meaning of “the image” is the complete freedom we find in man, [which means] that man must have free will.

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Part 1, Chapter 2

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

A questioner once asked Maimonides: How is it that the punishment for Adam’s sin (i.e., eating from the forbidden tree) resulted in the granting to mankind of that unique faculty which gives us precedence (فوقیت) over all other created beings, i.e. the ability to distinguish between good and evil?

… it thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the means of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to which he had not attained previously.

Maimonides uses this question as a starting point to discuss several issues that are of great importance in the GP. His answer to the questioner is that Adam was endowed intellect before the Fall, and so he considers the question misguided at best.

Maimonides explains that when he speaks of intellect as mankind’s great distinction among all of creation, and the faculty which brings us in close connection with God, he is not referring to the faculty of distinguishing right (حسن) from wrong (قبيح) — i.e., morally ‘good’ vs. morally ‘bad’ — but to the faculty of distinguishing true (haqq حق) from false (baatil باطل). He explains the differences between these two axes of distinction by giving the example of the statements “the heavens are spherical” and “the earth is flat”. He says that it is not correct to say that these are “good” and “bad” statements, respectively, but that they are “true” and “false”.

In Maimonides’ account of the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve already had “intellect”: they were endowed with the ability to distinguish the true from the false, but they did not (yet) possess any idea of “right” and “wrong”; not because they were deficient in some way, but for precisely the opposite reason. They had no reason to think that appearing in a state of nakedness is “bad” and that modesty is “good” because those categories did not make sense in that sublime state.

When Adam and Eve transgressed God’s commandment in the Garden, they were in a sense ‘punished’ by being given this additional faculty of distinguishing the “good” and the “bad”, categories that simply did not exist for them before this. For Maimonides, this is the reason why the fall of Adam is a “fall”, a demotion to a lower plane of existence. Because after the fall,

he was wholly absorbed in the study of what is proper and what improper. Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed.

Mankind, in its current fallen state, has no choice but to be embroiled in the perennial thorny questions of “apparent truths” (المشهورات) of the human sort as opposed to “necessary truths” (المعقولات) of the divine sort.

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Part 1, Chapter 3

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This short chapter explains the apparent anthropomorphism in Numbers XII 8: “and the similitude (tavnit תבנית) of the Lord shall he behold”.

Considering the seemingly similar words الشكل (shakl) and الهيئة (hai’at), corresponding to the Hebrew words תמונה (tmunah) and תבנית (tavnit), Maimonides states that the word hai’at (هيئة) is never used in connection with God because the word refers to “the build and construction” of a thing. And the word shakl (شكل) , whose apparent meaning is the sense-perceptible form of an object, also admits (according to Maimonides) the meaning of ‘Form with a capital F’: “the true form of an object, which is perceived only by the intellect”. For Maimonides, this latter meaning is the only appropriate interpretation of Numbers XII 8.

The extant Arabic versions of Numbers XII:8 have the phrase “wa shibha rabbi yu’ayin وَشِبْهَ الرَّبِّ يُعَايِنُ” and do not use the word shakl. It seems that beholding the likeness, shibha (شِبْهَ), of God is much less theologically dangerous than beholding the form/face shakl (شكل) of God. The Arabic text of Numbers XII 8 used by Maimonides appears to have the phrase “و صورة رب يعاين”.

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Part 1, Chapters 4 to 30 & 37 to 45

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Following from the models of chapters 1 and 3, most of the remaining chapters in part I are concerned with resolving the apparent anthropomorphisms in the Bible, or other verses which seem to point toward a corporeal God. For example, chapter 4 is concerned with the various places in the Bible where it seems as if someone “saw” God (e.g., Genesis XVIII 1, Exodus XXIV 10).

Maimonides is extremely thorough in his process of striking down every single anthropomorphism, and exhorts his readers not to confine themselves to those examples he treats explicitly.

When we treat in this work of any homonym, we do not desire you to confine yourself to that which is stated in that particular chapter; but we open for you a portal…

In chapter IX, Maimonides deals with Isaiah LXVI 1, “the heaven is my throne (kursi كرسي) \ and the earth is my foot-stool”. As may be expected, he is at pains to explain that the “throne” is a symbol for the power and dominion of God, and not to be taken literally, but he goes further.

… the throne denotes here the Essence and Greatness of God … these (Essence and Greatness) need not be considered as something separate from God himself or as part of the Creation, so that God would appear to have existed both without the throne and with the throne; such a belief would undoubdtedly be heretical (haza kufr bila shak هذا كفر بلا شك).

In this passage we see the beginnings of Maimonides’ doctrine that God’s attributes are “inseparable from His Being” (جلالة و عظمة التي ليست شيئا خارجا عن ذاته…).

God does not stand, God does not sit, God does not rise, etc…

In chapter XVIII, Maimonides deals with verses such as Psalms CXLV 18 (“The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him”; الرب قريب لكل الذين يدعونه) and Exodus XXIV 2 (“And Moses alone shall come near the Lord”; ويقترب موسى وحده الى الرب) to examine the question about what it means to be “near” or “close to” God.

For Exodus XXIV 2, Maimonides offers two options: either one can inrepret the approach to be a ‘spiritual approach’, or one can interpret it to mean that Moses approached some physical place on the mountain. Guarding against any notion of God having a physical ‘place’ in this world, however, Maimonides is quick to add:

provided you do not lose sight of the truth that there is no difference whether a person stand at the center of the earth or at the highest point of the ninth sphere, if this were possible; he is no further away from God in the one case, or nearer to Him in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a knowledge of Him; while those who reamin ignorant of Him recede from Him.

Thus, Maimonides does believe that there are degrees of closness and separation from God, but these degrees are strictly spiritual or intellectual, and the only axis along which we humans can approach God is along the axis of intellection. Moses, being the chief of the Prophets, came closest to achieving the qurb قرب of God, but this had nothing whatsoever to do with a spatial or physical nearness to God.

When speaking of the impossibility of God possessing motion in Chapter XXVI, Maimonides recalls the Talmudic saying that “The Torah speaks according to the language of man”, and remarks that since most people need tangible, material referrents with which to understand concepts, the Torah often uses figurative language to express the perfection of God; “whatever we regard as a state of perfection is attributed to God”. But according to Maimonides, “in relation to God, what we consdier to be state of perfection is in truth the highest degree of imperfection”. The argument here is that an ordinary person may associate lack of locomotion with ‘imperfection’, and for this reason the Torah, speaking in the language of man, hints at God possessing motion. However,

it has been clearly proved that everything which moves is corporeal and divisible; it will be shown below that God is incorporeal and that He can have no locomotion; nor can reset be ascribed to Him, for rest can only be applied to that which also moves.

Thus, we see Maimonides working slowly but surely toward a decisive statement about God’s incorporeality, but he doesn’t get ahead of himself (“it will be shown below”), and is content with getting there piece by piece, one anthropomorphism at a time.

Later, in chapter XXVIII, he goes a step further and states

the incorpreality of God is a demonstrative truth and an indispensable element in our faith … the primary object of every intelligent person must be to deny the corporeality of God (nafi altajsim ‘an Allah ta’aala نفي التجسيم عن الله تعالى).

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Part 1, Chapters 31 & 32

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides argues that the intellectual faculties of man (idraak al-‘aqli إدراك العقلي) are subject to the same sorts of limitations that our physical faculties are subject to. This is so in two ways:

Just as, for example, one person’s eyesight may be better than another person’s, so one person’s capacity for intellectual perception/understanding may be better than another person’s. There is a variation in different members of the species’ ablity to understand and synthesize ideas.
In addition, there are some limitations on the intellectual abilities of man as a species; these limitations cannot be surpassed by any member of the species, no matter how intellectually accomplished. “A boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mind which it cannot pass”.

Amongst the things which it is not possible for humans to know, there are two types:

those which people do not really possess a desire to know. The paradigmatic example given by Maimonides is the question as to how many stars there are in the heavens and whether their number is even or odd. This is a question which is outside the reaches of human understanding, but no one really cares.
those which people in all societies at all times have shown a desire to know, and have motivated extensive research, study, and debate. This category does not include those questions which can be answered by demonstrative evidence or logical reasoning, “for a proposition which can be proved by evidence is not subject to dispute, denial, or rejection”. According to Maimonides, uncertain questions of this type most commonly occur in Metaphysics, less commonly in Physics, and are “entirely absent from the exact sciences”.

As preparation for the following chapters, Maimonides reminds the reader that there are four pitfalls to be aware of when investigating questions of the second type:

“arrogance and vainglory”
“the subtlety, depth, and difficulty” of the subject
“ignorance and want of capcacity to comprehend what might be comprehended”
“habit and training”.

The first three are attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias and the fourth is added by Maimonides.

Chapter XXXII takes up a discussion about passages in Scripture which appear to circumscribe and limit the sphere of our pursuit of knowledge, e.g., Proverbs XXV 16. Maimonides believes that the appropriate interpretation of these passages is that one should

only attempt things which are within human perception; for the study of things which lie beyond man’s comprehension is extremeley injurious … It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in these utterances to close the gate of investigation entirely, and to prevent the mind from comprehending what is within its reach, as is imagined by simple and idle people…

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Part 1, Chapters 33 & 34

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides warns against beginning one’s philosophical studies with Metaphysics (ilm al-ilahi العلم إلهي), and likens this to feeding an infant with food meant for adults.

He, however, who begins with Metaphysics, will not only become confused in matters of religion, but will fall into complete infidelity. I compare such a person to an infant fed with wheaten bread, meat, and wine; it will undoubtedly die, not because such food is naturally unfit for the human body, but because of the weakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food, and cannot derive benefit from it.

In truth, far from being injurious to the (properly prepared) student, Maimonides considers learning the secrets of metaphysics to be the apotheosis of religious belief, because it puts those beliefs which one initially acquires through Scripture in allegorical language on a firm, scientific foundation; such a person will “have a true notion of those things which he previously received in similes and metaphors”.

he who wishes to attain to human perfection, must therefore first study Logic, next the various branches of Mathematics in their proper order, then Physics, and lastly Metaphysics … all these subjects are connected together; for there is nothing else in existence but God and His works, the latter including all existing things besides Him: we can only obtain a knowledge of Him through His works; His works give evidence of His existence, and show what must be assumed concerning Him.

Chapter 34 gives five reasons why “instruction should not begin with Metaphysics” and it should be limited to a select few.

The difficulty of the subject
The insufficiency (sans proper training) of man’s intellect
The fact that, according to Maimonides, there is a hierarchy of disciplines, and Metaphysics builds upon other subjects, and consequently a student should “first study Logic, then the various branches of Mathematics in their proper order, then Physics and lastly Metaphysics.”
Metaphysics requires a certain temparament and bent of mind, which only comes through years of moral training and uprightness.
Worldy concerns of earning a living distract most people from being able to give the subject the necessary care and attention.

Maimonides views revelation (in the form of the Law given to Moses) as a ‘shortcut’ to arriving at the correct, rigorously supported conclusions of Metaphysics. If everyone had to depend on a careful study of Logic, Mathematics, and Physics before they could embark upon the study of Metaphysics, then clearly only a very few people would have formed correct notions about the nature of God and his relationship with the created world, because not everyone is equipped with the inclination to study Metaphysics. “In such a case most people would die, without having known whether there was a God or not, much less that certain things must be asserted about Him, and other things denied as defects.”

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Part 1, Chapter 35

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Despite the onerous restrictions on the study of Metaphysics to a select class of persons, one must not think that all the correct conclusions of Metaphysics are also to be hidden from the multitude. In fact, some of the conclusions of (properly conducted) Metaphysics are so important that it is not permissible to let people hold incorrect opinions on them! Examples of Metaphysical facts that “must be taught by simple authority” even to ordinary people include:

God’s incorporeality
“His exemption from all affections”
that there is no similiarity between him and his creatures, not just in quantity but in kind.

Maimonides likens the holding of correct opinions on these questions to holding correct opinions about, say, the Existence and Oneness of God:

it is not proper to leave them [those unversed in Metaphysics] in the belief that God is corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of material objects, just as there is no need to leave them in the belief that God does not exist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any other being may be worshipped

There are other, more complex subjects on which Maimonides clearly thinks it is important to hold corect opinions if one wishes to achieve perfection, but that it is not necessary to teach of these to the multitude. These include, for example, the nature of God’s attributes, his will and perception, Divinie Providence, etc.

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Part 1, Chapter 36

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Belief in a corporeal God is held to be as great an error as — or perhaps even greater than — idolatry (shirk, شرك). Maimonides sets up a hierarchy of errors by giving examples of things that are more or less wrong than each other. This hierarchy states that the following are instances of increasing degree of “wrongness”:

to believe that someone is standing when in fact they are sitting
to believe that fire is under the air, or that water is under the earth (i.e., that the 4 elements are ordered differently than they really are), or to believe that the earth is flat
to believe that the sun consists of fire, or to believe that the heavens consist of a hemisphere
to beleive that something besides God is to be worshipped.

Similarly, he states that believing wrong things about God, especially believing that he has a body, is “more wrong” than idolatry and invites God’s wrath to an even greater degree than idolatry does. He is convinced that ignorance or tradition is not an excuse for a religious person to continue to hold such beliefs, the same way that ignorance or tradition is not considered sufficient excuse for believing in a mulitplicity of Gods.

In the process of making his arguments, Maimonides puts forward an interesting perspective on idolatry itself.

You must know that idolaters when worshipping idols do not believe that there is no God besides them: and no idolater ever did assume that any image made of metal, stone, or wood has created the heavens and the earth, and still governs them. Idolatry is founded on the idea that a particular form represents the agent between God and His creatures. … By transferring that prerogative [i.e., that of rites of worship] to other beings, they cause the people, who only notice the rites, without comprehending their meaning or the true character of the being which is worshipped, to renounce their belief in the existence of God.

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Part 1, Chapter 46

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Here, Maimonides explains that “there is a great difference between bringing to view the existence of a thing and demonstrating its essence”. He gives several examples of how it is possible to speak about an entity by referring to its accidents, its properties, or its effects on the external world, and that often this is enough to convince another person that the entity exists. His first few examples are quite mundane, for example, he writes about how one could tell his compatriot about the king of thier country by pointing to physical features of the king, or by describing his entourage, or by describing his demeanour.

The ultimate example that Maimonides gives to differentiate between “bringing to view the existence of a thing” and “demonstrating its essence” is that of someone who proves the existence of a king by pointing to the existence of a functioning society which works only because of the implicit belief in the sanctity of life and property that subjects of the king enjoy. For example,

The fact that this banker here, a weak and little person, stands before this large mass of gold pieces, and that poor man, tall and strong, who stands before him asking in vain for alms of the weight of a carob-grain, is rebuked and is compelled to go away by the mere force of words: for had he not feared the king, he would, without hesitation, have killed the banker, or pushed him away and taken as much of the money as he could.

According to Maimonides, a literal and simplistic reading of the Torah — i.e., the commandments given to “ordinary men” — leads to an understanding of God of this kind. “For it was found necessary to teach all of them that God exists”, but this was “shown to ordinary men by means of similes taken from physical bodies”. Maimonides identifies four qualities of God and four corresponding types of similes that are used to explain these qualities “in the language of man”:

that God is living — using locomotion and its organs such as feet
God’s knowledge — using sense-perception and its organs such as ear, eye, nose
God’s ‘communication’ to his prophets — using speech, and its organs such as mouth and tongue
God’s work — using literal handiwork and its organs such as hand, fingers, and palm.

This typology is accompanied by an extensive bibliography of Biblical anthropomorphisms. But Maimonides waves away the literal interpretation of all of this by stating that these four types of organs — locomotion, sense perception, communication, and organs of work — are needed by living things on Earth in order to sustain, protect, and reproduce themselves. But, says Maimonides,

I do not believe that any man can doubt the correctness of the assertion that the Creater is not in need of anything for the continuance of His existence, or for the improvement of His condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or, what is the same, He is not corporeal; His actions are accomplished by His Essence…

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Part 1, Chapter 49

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The angels are likewise incorporeal: they are intelligences (‘aqool’ عقول) without matter, but they are nevertheless created beings…

Maimonides takes the unequivocal position that all references to angels in the Bible are to be interpreted allegorically; there are no actual beings with wings. How, exactly, does he then make sense of the passages in the Torah which refer to angels? The answer is, once again, the idea that ‘the Torah speaks in the language of man’; i.e., “[it is] difficult … for men to form a notion of anything immaterial, and entirely devoid of corporeality”; therefore, the Bible speaks of angels, e.g., taking on human form and appearing to prophets. It endows angels with a form because for most people, it is difficult to conceive of entities that have no form; most people need the help of the imagination in order to form ideas about things.

The goal, according to Maimonides, is simply to lead people to the belief “that angels exist, are alive and perfect”. The reason why the Bible did not simply say so is that such ideas are liable to be misinterpreted by common people to mean that “their [angels’] true essence [is] the same as the essence of God”. According to Maimonides, there are subtle differences in the kind of (metaphorical) corporeality that is attributed in scripture to angels and the kind of corporeality that is attributed to God, “thereby show[ing] that the existence of God is more perfect than that of angels, as much as man is more perfect than the lower animals.”

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Part 1, Chapter 50

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides emphatically states that strict monotheism requires the denial of essential attributes (al-sifaat al-zaatiya الصفات الذاتية) predicated to God.

to truly hold the conviction that God is One and possesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility in any sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essential attribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and rejection of corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes Those who believe that God is One, and that He has many attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts.

Of the latter kind, he gives the analogy of Christians — explicitly — who say that God is both One and Three at the same time, and of Muslims — implicitly — who say that God is one but then assign to him multiple attributes (the 99 names of God). About both of these theological points of view, Maimonides is respectfully disdainful: “… as if our object were to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief”.

In the process of making these points, Maimonides explains what he means by the term “belief” (al-i’tiqad الاعتقاد), but I won’t go into that for now.

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Part 1, Chapter 51

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides explains to the reader that philosophers (Huseyin Atay’s Arabic has ahl al-ilm أهل العلم) often have to prove things that would be manifestly obvious to people “if man had been left in his primitive state”. But due to the corrupting influence of false notions, it is sometimes necessary to give proofs for these self-evident truths. As an example, he states that Aristotle found it necessary to give a proof even for the existence of motion.

“To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes in reference to God (nafi al-sifaat al-zatiyah ‘an Allah ta’aala نفي الصفات الذاتية عن الله تعالى),” he says. There are two possibilities for attributes:

either it is inherent in the object to which it is ascribed” — in which case, would denote the essence of the object.
- this could either be a tautology, e.g., “man is man”
- or this could be an explanation of a name, e.g., “man is a speaking animal”.
or it is not inherent in the object, in which case it is something different from the object described; in this case it is an accident (‘ard عرض).

According to Maimonides, there is no getting away from the fact that assigning attributes to God means admitting accidents: something “superadded to the essence”. Further, he claims that the logical consequence of considering God to have multiplee attributes is to claim “the existence of many eternal beings”. But his strict monotheism stipulates that

There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or plurality of elements: one from whatever side you view it, and by whatever test you examine it: not divisible into two parts in any way and by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either objectively or subjectively…

The remainder of the chapter is a scathing critique of those who would get out of this conundrum by claiming that “the attributes of God are neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence”. This is a logical impossibility, and Maimonides is scornful of those who wouuld hold this position (presumably in order to justify their belief in attributes): “Such things are only said; they exist only in words, not in thought, much less in reality … Or is there a mean between existence and non-existence, or between the identity and non-identity of two things?”

His diagnosis of why people fall into this rather grave doctrinal error is once again the tendency to literally interpret Scripture, to which people are inclined because their imagination leads them astray. To admit that God is “one simple substance” (the correct theological position) would be to admit the existence of something that no human has ever actually encountered. And because “every existing material thing is necessarily imagined as a certain substance possessing several attributes”, people find it hard to grasp the idea of a truly Indivisible and Unitary God. And since “the torah speaks in the language of Man”, “The adherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy Writ is the source of all this error”.

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Part 1, Chapter 52

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Affirmative attributes can be …

a definition
part of a definition
something different from its true eseence (kharij ‘an haqiqatih خارج عن حقيقته), i.e., a quality. These can be of four kinds:
1. intellectual or moral qualities
2. physical qualities
3. passive qualities or emotions
4. qualities resulting from quantity
express the relation of that object to something else
describe existent actions of the object

For each of these five possibilities, Maimonides painstakingly examines whether or not we can admit attributes of that kind to God. His judgements are:

“it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers who are precise in their statements (Atay has النظار المحصلين), that no definition can be given of God.”
“all agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference to God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we hsould consider His essence to be a compound.
According to Maimonides, qualities of this kind are not admissible for God because “quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be described in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents (mahall al-a’rad محل الأعراض)”. He then examines each of the four kinds of qualities:
1. intellectual or moral qualities: e.g., someone could be described by their profession (e.g., carpenter) or by their characteristics (‘one who shrinks from sin’). These qualities may be great or small, good or bad; Maimonides is not prepared to admit any of them whatsover. Significantly, the example he gives here includes one of the 99 names of God in Islam: “… nor does it make a difference whether we say ‘sin-fearing’ (al-‘afif العفيف) or ‘merciful’ (al-raheem الرحيم)”
2. God is not corporeal, so physical qualities are out of the question.
3. God “is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess any quality resulting from emotion”.
4. God is not a quantity, so he cannot have qualities like ‘long’, ‘short’, ‘large’, ‘small’, etc.
Relational attributes (to time, to space, or to some other entity) seem, at first to be more readily admissable for God than do the preceding attributes, because these “do not necessarily imply plurality or change in the essence of the object described”; Person A could be the father of person B and the friend of person C, and this does not change the unity of person A. However, Maimonides is not willing to admit these sorts of attributes for God, either. “It is quite clear that there is no relation between God and time or space (al-zaman wal-makan الزمان والمكان)”.
- Relation to time is inadmissible because “time is an accident connected with motion”, and he has already established that for God there is no motion, since only material bodies are subject to motion;
- relation to space is inadissible because, again, only material bodies take up space and God is not material. This much is clear without much exposition,
- “but what we have to investigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists between God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could be described? (هل بينه تعالى و بين شيء من مخلوقاته من الجواهر نسبة ما حقيقية فيوصف بها ؟)” Clearly, for Maimonides the important question is whether God admits any description at all, and attributes of the fourth kind seem at first glance to be the most likely candidates for being the basis of a description of God, i.e., perhaps we can describe God using his relationship to the created beings? According to Maimonides, this might seem plausible but the answer is still no; because “God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only possible existence (هو تعالى واجب الوجود و ما سواه ممكن الوجود), as we shall show”. He then gives several examples to explain this point.
  - “it is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to both [i.e., possible/contingent existence]. How, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term existence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion, only by way of pure homonymity”
  - Maimonides sets up a taxonomy of things by using the categories of ‘kind’ and ‘class’, where ‘kind’ is akin to ‘species’ and ‘class’ akin to ‘genus’. He then states that relations are only possible between two things of the same kind, and if two things belong to the same class but different kinds, then no relation is admissible. The example he gives here is when you compare different intensities of two different colors. Both red and green belong to the same class: colour, but they are different kinds of colors. Hence — says Maimonides — we cannot compare ‘the intensity of this red’ with ‘the intensity of that green’.
  - For things that don’t even share a class; it is clear “even to a man of ordinary Intellect” that no relation can exist between “a hundred cubits and the heat of pepper … or between wisdom and sweetness”, etc. “How, then, could there be any relation between God and His creatures, considering the important difference between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all differences”.
As long as by ‘actions’ we mean actions that have been performed, not the capacity for actions, Maimonides believes that the fifth kind of attribute can indeed be admitted for God. When we say, e.g., that person A did action B, this is a kind of ‘attribute’ which leaves the essence of the described thing completely unchanged, and therefore, “is appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator”. He is careful to caution, however, that we must not think that there is a plurality of capacities within God from which he does different types of actions; “on the contrary, all the actions of God emanate from His essence”.

Thus, God does not have a plurality of attributes, or any attributes at all; instead, he has (or rather, performs) a plurality of actions which — despite being multifaceted and varied — follow from his unitary essence.

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Part 1, Chapter 53

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The reason why people believe that God has attributes is — once again — a literal understanding of Scripture. Because “the Torah speaks in the language of man”, it tends to explain the nature of God using terminology that is intelligible to ordinary people. When the Bible describes God as having attributes, it is usually in terms of attributes possessed by living beings encountered by humans in their daily experience, attributes which people naturally assume are ‘proper’ to a great living being.

Maimonides has an analogy for how a unitary essence can give rise to a multiplicity of actions, without the need for (or existence of) multiple attributes: fire. Fire burns, boils, hardens, melts, and blackens, but it would be wrong to assume that fire has several different constituent elements that separately cause each of these effects and are now brought together in fire. Instead, “by virtue of one quality in action, namely, by heat, it produces all these effects.” Similarly, for God, it is not true that “He contains one element by which He knows, another by which He wills, and another by which He exercises power”, etc.

What exactly are the ‘essential attributes’ which people ascribe to God? Maimonides lists four of these: life, power, wisdom, and will. “They believe that these are four different things, and such perfections as cannot possibly be absent from the Creator, and that these cannot be qualifications of His actions” and therefore they believe these are ‘essential attributes’. Maimonides disagrees;

we, who truly believe in the Unity of God (muwahhideen موحدين), declare, that as we do not believe that some element is included in His essence by which He created the heavens, another by which He created the elements, a third by which he created the ideals, in the same way we reject the idea that His essence contains an element by which He has power, another element by which He has will, and a third by which He has knowledge of His creatures. On the contrary, he is a simple essence (ذاته واحدة بسيطة), without any additional element whatever.

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Part 1, Chapter 54

knowledge of God, Moses' conversation with God

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Knowing God, of course, is very important in Maimonides’ schema.

“Not only is he acceptable and welcome to God who fasts and prays (صام و صلى), but everyone who knows Him (بل كل من عرفه). … The pleasure and displeasure of God, the approach to Him and the withdrawal from Him are proportional to the amount of man’s knowledge or ignorance concerning the Creator.

To know something is to know its attributes, and God’s attributes are nothing but his actions, his tariqa طريقة, according to Maimonides. He finds support for this position in the story of Moses’ conversation with God. Moses asked God to ‘show me now thy way (tariqak طريقك), that I may know thee’ (Exodus XXXIII.13), which — according to Maimonides — is evidence that Moses knew that “God is known by His attributes, for Moses believed that he knew Him, when he was shown the way of God”.

God’s reply to this was “I will make all My goodness pass before you”. ‘all my Goodness’ is the word “kul-tubi כל־טובי” in Hebrew, which uses the same word as Genesis I.10 “And God saw that it was good tuv טוב). Thus, Maimonides seems to interpret the question-and-answer between Moses and God to mean that

God is known by his ways, and
God’s ways, i.e., his actions, are the works of this world: the stuff of creation.

Maimonides says that “God promised to make him comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each other, and the way they are governed by God … The knowledge of the works of God is the knolwedge of his attributes”.

Another topic which Maimonides discusses in this chapter is the affects of God; Scripture very often refers to God’s mercy, anger, jealosy, or various other emotions. Needless to say, Maimonides is not willing to accept that God actually has any human-like emotions; he believes that

whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe to God that emotion which is the source of the act when performed by ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from the verb expressing that emotion.

There is also some discussion of providence in this chapter.

God creates and guides beings who have no claim upon Him to be created and guided by Him; He is therefore called gracious. His actions towards mankind also include great calamities, which overtake individuals and bring death to them, or affect whole families and even entire regions, spread death, destroy generation after generation, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occur inundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of one nation against the other for the sake of destroying it with the sword and blotting out its memory, and many other evils of the same kind.

He hints that these actions are not actually the result of various emotions experienced by God, but follow from God’s essence; he hints that a just ruler should act similarly in relation to his subjects:

At times and towards some persons he must be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of mercy and compassion, but according to their merits: at other times and towards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath in proportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion

Although a concrete example was given regarding a hypothetical ruler, Maimonides ends the chapter by stating that the objectives of an ordinary person should be similar:

… for the chief aim of man should be to make himself, as far as possible, similar to God: that is to say, to make his acts similar to the acts of God

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Part 1, Chapter 55

importance of proof

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The following have to be negatively “demonstrated by proof” with reference to God:

corporeality: for reasons already elaborated
passiveness: because if God could be the recipient of any actions, then another being would exist that could act on Him
potentiality: because “potentiality always implies non-existence (كل قوة يقارنها عدم ضرورة)”
similarity to any existing being

For demonstrating all these points, Maimonides says that “our knowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural Science”, which helps us understand, for example, “the non-existence implied in all potentiality”, and other such fine points which necessitate negating all four of these for God.

He who knows these things, but without their proofs, does not know the details which logically result from these general propositions: and therefore he cannot prove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned above are inadmissible in reference to God

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Part 1, Chapter 56

denial of attributes

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides explains why it is wrong to believe that God has essential attributes (al-sifaat al-zaatiya الصفات الذاتية).

There are two related concepts: ‘similarity’ (shibhiya شبهية) and ‘relation’ (nisbat نسبة). There can only be a similarity between two things if there is some relation between them; and “since the existence of a relation between God and man, or between Him and other beings has been denied, similarity must likewise be denied”. Maimonides’ concept of similarity is quite wide: he gives the example of ‘a grain of mustard’ and ‘the sphere of the fixed stars’: both are similar in the sense that they both share an essential property, i.e., “the property of having dimensions”.

Even if we keep such a wide latitude for the idea of ‘similarity’, however, we cannot admit in God the ‘essential attributes’ of Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will if by these terms we mean a ‘more perfect version’ of these qualities compared to the life, power, wisdom, or will of human beings. Maimonides says that those who believe in essential attributes of God practically believe exactly this: that “His existence is only more stable, His life more permanent, His power greater, His wisdom more perfect, and His will more general than ours, and that the same definition applies to both”; nothing could be further from the truth, according to Maimonides, because these terms when applied to God have no relation whatsoever to the terms as used for human beings.

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Part 1, Chapter 57

denial of attributes

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In general, existence is an attribute of things, and is not part of their essence; this is true for all those beings which have a cause outside themselves. However, God — who is existence qua existence, i.e., whose existence is identical to his essence — does not possess the attribute of existence (the way you or I possess this attribute); instead, he simply “is”.

Thus, God ‘exists’ without having the attribute of existence. In a similar vein, Maimonides posits, God:

lives without having the attribute of life
knows, without having the attribute of knowledge
is omnipotent without having the attribute of omnipotence
is wise without having the attribute of wisdom

because of the common underlying principle that God cannot have any plurality, or any elements ‘supperadded to his essence’.

In a similar vein, Maimonides argues that even the ‘attribute’ of Unity is not proper to God: “the accident of unity is as inadmissible as the accident of plurality”, and consequently God is “One without possessing the attribute of unity”. At this point, Maimonides concedes that language itself breaks down and is unable to express the idea he is trying to convey.

It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in any language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject, and we can only employ inadequate language. In our endeavour to show that God does not include a plurality, we can only say “He is one,” although “one” and “many” are both terms which serve to distinguish quantity.

Similarly, the attribute of ‘First and Last’ employed for God is inadmissible for Maimonides because strictly speaking these are attributes which describe a being subject to time; and since God is not subject to time, these terms are “as metaphorical as the expressions ‘ear’ and ‘eye’.”

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Part 1, Chapter 58

negative attributes

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Know that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism (shirk شرك), and are inadequate …

Maimonides acknowledges that negative attributes are similar to positive attributes in the sense that “they necessarily circumscribe the object to some extent”. However, he argues that they are different from positive attributes because “the positive attributes … describe a portion of what we desire to know: either some part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative attributes do not tell us what the essence of something is, except indirectly”.

Attributes are the means by which we grasp the essence of something. But since God doesn’t have an essence the way other things do — his essence is identical with his existence — he cannot have any positive attributes. For other things, ‘existence’ is an attribute superadded to their essence; but for the entity that is existence per se, the question of an essence to which attributes are added does not arise at all. Still less does God have a compound essence which could have been made up of constituent elements; and even less is it possible for God to be the locus of accidents. In other words, God is neither mahall al-araad (the locus of accidents محل الأعراض) nor mahall al-ausaf (the locus of attributes محل الأوصاف).

The negative attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other, they convey to man the highest possible knowledge of God.

The knowledge of God can therefore be approached through a process of step-by-step elimination;

there is an entity which cannot not exist, i.e., it necessarily exists (this is the Avicennan formula for proving the existence of God, in which a Necessary Being causes existence in other, possible beings)
this being is not like the four elements of sublunary matter (earth, air, fire, water); “we therefore say that it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead”
this being is not like the stuff of the heavens, either (which in the mediaeval worldview were living, material beings) and so we say it is incorporeal
this being is not like the intellect (al-aql العقل, which in the mediaeval worldview was considered living and immaterial) because unlike the intellect this being does not owe its existence to any cause, and so we call it the first (qadim قديم)
we notice that this entity’s process of causing-being is not like heating process of fire or the illuminating process of the sun; thus, we learn that God is potent, knolwedgeable, and willful (qadir, ‘alim, murid قادر و عالم و مريد), by which we mean that he is not feeble, ignorant, hasty or careless (laysa bi’aajiz wa la jahil wa la zahil wa la muhmil ليس بعاجز و لا جاهل و لا ذاهل و لا مهمل). For each of these negative attributes, Maimonides shows how it leads to specific knolwedge about God.

Maimonides ends this chapter with praise of God in which he starts out with a metaphor:

[God’s] relation to the universe is that of a steersman to a boat;

but he then corrects himself, and adds:

and even this is not a real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea that God rules the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and preserves its necessary arrangement.

He concedes that, in fact, we can actually say very little about God at all; acknowledging the insufficient-ness of language to truly describe God, he writes:

Praised be He, in whose essence’s contemplation our comprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge proves to be ignorance; and in the endeavor to extol him with attributes, all our attempts at eloquent speech are mere weakness and discounting!

فسبحان من إذا لا حظت العقول ذاته عاد إدراكها تقصيرا و إذا لحظت لزوم أفعاله عن إرادته عاد علمها جهلا و إذا رامت الألسن تعظيمه بأوصاف عادت كل بلاغته عيا و تقصيرا

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Part 1, Chapter 59

impossibility of grasping essence of God

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God (حقيقة ذاته), and … the only thing that man can apprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positive attributes are inadmissible

some discussion of how knolwedge of God can still be progressively approached; “by each additional negative attribute you advance toward the knolwedge of God, and you are nearer to it than he who does not negative [it]”
affirming positive attributes to God goes wrong on two accounts: 1) any positive attribute that we can imagine and wish to ascribe to God is only a perfection in relation to us; 2) God is pure existence, and does not possess anything superadded to his essence

[since] negations do not convey a true idea of the being to which they refer, all people, both of past and present generations, delcared that God cannot be the object of human comprehension, that none but Himself comprehends what He is, and that our knolwedge consists in knowing that we are unable truly to comprehend Him

This is why the best course of action is silence: Psalms LXV.2 “Silence is praise to Thee”, since any praise uttered by human beings will necessarily be inadequate and inappropriate for God, who is above all description.

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Part 1, Chapter 60

denial of positive attributes

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides mounts his strongest attack agains the notion that God has attributes.

I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God has not sufficient knowledge concerning the Creator, admits some association with God, or conceives Him to be different from what He is: but I say that he unconsciously loses his belief in God.

This is because the error is not one of degree but of kind; it’s not like the error one makes if one describes an ordinary object by one attribute (correctly) but does not know its other attributes. Instead, it is like one who ascribes a category to the wrong kind of subject, e.g.

he … who says that taste belongs to the category of quantity has not, according to my opinion, an incorrect notion of taste, but is entirely ignorant of its nature, for he does not know to what object the term “taste” is to be applied

Maimonides’ examples get even more inventive. Suppose that someone did not know what an elephant was, and another person

who is either misled or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg, three wings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a transparent body: its face is wide like that of a man, has the same form and shape, speaks like a man, flies sometimes in the air, and sometimes swims like a fish. I should not say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, or that he has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I would say that the thing thus described is an invention and fiction, and that in reality there exists nothing like it: it is a non-existing being, called by the name of a really existing being … like the griffin [or] the centaur.

A God partially described by a set of positive attributes is “a mere fiction and invention”.

If such a simple, absolutely existing essence were said to have attributes, as has been contended, and were combined with extraneous elements, it would in no way be an existing thing, as has been proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which is called “God,” is a substance with many properties by which it can be described, we apply that name to an object which does not at all exist.

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Part 1, Chapter 61-63

names of God

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In the Hebrew scriptures, many names are ascribed to God, which could be seen as attributes. However, Maimonides believes that all these names describe actions of God. The only name of God which actually attempts to describe the ‘essence’ of God — such as it is — is the Tetragrammaton YHWH. He speculates that in the Hebrew language “of which we have now but a slight knolwedge”, the name may have signified something along the lines of “absolute existence” with no other signification. This might explain the sacredness of the name, which of course cannot be pronounced except in the Holy of Holies in the Temple.

In ordinary language, we have no good way of referring to God in his capacity as existence qua existence; instead, we make do with attributive names because ordinary people find it difficult to conceive of something without attributes.

Maimonides seems to link the many legends associated with the name of God — e.g., that the ancient sages knew its pronunciation, and transmitted it across the generations by teaching it to a distinguished disciple every seven years, or that there was an additional twelve-letter name and forty-two-letter phrase in addition to YHWH — to the idea that in the present day, most people are unaware of the true knolwedge of God that is contained in this name. This true knolwedge consists in the fact that God is pure and simple existence, and not a substratum of attributes. Thus, the knowledge that has been lost — the pronunciation of YHWH and the identity of the 12 or 42 letters — is not just some letters but Metaphysics itself: the “secrets of the Law”.

This understanding of the nature of God’s name ties well with the story of Moses’ conversation with God, in which God replied to Moses’ question about his name with the phrase Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh”, I am that I am (Exodus III.14). This phrase is rendered in Hussein Atay’s Arabic edition as ana hua al-ka’in أنا هو الكائن, but in modern translations of the Old Testament it appears usually as ahyah allazi ahyah ‘أهيه الذي أهيه’ which is closer to the original Hebrew.

Maimonides’ explanation for this name elaborates an Avicennan conception of God: God is pure existence, existence-as-subject and existence-as-predicate. The structure of the sentence uttered by God contained within it an intelligible ‘proof’ or demonstration of the nature of God. This sentence

is, therefore, the expression of the idea that God exists, but not in the ordinary sense of the term; or, in other words, He is “the existing Being which is the existing Being,” that is to say, the Being whose existence is absolute (al-wajib al-wujud الواجب الوجود ). The proof which he was to give consisted in demonstrating that there is a Being of absolute existence, that has never been and never will be without existence (لم يعدم ولا يعدم) … God thus showed Moses the proofs by which His existence would be firmly established among the wise men of His people

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Part 1, Chapter 65-67

anthropomorphisms, creation

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides returns to the theme of explaining away the parts of Scripture that seem to describe a God inconsistent with correct Metaphysics. In chapter 65 he wades into the ‘createdness of the Qur’an debate’, where he stands firmly on the side of ‘the word of God is created’. Since God does not have any attributes superadded to his essence, he cannot have the attribute of speech, either; this is why, he says, “our people generally believe that the Law, i.e., the word asribed to him, was created” (anna al-taurata makhluqah أن التوراة مخلوقه). Thus, any references to the ‘speech’ of God should not be taken to mean that God actually speaks, but rather that God ‘thinks’ or ‘wills’; even with regard to the speech of God to Moses on Mount Sinai, Maimonides insists that we must understand these things figuratively.

In these chapters, Maimonides makes a passing remark about the process of creation when he is dealing with the reference in the Bible to ‘God rested on the seventh day’. The Universe works according to definite rules, but the act of Creation must have involved an entirely different set of rules. Thus,

while on each of the six days events took place contrary to the natural laws now in operation throughout the Universe, on the seventh day the Universe was merely upheld and left in the condition in which it continues to exist.

This is because Maimonides identifies the Hebrew word used for God’s action on the seventh day ( וישבת) with something like “to leave off speaking”. Thus, while God was actively involved — through his ‘Word’ — in the creation process in the first six days, on the seventh day, he ceased speaking. He seems to indicate that this goes against the grain of “Our Sages’” explanation, who prefer the term to mean that God “gave rest to the world” on the seventh day, but gives a detailed philological argument as to why his own interpretation is more appropriate.

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Part 1, Chapter 68

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides explains how and why God is “the intellectus, ens intelligens, and ens intelligible” (al-‘aql wa al-‘aqil wa al-ma’qul العقل والعاقل والمعقول). His reasoning goes like this

Comprehension, for us, first exists in potentia; we have the ability to comprehend the idea of an object before we actually comprehend it. At this point, the three — (1) the comprehender (to the extent that he or she is a thinking being), (2) the power of comprehension, and (3) the idea of a tree — are undoubtedly distinct
When comprehension moves from being in a state of potentiality to actuality, i.e., when we actually comprehend the idea of a tree, these three become one; this process is not particular to God, but according to Maimonides is the very nature of intellect. Thus, when (and to the extent that) the intellect is in action, it is identical with the ens intelligens and the ens intelligible.
God is never in a state of potentiality:

Now, it has been proved that God is an intellect which always is in action, and that — as has been stated, and as will be proved hereafter — there is in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at one time, and is without comprehension at another time, but He comprehends constantly; consequently, He and the things comprehended are one and the same thing, that is to say, His essence … God is therefore always the intellectus, the intelligens, and the intelligible.

This quality, of course is peculiar to God; ordinary intellects such as those belonging to humans do not constantly comprehend ideas, but instead are always moving between potential comprehension and actual comprehension.

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Part 1, Chapter 69

relationship between God and the world

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides explains in this chapter that there is disagreement between the philosophers and the mutakallemin about whether God is the First Cause (al-‘illat al-ula or al-sabab al-awwal) — as the philosophers maintain — or the Agent (al-fa’il) as the mutakallemin call him. The latter prefer to call God an Agent rather than a Cause because they believe that

the coexistence of the Cause with that which was produced by that Cause would necessarily be implied: this again would involve the belief that the Universe was eternal, and that it was inseparable from God. When, however, we say that God is the Agent, the co-existence of the Agent with its product is not implied: for the agent can exist anterior to its product.

However, despite Maimonides’ sympathies with the theological aims of the practioners of kalam, he considers their arguments quite lacking; a philosophically grounded person,

however, should know that in this case there is no difference whether you employ the term “cause” or “agens”; for if you take the term ‘cause’ in the sense of a mere potentiality, it precedes its effect; but if you mean the cause in action, then the effect must necessarily co-exist with the cause in action. The same is the case with the agens; take it as an agens in reality, the work must necessarily co-exist with its agens. For the builder, before he builds the house, is not in reality a builder, but has the faculty for building a house-in the same way as the materials for the house before it is being built are merely in potentiâ–but when the house has been built, he is the builder in reality, and his product must likewise be in actual existence. Nothing is therefore gained by choosing the term ‘agens’ and rejecting the term ‘cause.’

Knowing that the two terms al-fa’il and al-sabab are both equally appropriate at first glance, why do the philosophers — and Maimonides seems to agree with them — prefer to call him the Cause rather than the Agent? The answer lies in Aristotelean physics. Everything, according to Aristotle, has a ‘cause’ in four different senses of the word ‘cause’:

substance or material cause
form or formal cause
agent or efficient cause
purpose or final cause

If the Universe is considered as a single ‘organism’ or being (see GP.I.72), then for the Universe as a whole, God is “the agens, the form, and the final cause of the Universe”.

This chapter expounds one of Maimonides’ key themes, that of emanation or overflow (Arabic faid فيض and translated by Samuel ibn Tibbon into Hebrew as shefa’ שפע which seems cognate with Arabic sh-f-‘a).

it is through the existence of God that all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence by that process which is called emanation, as will be explained in one of the chapters of the present work. If God did not exist, suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist, and there would be an end to the existence of the distant causes, the final effects, and the intermediate causes.

In addition, God is also the cause for everything that happens in the Universe; every event has a cause, and the cause has a cause, and so on until we reach the First Cause which is God. The idea of a ‘chain of causes’, in Maimonides’ system, works for each of the last three types of causes. For any existing thing or event, its ‘form’ itself has a form, which has a form, and so on until we reach God who is the “form of all forms”. Similarly, each event has an agent, and the agent has an agent, and so on until we get to God as the first Agent. If we inquire after the ‘final cause’ or ‘purpose’ of things, according to Maimonides, we will once again find a chain of causes or purposes, but eventually the final answer will either be “because it is the will (mashiyyat مشيت) of God” or “because it is the wisdom (hikmat حکمت) of God”. Which of these is more correct will be dealt with later in the Guide.

Commentary

It would seem from the discussion about Agent vs Cause that God does not pre-exist the Universe since “there is in Him at no time a mere potentiality” (GP.I.68); and for an Agent or a Cause to pre-exist the Universe, it would have to have existed in a state of potential agent-ness or potential cause-ness. Maimonides hints to the reader that his words seem to be leading in this direction because right at the point where this thought would occur to a reader, he says:

You need not trouble yourself now with the question whether the universe has been created by God, or whether, as the philosophers have assumed, it is eternal, co-existing with Him. You will find [in the pages of this treatise] full and instructive information on the subject.
It is curious that of the four causes of Aristotle, Maimonides would explain in great detail how God is the ultimate cause of all things from the point of view of 3 out of the 4 causes, but remain entirely silent about the first item on that list: the material cause. Is God also the material cause of the universe, i.e., the ‘substance’ that ultimately gives rise to all substances? It is unclear on what grounds Maimonides excluded it without explanation; perhaps he considered it self-evident that God is not the substantial cause of things.
This chapter shows the careful synthesis of an Aristotelean God (the first cause, the intellect, the Prime Mover of the Universe) with a Neoplatonist God (pure being, whose emanation/overflow brings about the existence of the universe in a continuing process). Maimonides would have received the latter from `the Theology of Aristotle’, a work which was actually written by Plotinus and misattributed to Aristotle for centuries.

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Part 1, Chapter 70

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides returns to the earlier theme of explaining expressions in Scripture that seem to imply a corporeal God. This time, he is explaining the verb “to ride” (rakaba) when it has been used for God, e.g., “who rideth (rokeb) upon the heaven in thy help” (raakib al-samaa’ li-nusratik) (Deuteronomy XXXIII.26)

After a long-winded explanation, Maimoindes says that in this passage from Deuteronomy, the phrase

“who rideth upon heaven” means “who sets the all-surrounding sphere (al-falak al-a’laa) in motion, and turns it by His power and will” … through the motion of the uppermost sphere in its daily circuit, all the spheres move, participating as parts in the motion of the whole.

Thus, God’s role in the Universe is in the form of raakib al-samaawaat, the entity that ‘rides’ on the outermost sphere and sets it in motion.

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Part 1, Chapter 71

attack on kalam, creatio ex nihilo

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides prefaces this chapter with a comment (which was alluded to in the Introduction) about the fact that metaphysical knowledge — which he terms part of “the secrets of the Law” — were deliberately not written down by the ancient Sages of the religion. This principle, Maimonides said, was appropriate for matters of Law because it avoided problems like

great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written words, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new sects

but when it came to metaphysics, Maimonides considers this reluctance to write things down to have been unfortunate. Because of it,

our nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing but a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the Midrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk, that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that it encloses a kernel.

In this chapter, Maimonides mounts a strong criticism on the practice of kalam. His main criticism is that the practitioners of kalam — in their zeal to defend faith against philosophy — get ahead of themselves and use incomplete proofs. At one point, he says that they

did not investigate the real properties of things: first of all they considered what must be the properties of the things which should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the identical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they either supported or refuted a certain opinion.

His response to this is a sober philospher’s response:

I tell you, however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that the properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.

He later says disparagingly:

the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their propositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of future generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books have been written

He also takes issue with the way that mutakallemin weigh in on the debate about the eternity of the world. He says that

they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and establish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have been employed which have never been proved.

He is sympathetic to the theological need for creatio ex nihilo, but because the debate has been raging “for the last three thousand years”, he believes that the best which can be hoped for is

to expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has accomplished a great deed!

Thus, Maimonides reveals where his sympathies lie, but he strongly believes that one cannot base a philosophical defense of religion on an unproven premise (i.e., that of creatio ex nihilo). He proposes, instead, to prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God under the assumption that the Universe is eternal — not because he believes this to be the case, but because he thinks that it is important for a proof for God’s existence be admissible to all: both those who believe in Creation and those who believe in the Eternity of the Universe.

The Universe is either eternal or it had a beginning
- “if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense”
- “If on the other hand the Universe were eternal, it could in various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and immutable. That being is God”

Only with this rigorous process does he believe that a proof for the existence of God is truly complete. Maimonides is at pains to explain that he himself does not believe in the Eternity of the Universe; he merely accepts that position for the sake of argument in order to build an airtight proof for the existence of God. After all, if the Universe had a beginning — so his logic goes — it would be trivial to prove that God exists. At this moment, he does not actually weigh in on whether the universe is eternal or created; he simply admits that this question has been the subject of philosophical debate and that not all scientifically-minded people are fully convinced by either side.

When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a special chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the same end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view [i.e., the correctness of creatio ex nihilo], yet I shall not contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct.

A proof is necessary because

nothing exists except God and this universe, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but this universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently the universe must be examined as it is: the propositions must be derived from those properties of the universe which are clearly perceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature. Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a being not included therein

Commentary

In this chapter, Maimonides sets out, perhaps for the first time in the Guide, his unadulterated commitment to a rational, logically-consistent understanding of the Universe even if it leads him on a collision course with the literal reading of Scripture. For most religious people in his milieu, the doctrine of the Eternity of the Universe must have been anathema (as it certainly was to al-Ghazali) and a non-starter. But Maimonides believes that for our understanding of God has to start from “the real properties of things”, not from the revealed texts of Scripture.

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Part 1, Chapter 72

cosmology

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter sets out Maimonides’ cosmology. This is a heavily Aristotelean system, and sounds jarring to the modern ear. This chapter summary is incomplete…

this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else but one individual being: that is to say, the outermost heavenly sphere, together with all included therein, is as regards individuality beyond all question a single being like Said and Omar

The structure of the Universe is as follows:

there is an outermost heavenly sphere, which forms the outer limit of the Universe and which contains everything that is not God
there are spheres “enclosed within another so that no intermediate empty space, no vacuum, is left”
each sphere rotates at a constant speed, but the various spheres have different speeds; the “outermost, all-encompassing sphere, revolves with the greatest speed; it completes its revolution in one day, and causes everything to participate in its motion”
the spheres are not concentric; some of them share a center with the center of the universe, while others do not.
stars and other heavenly bodies are ‘embedded’ into the spheres.
there are at least 18 spheres, and possibly more; “this is a matter for further investigation”
some things about the four elements and their natures.

This cosmology works together in harmony through a special force:

There also exists in the Universe a certain force which controls the whole, which sets in motion the chief and principal parts, and gives them the motive power for governing the rest. Without that force, the existence of this sphere, with its principal and secondary parts, would be impossible. It is the source of the existence of the Universe in all its parts. That force is God: blessed be His name!

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Part 1, Chapter 73-76

attack on kalam

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

These chapters set out the philosophical premises of kalam, and explain in detail why those arguments are not successful according to Maimonides. We will skip over this.

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Part 2

Part 2, Introduction to Part II

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides sets out 25 propositions common to Peripatetic philosphers; he acceps all of these. There is also a proposition 26, “Time and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence” — which Maimonides accepts for the sake of argument.

It is Maimonides’ belief that this last proposition was never conclusively proven by Aristotle, and that the First Teacher merely considerred it to be the “most probable and acceptable proposition”. He believes that it is the followers of Aristotle who have morphed his tentative assertion into an incontrovertible statement of truth. What Maimonides is willing to admit is that

his proposition is admissible, but neither demonstrative, as the commentators of Aristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible, as the Mutakallemim say.

Part 2, Chapter 1-3

disambiguate the introduction to part 2 from this

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Here, Maimonides sets out the philosophers’ proof for the existence of God. At the end of this, he declares:

If the spheres are transient, then God is their Creator: for if anything comes into existence after a period of non-existence, it is self-evident that an agent exists which has effected this result. It would be absurd to contend that the thing itself effected it. If, on the other hand, the heavenly spheres be eternal, with a regular perpetual motion, the cause of this perpetual motion, according to the Propositions enumerated in the Introduction, must be something that is neither a body, nor a force residing in a body, and that is god, praised be His name! (هو الالاه جل أسمه)

Part 2, Chapter 4-5

intelligences and spheres

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The four elements which comprise matter in the sublunary sphere follow rectilinear motion, which follows from a “natural property”; on the other hand, the ‘fifth element’ which makes up the heavenly spheres follows perfect circular motion, and this is due to a “soul”. Maimonides is at pains to explain that those who dispute the assertion that the heavenly spheres are endowed with souls

wrongly assume that when we ascribe a soul to the heavenly spheres we mean something like the soul of man, or that of an ass, or ox. We merely intend to say that the locomotion of the sphere undoubtedly leads us to assume some inherent principle by which it moves; and this principle is certainly a soul.

Maimonides explains further that animate beings move “either by instinct or by reason”; under ‘instinct’ he files all motion which is in response to the fulfillment of needs or the avoidance of harm; since the heavens move continuously and keep arriving at the same point over and over again, their motion must be due to reason and not instinct.

The circular motion of the sphere is consequently due to the action of some idea which produces this particular kind of motion; but as ideas are only possible in intellectual beings, the heavenly sphere is an intellectual being

That idea is God; thus, the motion of the spheres is essentially the motion of an intellectual being which seeks to achieve ‘closeness’ to God by way of its circular motion (see, for example, Ibn Tufail) — perfect, ceaseless, circular, constant — and it is in this sense that God ‘moves’ the spheres; he is the ideal which is comprehended by the soul which animates the spheres.

the heavenly sphere must have a desire for the ideal which it has comprehended, and that ideal, for which it has a desire, is God, exalted be His name! When we say that God moves the spheres, we mean it in the following sense: the spheres have a desire to become similar to the ideal comprehended by them. This ideal, however, is simple in the strictest sense of the word, … whilst the spheres are corporeal: the latter can therefore not be like this ideal in any other way, except in the production of circular motion: for this is the only action of corporeal beings that can be perpetual; it is the most simple motion of a body; there is no change in the essence of the sphere, nor in the beneficial results of its motion

Although the heavenly spheres themselves are corporeal beings, with a material existence, they are each associated with an Intelligence; these are

purely spiritual beings, which do not reside in corporeal objects, and which derive existence from God (كلها فائضة عن الله تعالى); and these form the intermediate element between God and this material world (هي الوسائط بين الله و بين هذه الأجسام كلها).

When Scripture speaks of the heavens praising and glorifying God — the example he gives is Psalms XIX 2: “The heavens declare the glory of God” — Maimonides asserts that “it is a great error to think that this is a mere figure of speech”; the heavens are not inanimate like the four elements of the sublunary world, but are intellectual beings (dhi ‘aql ذي عقل) which literally glorify God with their actions, perhaps consciously. When the heavenly spheres ‘praise God’, it is not really any different from a human being doing the same thing with spoken words, because when we do this, the real praise is in the form of an idea whereas the spoken words are just a vehicle for those ideas.

Part 2, Chapter 6-7

angels

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides identifies the angels of the Abrahamic tradition with the Aristotelean Intelligences.

Aristotle’s theory is that the Intelligences are intermediate beings between the Prime Cause and existing things, and that they effect the motion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things depends. This is also the view we meet with in all parts of Scripture: every act of God is described as being performed by angels.

‘Angels’ are the name given to that immaterial entity which forms the intermediary between God and the material world.

God, as it were, “contemplates the world of ideals, and thus produces the existing beings”.

This ‘contemplation’ is what is meant when Scripture appears to refer to God ‘confering with the angels’; after all, God could not actually be in need of advice or help from beings whom he has himself created. Maimonides explains that there is a ‘simplistic’ way to understand the nature of angels (which one is tempted toward if a purely literal understanding of Biblical terms is pusrsued) and a more philosophical way.

Say to a person who is believed to belong to the wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the womb of a woman and to form there the fœtus, he will be satisfied with the account; he will believe it, and even find in it a description of the greatness of God’s might and wisdom; although he believes that the angel consists of burning fire, and is as big as a third part of the Universe, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell him that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes the limbs, and that this power is called “angel,” or that all forms are the result of the influence of the Active Intellect, and that the latter is the angel, the Prince of the world, frequently mentioned by our Sages, and he will turn away; because he cannot comprehend the true greatness and power of creating forces that act in a body without being perceived by our senses.

Thus, the imperceptible, immaterial ‘forces’ which reside in certain bodies — in the above example, the ‘force’ that resides in human gametes, endowing their combined product with life, causing it to multiply and form into the shape of a human — are identical to what the Abrahamic religions mean by ‘angels’. Clearly, for Maimonides, the description of angels as ‘made from fire (or light)’ and ‘as big as a third of the universe’ are simply figurative expressions that are meant to induce awe, not actual descriptions of the angels.

Maimonides clarifies in GP II.7 that we should not think of the ‘forces’ associated with angels to be the ordinary forces of nature (القوى الجسمانية هي طبيعية); the angels have ‘free will’ (albeit of a different kind than we have) and consciously act; the motion of earth downward or of fire upward, however, is not a conscious force and simply follows from the laws of nature.

Part 2, Chapter 9-10

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides makes some remarks on the Aristotelean astronomical system. There are some ‘open questions’, e.g.:

How many ‘spheres’ are there? Like a good scientist, Maimonides is not very concerned about whether Aristotle himself was correct about the exact number of spheres; if one counts nine, then a great number of heavenly bodies are assigned to one sphere (plus seven individual ones for the sun, the moon, and the five classical planets). Under the same principle, one could consider the universe to have, say, two spheres — apparently, Deuteronomy 10:14 was believed to lend itself to such an interpretation — by ‘rolling up’ multiple heavenly bodies into the same sphere.
It was not known whether Mercury and Venus are ‘above’ the sun (in a geocentric frame of reference) or below it; Maimonides discusses the views of different astronomers on this question at great length. Maimonides seems to prefer the former view.

The astronomical system thus looks like this:

the moon
the sun
the five planets in succession, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn
the fixed stars.

Grouped in this way, the sky therefore consists of four ‘spheres’. Maimonides links these four spheres to the sublunary world; all the heavenly spheres affect the sublunary world, but each has a particular affinity with, and is the cause for the motion of, one of the four elements:

the moon is related to water, as is evident from the tides;
the sun is related to fire, as is evendient from its heating effect;
the planets are related to air, since they “move in many and different courses with retrogressions, progressions, and stations, and therefore produce the various forms of the air with its frequent changes”
the fixed stars are related to earth; Maimonides finds some support for this in Jewish writings.

Continuing the theme of ‘four’, Maimonides goes on to articulate that each ‘sphere’ is associated with 4 properties, or “the four causes of the motion of the sphere”:

its spherical shape; this is necessary for the heavens’ motion to be continuous and ‘eternal’.
its soul; “for only animate beings can move freely”
its intellect;
the Intelligence which it aims to imitate

the last two are necessitated because:

There must be some cause for the motion, and as it does not consist in the fear of that which is injurious, or the desire of that which is profitable, it must be found in the notion which the spheres form of a certain being, and in the desire to approach that being. This formation of a notion demands, in the first place, that the spheres possess intellect; it demands further that something exists which corresponds to that notion, and which the spheres desire to approach

The spheres are associated with four “principal forces”:

the nature of minerals, jamadat جمادات
the nature of plants, nabatat نباتات
the nature of animals, hayawanat حیوانات
the intellect

These ‘natural forces’, as Maimonides describes them, are what perpetuate life, both as species and as individual elements of species.

These are also the functions ascribed to Nature, which is said to be wise, to govern the Universe, to provide, as it were, by plan for the production of living beings, and to provide also for their preservation and perpetuation. Nature creates formative faculties, which are the cause of the production of living beings, and nutritive faculties as the source of their temporal existence and preservation. It may be that by Nature the Divine Will is meant, which is the origin of these two kinds of faculties through the medium of the spheres.

Part 2, Chapter 11

Occam's Razor

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides speaks as a scientist to remind the reader that while some astronomical questions are a matter of settled proof — “e.g., it has been proved that the path of the sun is inclined against the equator; this cannot be doubted” — others are the subject of what we might call scientific speculation.

But it has not yet been decided whether the sphere of the sun is excentric or contains a revolving epicycle, and the astronomer does not take notice of this uncertainty, for his object is simply to find an hypothesis that would lead to a uniform and circular motion of the stars without acceleration, retardation, or change, and which is in its effects in accordance with observation. He will, besides, endeavour to find such an hypothesis which would require the least complicated motion and the least number of spheres.

Of the two competing theories: excentricity or epicycles, Maimonides prefers the former to the latter because it is ‘the least complicated’ of the hypotheses on offer. Similarly, one could posit for the sake of simplicity a model which assigns to all the fixed stars a single revolving sphere; Maimonides himself does as much in the previous chapter.

It is, however, not impossible that the stars should have each its own sphere, with a separate centre, and yet move in the same way… Nevertheless the species of the stars can be numbered, and therefore we would still be justified in counting the spheres of the fixed stars collectively as one, just as the five spheres of the planets, together with the numerous spheres they contain, are regarded by us as one.

He also includes a side discussion about a threefold division of the Creation:

“the pure Intelligences”
“the bodies of the spheres endowed with permanent forms”
“the transient earthly beings, all of which consist of the same substance”

A process of emanation is described in which each of the three aspects of creation:

the ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is received by the Intelligences according to their order: from the Intelligences part of the good and the light bestowed upon them is communicated to the spheres, and the latter, being in possession of the abundance obtained of the Intelligences, transmit forces and properties unto the beings of this transient world.

Lastly, he includes a moving discussion which seeks to claim these philosophical truths for ‘his people’:

these theories are not opposed to anything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages … But when wicked barbarians have deprived us of our possessions, put an end to our science and literature, and killed our wise men, we have become ignorant; this has been foretold by the prophets, when they pronounced the punishment for our sins: “The wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent men shall be hid” Isaiah 29:14. We are mixed up with other nations; we have learnt their opinions, and followed their ways and acts … Having been brought up among persons untrained in philosophy, we are inclined to consider these philosophical opinions as foreign to our religion, just as uneducated persons find them foreign to their own notions. But, in fact, it is not so.

Commentary Maimonides shows remarkable persipcacity in his approach to scientific theories and their relation to observation. Astronomical observations can be fit into one of several possible theoretical frameworks, between which there was much scientific debate. In the geocentric understanding which prevailed at the time, many observed phenomena required the positing of either epicycles or eccentric rotation; Maimonides is aware that while both models may come close to describing and predicting astronomical phenomena, it is preferable to choose the “least complicated” one; in other words, Occam’s Razor. His further discussion about the number of the spheres to be ascribed to the fixed stars shows, further, that he is aware that one may choose to use two different descriptions (essentially, two different scientific theories) based on what aspect of the natural world one is trying to describe or predict.

Part 2, Chapter 12

emanation

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides develops his theory of ‘emanation’ or fayd (فيض) by starting off with a discussion of the ‘efficient cause’ of things (sabab fa’il سبب فاعل). The efficient cause of any thing occuring in this world (Friedlander has ‘whenever a thing is produced’; Hussayn Attai has an kull hadis أن كل حادث) is either corporeal or incorporeal. A chain of efficient causes cannot be infinite, but must end in a First Cause, which is the true or ultimate cause.

Investigating these causes further, Maimonides notes that when a physical object affects another object, the affect must be transmitted by direct or indirect contact; fire transmits heat to air which transmits heat to the wax and melts; “the magnet attracts iron from a distance through a certain force communicated to the air round the iron”, and so on. Thus, “we find the causes of all changes in the Universe to be changes in the combination of the elements that act upon each other when one body approaches another or separates from it.”

What about changes which are not corporeal?

There are, however, changes which are not connected with the combination of the elements, but concern only the forms of the things; they require likewise an efficient cause: there must exist a force that produces the various forms. This cause is incorporeal, for that which produces form must itself be abstract form.

Eventually, Maimonides gets to the following dichotomy: physical/corporeal cause-effect pairs are characterized by a limited sphere of action: fire only heats up the air to a certain extent; the magnet only acts so far; and most cause-effect pairs are effected by simple contact. However, “in every case of change that does not originate in the mere combination of elements”, i.e., when the cause of a thing is not corporeal but incorporeal, there is no such limitation of distance or impact; and it is these actions which Maimonides calls fayd (فيض).

They are termed “influence” (or “emanation”), on account of their similarity to a water-spring. The latter sends forth water in all directions, has no peculiar side for receiving or spending its contents: it springs forth on all sides, and continually waters both neighbouring and distant places. In a similar manner incorporeal beings, in receiving power and imparting it to others, are not limited to a particular side, distance, or time. They act continually; and whenever an object is sufficiently prepared, it receives the effect of that continuous action, called “influence” (or “emanation”).

This has bearing both on the nature of God’s influence on the natural world, but also on Maimonides’ theory of Prophecy (or divine wisdom):

God being incorporeal, and everything being the work of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe has been created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in the Universe emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that He caused wisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon the prophets. In all such cases we merely wish to express that an incorporeal Being, whose action we call “influence,” has produced a certain effect. The term “influence” has been considered applicable to the Creator on account of the similarity between His actions and those of a spring.

He wants to be careful to explain exactly what the incorporeality of God (and the incoproeality of his influence on the world) means and what it does not.

There are … persons who, on learning that God is incorporeal, or that He does not approach the object of His action, believe that He gives commands to angels, and that the latter carry them out by approach or direct contact, as is the case when we produce something. These persons thus imagine also the angels as bodies. Some of them, further, believe that God commands an action in words consisting, like ours, of letters and sound, and that thereby the action is done. All this is the work of the imagination, which is, in fact, identical with “evil inclination.”

Part 2, Chapter 13

eternity of the universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides finally lays out the question of the eternity of the universe, to which he has been alluding throughout the book so far. He claims that, among those who believe in the existence of God, there are three theories about its origin:

That the Universe was created from nothing
That the Universe, including both the heavens and the earth, was fashioned from a primordial substance
That the Universe is eternal, and has always been as it is now.

Neither of the three theories deny the existence of God; Maimonides tacks on to the end of the chapter a passing mention of atheists such as Epicurus, but he considers that “it would be superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of God has been demonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be untenable”.

Let’s now examine each of these three theories in detail, as Maimonides tells them.

Createdness of the Universe. Maimonides is unequivocal about which theory he believes in. He exhorts the reader to believe only in this theory, and declares it to be second in importance only to monotheism.

Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, hold that the whole Universe, i.e., everything except God, has been brought by Him into existence out of non-existence (بعد العدم المحض المطلق ). In the beginning God alone existed, and nothing else; neither angels, nor spheres, nor the things that are contained within the spheres existed. He then produced from nothing all existing things such as they are, by His will and desire (بإرادته ومشيته).

Maimonides further explains that time itself is one of the created entities; it does not make sense to speak of a time before the creation of the Universe because “time is undoubtedly an accident.. connected with motion. This must be clear to all who understand what Aristotle has said on time and its real existence”. Thus, it is technically incorrect to say that God created the Universe “in the beginning” because time only began to be counted with the act of Creation and the existence of bodies which can experience motion.

The theory of most philosophers other than Aristotle, including Plato.

God created the existing Universe out of a pre-existing matter of some kind; the heavens and earth did not always exist, but some type of primordial substance did always exist coeternally with God. Maimonides presents a strong, quite convincing version of this theory.

They … assume that a certain substance has coexisted with God from eternity in such a manner that neither God existed without that substance nor the latter without God. But they do not hold that the existence of that substance equals in rank that of God: for God is the cause of that existence, and the substance is in the same relation to God as the clay is to the potter, or the iron to the smith: God can do with it what He pleases; at one time He forms of it heaven and earth, at another time He forms some other thing.

According to this theory — says Maimonides — it is impossible for God to create something out of nothing, or to destroy entirely an existing thing; in other words, God is subject to the Law of Conservation of Matter.

To say of God that He can produce a thing from nothing or reduce a thing to nothing is, according to the opinion of these philosophers, the same as if we were to say that He could cause one substance to have at the same time two opposite properties, or produce another being like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or produce a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar impossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect in the Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities

Aristotle and his followers go a step further and state that the Universe in its current form is eternal;

the Universe in its totality has never been different, nor will it ever change: the heavens, which form the permanent element in the Universe, and are not subject to genesis and destruction, have always been so; time and motion are eternal, permanent, and have neither beginning nor end; the sublunary world, which includes the transient elements, has always been the same, because the materia prima is itself eternal, and merely combines successively with different forms; when one form is removed, another is assumed.

The reason why he contends that the Universe always has been the way it is now is that it is

impossible for God to change His will or conceive a new desire … Aristotle finds it as impossible to assume that God changes His will or conceives a new desire, as to believe that He is non-existing, or that His essence is changeable. Hence it follows that this Universe has always been the same in the past, and will be the same eternally.

From a polemical standpoint, Maimonides considers the second and third opinions to be equally contrary to revealed religion: “it makes no difference to us whether it is believed that the heavens are transient, and that only their substance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be indestructible, in accordance with the view of Aristotle”. This is why, in the next chapter, he proceeds to restrict his analysis of ‘the philosophers’ position to Aristotle’s position alone.

However, like a good scientist, Maimonides does not overstate his case. While he is unequivocal about what he believes, he does not pretend that (what he considers to be) the Biblical position is established by proof.

All who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all who adopt similar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God, and that the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that is impossible, whilst some thinkers even regard it as an established truth.

Part 2, Chapter 14

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides explains the arguments used by Aristotle to prove the eternity of the Universe. It is clear that Maimonides considers him to be the philosopher par excellence because he says

No notice will be taken of the opinion of any philosopher but that of Aristotle; his opinions alone deserve to be criticized, and if our objections or doubts with regard to any of these be well founded, this must be the case in a far higher degree in respect to all other opponents of our fundamental principles (من خالف قواعد الشريعه).

An argument from the eternity of motion and time: if we assume that motion had a beginning, then how did the ‘first’ motion start? Either one would have to posit a ‘first’ motion that was itself eternal, or we would need an infinite chain of causes. Similarly, since time is a measure of motion, time also is eternal.
The First Substance (مادة الأولى) common to the four elements is eternal. For if it had a beginning it would have come into existence from another substance; it would further be endowed with a form, as coming into existence is nothing but receiving Form. But we mean by “First Substance” a formless substance; it can therefore not have come into existence from another substance, and must be without beginning and without end.
The heavenly substance (which for Aristotle was a fifth type of matter) performs circular motion rather than the rectilinear motion of the four sublunary elements. Therefore, unlike the four elements of our experience, the heavenly substance “contains no opposite elements” and “whatever is destroyed, owes its destruction to the opposite elements it contains”. Hence, the heavens are indestructible and therefore they must be eternal. Maimonides points out that Aristotle therefore assumes a ‘one-to-one and onto’ correspondence between indestructability and not-having-a-beginning.
When the Universe did not yet exist, its existence was either possible or necessary, or impossible. If it was necessary, the Universe could never have been non-existing; if impossible, the Universe could never have been in existence; if possible, the question arises, What was the substratum of that possibility? for there must be in existence something of which that possibility can be predicated. This is a forcible argument in favour of the Eternity of the Universe.
If God produced the Universe from nothing, He must have been a potential agent before He was an actual one, and must have passed from a state of potentiality into that of actuality–a process that is merely possible, and requires an agent for effecting it
If an agent is active at one time and inactive at another, this reflects (for ordinary agents) differences in circumstances which can be more or less favorable for an intended action. But

God is not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His will, and i s not affected by obstacles and hindrances … it is impossible, they argue, to imagine that God is active at one time and inactive at another.
Because “Nature is wise and does nothing in vain”, “this existing Universe is so perfect that it cannot be improved, and must be permanent; for it is the result of God’s wisdom”.
An arugment from ‘commonsense’: “all people have evidently believed in the permanency and stability of the Unvierse (كل الناس يصرحون بدوام السماء و ثباتها)”, attributing to them the residence of God or other spiritual beings. Maimonides does not consider this to be a proof in the philosophical sense, but he says that arguments of this kind are offered “to support the results of his philosophical speculation by commonsense”.

Maimonides offers an additional argument against his own stated position of Creatio ex nihilo, without attributing it to Aristotle:

How could God ever have been inactive without producing or creating anything in the infinite past? How could He have passed the long infinite period which preceded the Creation without producing anything, so as to commence, as it were, only yesterday, the Creation of the Universe?

Part 2, Chapter 15

eternity of the universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides argues — quite convincingly — that the eternity of the universe has been wrongly assumed by later Aristotleans to have been proven by Aristotle. While he concedes that it was certainly the theory held by Aristotle, he argues that the Philosopher himself didn’t consider the question to be firmly settled; he simply believed that the preponderance of the evidence supports the theory of its eternity and not of its creation in time.

Although this chapter is putatively devoted to a ‘refutation’ of what is widely held to be Aristotle’s theory, it is in fact full of the highest kind of praise for the First Teacher. For example, Maimonides writes:

Aristotle was well aware that he had not proved the Eternity of the Unvierse. … He knew that he could not prove his theory, and that his arguments and proofs were only apparent and plausible, … but Aristotle could not have considered them conclusive, after having himself taught us the rules of logic, and the means by which arguments can be refuted or confirmed (إذ و أرسطو هو الذي علم الناس طرق البرهان و قوانينه و شرائطه).

As proof, Maimonides gives the following examples:

In Physics VIII.1, Aristotle states that physicists in past times believed that motion is eternal. Maimonides says:

Now if Aristotle had conclusive proofs for his theory, he would not have considered it necessary to support it by citing the opinions of preceding Physicists, nor would he have found it necessary to point out the folly and absurdity of his opponents. For a truth, once established by proof, does neither gain force nor certainty by the consent of all scholars, nor lose by the general dissent (emphasis added).
In another place, Aristotle states that he is going to juxtapose his theory (of eternity of the universe) against the opposing theories, and that he wants to give a fair hearing to the other side. “For if we were to state our opinion and our arguments without mentioning those of our opponents, our words would be received less favourably. He who desires to be just must not show himself hostile to his opponent; he must have sympathy with him, and readily acknowledge any truth contained in his words”. For Maimonides, this is straight from the horse’s mouth!

Now, I ask you, men of intelligence, can we have any complaint against him after this frank statement? Or can any one now imagine that a real proof has been given for the Eternity of the Universe? Or can Aristotle, or any one else, believe that a theorem, though fully proved, would not be acceptable unless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted? We must also take into consideration that Aristotle describes this theory as his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotle ignorant of the difference between argument and proof? between opinions, which may be received more or less favourably, and truths capable of demonstration? or would rhetorical appeal to the impartiality of opponents have been required for the support of his theory if a real proof had been given? Certainly not.

Once again, Maimonides has the highest respect for Aristotle’s grasp on the issue; he simply wishes to put the issue in its proper place. According to Maimonides, it is later scholars who, believing they are adhering to Aristotle’s theory, have confused proofs and arguments; far be it from the First Philosopher to have made such a crucial mistake. Aristotle, in fact, readily seems to have admitted that “There are things concerning which we are unable to reason, or which we find too high for us …[such as] to decide whether the Universe is eternal or not.”

Part 2, Chapter 16

eternity of the universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The question of eternity vs. createdness of the Universe is not conclusively decided in favor of either position: both theories are scientifically plausible, but neither has been conclusively demonstrated beyond doubt. Instead of using ‘dialectical’ methods a la mutakallemin to claim the correctness of the religious position, Maimonides accepts axiomatically — on the authority of Scripture — that the Universe had a beginning. This avoids the weaknesses of the kalam proofs as well as the weaknesses of the Aristotlean proofs.

I will not deceive myself, and consider [the mutakallemin’s] dialectical methods as proofs; and the fact that a certain proposition has been proved by a dialectical argument win never induce me to accept that proposition, but, on the contrary, will weaken my faith in it, and cause me to doubt it. For when we understand the fallacy of a proof, our faith in the proposition itself is shaken. … Since I … consider either of the two theories — viz., the Eternity of the Universe, and the Creation — as admissible, I accept the latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can teach things beyond the reach of philosophical speculation.

Part 2, Chapter 17

eternity of the universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides criticizes the theory of the Eternity of the Universe on the grounds that it is not possible to find out how a system came about by examining its properties in its current condition, because the scientific principles that govern the sustained existence of a system need not be the same as those which govern the genesis or destruction of that system.

For example, human beings possess organs which work together in a careful balance; by examining a human being, it is not possible to conceive how a zygote could turn into an embryo and how a clump of cells can grow into a fully-formed human being. He illustrates this by giving the example of a male child who lost his mother at a young age and was brought up by his father in an isolated island where there were no women. If this child wanted to know how he came into the world, the whole process of fertilization, gestation, and childbirth would seem incredulous to him because, on examining a fully-developed human being, it seems unlikely that it is possible for a human to grow in the belly of another human being and to survive, suspended inside a liquid, for months. “It is therefore quite impossible to infer from the nature which a thing possesses after having passed through all stages of its development, what the condition of the thing has been in the moment when this process commenced”.

Thus, any objections to the theory of Creation must — says Maimonides — rely on something other than its present properties. Because its present properties tell us nothing about how it came about. This rules out those proofs for the eternity of the Universe attributed to Aristotelians in chapter 14 which rely on the present properties of the Universe, because “We admit the existence of these properties, but hold that they are by no means the same as those which the things possessed in the moment of their production”.

In short, the properties of things when fully developed contain no clue as to what have been the properties of the things before their perfection. … For the state of the whole Universe when it came into existence may be compared with that of animals when their existence begins; the heart evidently precedes the testicles, the veins are in existence before the bones; although, when the animal is fully developed, none of the parts is missing which is essential to its existence.

This argument is key to Maimonides’ project of upholding his religious beliefs to philosophical scrutiny. He emphasizes this to the reader by saying that this idea — that “the properties of things when fully developed contain no clue” about how they were developed “is a high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist all missiles directed against it.”

At this stage, Maimonides does not believe he has established the theory of Creation from a scientific perspective. Instead,

we do not desire to prove the Creation, but only its possibility: and this possibility is not refuted by arguments based on the nature of the present Universe, which we do not dispute. When we have established the admissibility of our theory, we shall then show its superiority. In attempting to prove the inadmissibility of Creatio ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore not derive any support from the nature of the Universe; they must resort to the notion our mind has formed of God (ليس من طبيعة الوجود بل مما يقضيه العقل في حق الإله).

Part 2, Chapter 18

eternity of the universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

One objection to the theory of creation is that if God created the Universe at a certain point in time, then he must have transitioned from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality (point 5 in the Guide II.14 ). Maimonides responds that this only applies to corporeal beings which have a substance and a form: when they transition from a state of poentiality to actuality, an agent must exist which effects this transition; an incoporeal (‘spiritual’) being, on the other hand, if it acts at one time and not another, does not necessitate a transition from potentiality to actuality”. It’s interesting to note that Maimonides clarifies

it is not our intention to state the reason why God created at one time and not at another; and … we do not mean to assert that God acts at one time and not at another … We have thus refuted the strong objection raised by those who believe in the Eternity of the Universe; since we believe that God is neither a corporeal body nor a force residing in a body, we need not assume that the Creation, after a period of inaction, is due to a change in the Creator Himself.
Another objection is that “all wants, changes, and obstacles are absent from the Essence of God”, and if God acted at one time and not in another, it would mean that there were some obstacles preventing him from acting. Maimonides’ answer is that we have developed this intuition from examples of human beings who act in accordance with their will (e.g., wanting to build a house) but in response to external factors (e.g. not having the money for it), they may or may not actually carry it out.

Every being that is endowed with free will and performs certain acts in reference to another being, necessarily interrupts those acts at one time or another, in consequence of some obstacles or changes. … This, however, is only the case when the causes of the actions are external; but when the action has no other purpose whatever than to fulfil the will, then the will does not depend on the existence of favourable circumstances [emphasis added]. The being endowed with this will need not act continually even in the absence of all obstacles, because there does not exist anything for the sake of which it acts, and which, in the absence of all obstacles, would necessitate the action: the act simply follows the will.
a third objection is that since God’s wisdom is eternal, everything that is produced from this wisdom must also be eternal. Maimonides’ response is that

[just] as we do not understand why the wisdom of God produced nine spheres, neither more nor less, or why He fixed the number and size of the stars exactly as they are; so we cannot understand why His wisdom at a certain time caused the Universe to exist, whilst a short time before it had not been in existence. All things owe their existence to His eternal and constant wisdom, but we are utterly ignorant of the ways and methods of that wisdom, since, according to our opinion, His will (mashi’at مشيئة) is identical with His wisdom (hikmat حكمة).

Part 2, Chapter 19

necessity of divine nature; key challenge to Aristotelean worldview

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In the Aristotelean worldview, says Maimonides, the world is inseparable from God: God is the cause (علته), and the Universe is the necessary (لزم) effect (معلول). This, however, implies “the conclusion that the nature of everything remains constant, that nothing changes its nature in any way”. This is the Spinozistic conclusion of Aristotelean metaphysics, and it — needless to say — causes problems for the usual religious worldview.

Spinoza Ethics I.29: Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

It is to this Aristotelian challenge to the Abrahamic worldview that Maimonides turns in this chapter. In the (orthodox) Abrahamic worldview, “all things in the Universe are the result of design, and not merely of necessity”; science, however, seems to show that the universe is a set of necessary effects preceded by necessary causes preceded by causes and so on. Even if this (Aristotelean) science has room for a God as the ‘First Cause’, that God doesn’t seem to be able to do very much except to originate an intricate chain of necessary causes and effects. Maimonides considers this to be a formidable challenge, because he says he will use “arguments almost as forcible as real proofs”, and will not fall into the mutakallemin’s error of “ignoring the existing nature of things or assuming the existence of atoms, or the successive creation of accidents” in their quest to defeat the Aristotelean challenge. Maimonides is much more measured. While he declares himself to be in agreement with their objectives, he does not agree with their methods, which claim to have proved things which cannot be conclusively proven.

Maimonides’ attack on the Aristotelian position begins as follows: the Aristotelian position is that the sublunary world consists of one substance; this substance takes on different forms, which comprise the four elements of fire, earth, water and air. Different elements form because the (common sublunary) substance is subject to different influences, e.g., the substance which is farther from the heavens becomes earth, the substance closest to the heavens becomes fire, and so on. These four elements share a common property: they have rectilinear motion. However, they differ from each other in that one moves upward, the other downward, and others laterally. The details of how some part of the sublunary substance “received the form of” earth, some of fire, etc., are not important here (and don’t make much sense to a modern reader anyway). But crucially, Maimonides is in perfect agreement with Aristotle’s explanations:

as regards things in the sublunary world, his explanations are in accordance with facts, and the relation between cause and effect is clearly shown.”

Maimonides then applies a similar line of argument to the heavens, and agrees with Aristotle that since all the different spheres move with a circular motion, they must share a common substance.

We can now put the following question to Aristotle: there is one substance common to all spheres; each one has its own peculiar form. Who thus determined and predisposed these spheres to receive different forms? Is there above the spheres any being capable of determining this except God?

Now, Aristotle does of course agree that there is a being above the spheres. But the question that Maimonides poses is: did God declare, by fiat, the speed and direction of the motion of each sphere? Or are there consistent natural laws that fully explain the movements of heavenly bodies?

Everything is, according to him, the result of a law of Nature, and not the result of the design of a being that designs as it likes, or the determination of a being that determines as it pleases. He has not carried out the idea consistently, and it will never be done. … According to our theory of the Creation, all this can easily be explained; for we say that there is a being that determines the direction and velocity of the motion of each sphere; but we do not know the reason why the wisdom of that being gave to each sphere its peculiar property.

Maimonides’ charge is that there seems to be no appropriate physical explanation — within the Aristotelian system — for why Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn move in precisely the way they do. This problem must have been even more perplexing in Aristotle’s time:

How much weaker must [Aristotle’s position] appear when we bear in mind that the science of Astronomy was not yet fully developed, and that in the days of Aristotle the motions of the spheres were not known so well as they are at present.

He then goes through a lengthy explanation of why the arrangement of the heavenly spheres appears to show evidence for design by a God who acted according to a will, and not simply according to fixed laws.

The answer to these and similar questions is very difficult, and almost impossible, if we assume that all emanates from God as the necessary result of certain permanent laws, as Aristotle holds.

Throughout this discussion, Maimonides does not rule out Aristotle’s position as being scientifically invalid. He simply believes that “it is extremely improbable that these things should be the necessary result of natural laws, and nor that of design”.

Part 2, Chapter 20-21

divine necessity vs. divine free will

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Aristotle’s arguments against the thesis that the world came into existence as a spontaneous result of chance.
Maimonides is in full agreement with Aristotle’s position. However, according to Maimonides, Aristotle did not — after rejecting the theory of spontaneity — conclude that there is a ‘Design’ or ‘Will’ behind the Universe, at least not in the way we usually think of ‘design’ or ‘will’.
Maimonides emphasizes that the two theories on this question (the one Mosaic and the other Aristotelian) are polar opposites:

For as it is impossible to reconcile two opposites, so it is impossible to reconcile the two theories, that of necessary existence by causality, and that of Creation by the desire and will of a Creator
Maimonides believes that a belief in design/determination/will is completely incompatible with a belief in the eternity of the Universe.
Some recent Aristotelians, says Maimoindes — probably in order to reconcile their Aristotelianism with their faith — hold that the Universe is eternal but it is still the result of a Divine Will; they believe that for God, it is not necessary that the results of an act of will follow the act of will in time.
For Maimonides, this is not an adequate solution.

[I]t is the same thing, whether we say in accordance with the view of Aristotle that the Universe is the result of the Prime Cause, and must be eternal as that Cause is eternal, or in accordance with these philosophers that the Universe is the result of the act, design, will, selection, and determination of God, but it has always been so, and will always be so.
Maimonides’ own belief goes against this Avicennan necessitarianism; for him,

the Universe is not the “necessary result” of God’s existence, as the effect is the necessary result of the efficient cause; in the latter case the effect cannot be separated from the cause; it cannot change unless the cause changes entirely, or at least in some respect.

clearly, the ‘latter case’ delineated above would be inimical to Maimonides’ religious beliefs about God’s will, which is why he rejects this sort of determinism. He puts it even more clearly thus:

according to Aristotle everything besides that Being is the necessary result of the latter, as I have already mentioned: whilst, according to our opinion, that Being created the whole Universe with design and will (قصد و إرادة), so that the Universe which had not been in existence before, has by His will come into existence.

Part 2, Chapter 22

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides pokes holes in the Aristotelian cosmology, which he believes cannot be satisfactorily explained merely by the laws of nature. The specifics of his critique are not too important, because they have to do with a view of the Universe that is not really intelligible to the modern reader (read: me). After mounting his attack, he clarifies that his criticism is not about the entire Aristotelian system, and is only about his theories of the heavenly spheres.

I hold that the theory of Aristotle is undoubtedly correct as far as the things are concerned which exist between the sphere of the moon and the centre of the earth. Only an ignorant person rejects it … But what Aristotle says concerning things above the sphere of the moon is, with few exceptions, mere imagination and opinion.

However, Maimonides acknowledges that the holes he is poking do not amount to a clear and unambiguous refutation, which can only be accomplished by proof. Rather than overstate his case, he acknolwedges that doubts in one theory do not prove the opposite theory. However, since the question of creation vs. eternity cannot be established by proof — as he established earlier — then one will have to settle for the theory which has the least doubt associated with it. To this, Maimonides the believer adds that his theory is to be preferred also on the authority of Abraham and Moses.

It may perhaps be asked … whether by mere doubts a theory can be overthrown, or its opposite established? This is certainly not the case. But we treat this philosopher exactly as his followers tell us to do. For Alexander stated that when a theory cannot be established by proof, the two most opposite views should be compared as to the doubts entertained concerning each of them, and that view which admits of fewer doubts should be accepted. Alexander further says that this rule applies to all those opinions of Aristotle in Metaphysics for which he offered no proof. For those that followed Aristotle believed that his opinions are far less subject to doubt than any other opinion. We follow the same rule. Being convinced that the question whether the heavens are eternal or not cannot be decided by proof, neither in the affirmative nor in the negative, we have enumerated the objections raised to either view, and shown how the theory of the Eternity of the Universe is subject to stronger objections … Another argument can be drawn from the fact that the theory of the Creation was held by our Father Abraham, and by our Teacher Moses.

Part 2, Chapter 23

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In setting up the debate between the two positions, eternity and createdness of the Universe, Maimonides explains — like a good scientist — that

the comparison cannot be trustworthy unless the two theories be considered with the same interest, and if you are predisposed in favour of one of them, be it on account of your training or because of some advantage, you are too blind to see the truth. For that which can be demonstrated you cannot reject, however much you maybe inclined against it; but in questions like those under consideration you are apt to dispute (in consequence of your inclination). You will, however, be able to decide the question, as far as necessary, if you free yourself from passions, ignore customs, and follow only your reason.

In order to settle this (un-provable) question scientifically, Maimonides says that one needs to have

sufficient preparation in mathematics, especially logic
adequate knowledge of natural science
a moral character which is equitable and free from passions

Maimonides is very clear that his intended audience is people who believe in the theory of the Creation on the authority of the Torah, and who may be tempted — through rational arguments — to go over to the ‘dark side’ and support the theory of eternity instead. He understands that there are very convincing opinions on the other side which could “shake your belief in the theory of the Creation … you would then adopt the theory which is contrary to the fundamental principles of our religion”. Interestingly, however, Maimonides has not closed off the door to the Aristotelian position entirely; that open door is that of demonstrative proof; “Only demonstrative proof should be able to make you abandon the theory of the Creation (لا تعدل عن راي حدث العالم إلا ببرهان): but such a proof does not exist in Nature (الطبع).”

We know very little about how the heavens work, and it is wrong to think that “human wisdom comprehends fully the nature of the spheres and their motions”. We do not have at our disposal rigorous scientific laws which can satisfactorily explain the motions of the heavens.

Part 2, Chapter 24

Ptolemaic epicycles, excentricity

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Reconciling the observed motion of heavenly bodies with the Ptolemaic world-system requires one of two hypotheses: epicycles (فلك تدوير) or excentric spheres (فلك خارج المركز). In a remarkable pre-saging of the Copernican revolution, Maimonides follows this statement of orthodoxy with the declaration,

I will show that each of these two hypotheses is irregular, and totlaly contrary to the results of Natural Science.

In this chapter, Maimonides explains in detail why both hypotheses lead to contradictions with the Physics of Aristotle; epicycles, for example, would entail the circular motion of something around an immaterial point, which seems — under Aristotelian physics — implausible. The theory of excentric spheres would necessitate the existence of some sort of material between two successive spheres, which again seems difficult under Aristotelian physics. Maimonides summarizes these difficulties:

Consider, therefore, how many difficulties arise if we accept the theory which Aristotle expounds in Physics. For, according to that theory, there are no epicycles, and no excentric spheres, but all spheres rotate round the centre of the earth! How then can the different courses of the stars be explained? how is it possible to assume a uniform perfect rotation with the phenomena which we perceive, except by admitting one of the two hypotheses or both of them?

Quoting Ibn Bajja, Maimonides points out that accurate astronomical observations were not available to Aristotle; consequently, he did not realize how imperfect his astronomical theories were. According to Maimonides, Aristotle

did not notice [the excentricity of spheres] or hear of it; the science was not perfect in his age. If he had heard of it, he would have strongly opposed it; if he had been convinced of its correctness, he would have been greatly embarrassed as regards all that he said on the question. … the theory of Aristotle, in explaining the phenomena in the sublunary world, is in accordance with logical inference: here we know the causal relation between one phenomenon and another; we see how far science can investigate them, and the management of nature is clear and intelligible. But of the things in the heavens man knows nothing except a few mathematical calculations, and you see how far these go.

This is followed by an eloquent expression of man’s (till then) inability to grasp the order in the heavens. Quoting Psalms 115, he says

the heavens belong to the Lord; but the earth he gave over to man. سماء السموات للرب و الأرض جعلها لبني بشر

and this is because

the facts which we require in proving the existence of heavenly beings are withheld from us: the heavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank … it is in fact ignorance or a kind of madness to weary our minds with finding out things which are beyond our reach.

And because the details of how the heavens work “cannot be approached by logical inference (بقياس)”, Maimonides prefers to defer to the authority of Moses, who spoke directly with God. Finally, Maimonides concludes by conceding that the solution to which he has arrived is not conclusive, but ‘embarassingly’ tentative:

another person may perhaps be able to establish by proof what appears doubtful to me. It is on account of my great love of truth that I have shown my embarrassment in these matters and I have not heard, nor do I know that any of these theories have been established by proof.

Commentary

It is clear from the text that Maimonides does not use Mosaic authority to settle scientific questions. He avoids doing this, and instead looks for answers in science. When he does not find answers, and finds a cosmology that is utterly inconsistent with the principles of physics, he believes that science cannot, therefore, conclusively answer the question of the origin of the universe. If Aristotle’s theory of the spheres is inconsistent with Ptolemy’s epicycles, and if Ptolemy’s epicycles are themselves quite necessary to explain astronomical observations, how can we accept the Aristotelian view of the universe as scientifically correct? Finding no scientifically consistent explanations, Maimonides throws his hands in the air and looks to Scripture to settle the question.

Part 2, Chapter 25

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter contains Maimonides’ famous assertion that he would have had no trouble with explaining away the Bible’s references to creation in time as metaphor, had the Aristotelian arguments for the eternity of the Universe amounted to conclusive proof. To show the reader that he means what he says, he points out that “[the] passages in Scripture [which] confirm the Creation … are not more numerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal being”; yet he has just spent dozens of chapters refuting the plain words of the text. He could have done similarly for the Biblical account of creation.

But the Eternity of the Universe has not been proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text, and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be supported by an equally good argument.

However, Maimonides has another, more fundamental reason to hold on to the literal Scriptural understanding that God created the Universe in time. For if he were to accept the theory of Eternity of the Universe, then the entire edifice of the Abrahamic worldview falls to the ground; for then.

If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws (انه على جهة اللزوم), that Nature does not change (و لا تتغير طبيعة أصلا), and that there is nothing supernatural (و لا يخرج شيء عن معتاده), we should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion, we should disbelieve all miracles and signs (و مكذب لكل معجز ضرورة), and certainly reject all hopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also explained figuratively.

So we learn that for Maimonides this is not an obscure question about the cosmological origins of the Universe, without any direct relation with our affairs here on earth. On the contrary, the answer to this question serves as the lynchpin on which “the foundation of our religion” stands; the “high rampart erected round the Law”.

Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that Revelation is possible,

and that any thorny philosophical questions arising from Scripture can be answered with the formula

He willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. Just as He created the world according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do not know why His will or wisdom determined” things the way God determined them.

Here, we can see that Maimonides does not try too hard to reconcile scripture with philosophocal truth. He finds an ‘out’: since it is possible that the Universe was brought into its current form by an all-powerful God, it is also possible that God spoke ‘mouth to mouth’ with Moses, and parted the Red Sea, and sent manna from heaven, and so on. Maimonides realizes that this is the only thread from which hangs the supposed truth of Scripture. For

if we assume that the Universe has the present form as the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions; and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying denial and rejection of the Biblical texts. … If the Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if only according to the Platonic hypothesis , all arguments of the philosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand, Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the Law in its entirety would be rejected (لسقطت الشريعة بجملتها), and we should be forced to other opinions (و أنقل الأمر لاراء أخرى).

Commentary No wonder there were Rabbinic authorities who wanted to burn this book! Because if the validity of the Law depends solely on the unprovability of the question of the eternity of the Universe, then it was hanging by a thin thread indeed. Philosophical opinion was almost entirely laid against the theory of the Creation, and I imagine that Maimonides’ insistence that this question was not open to demonstrative proof would have been severlely questioned by the Philosophers of his day. And here is the learned rabbi admitting that “if Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the entirety of the Law would be rejecrted”! And worse, he admits here that Scripture is not necessarily a source of philosophical truth, but the opinion held by the sages and the Prophets. Mouth to mouth God may have spoken to Moses on Mount Sinai, but Maimonides calls it mere opinion which can (and, we can infer from the rest of his writings, must) be discarded if found to be in contravention with philosophical truth.

Note: although I have used Friedlander’s translation throughout this work, I have taken the liberty to correct his translation on this page. Friedlander has: “the whole teaching of Scripture would be rejected”, but I believe the Arabic lends itself better to “the Law in its entirety would be rejected”. I am confident that ‘Law’ should be here and not Scripture, but I am not confident about the tense used here. For example, should it be “would be rejected” or “would have to be rejected”? The translation of Shlomo Pines may have dealt with this passage better.

Some issues in translation:

Source	Text
Friedlander	that there is nothing supernatural
Pines	that the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything
Atai	(و لا يخرج شيء عن معتاده)

following Shlomo Pines’ version, there are three problematic Aristotelian premises:

the world exists in virture of necessity
no nature changes at all
the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything

and they lead to the following problems:

destroys the Law in its principle
necessarily gives the lie to every miracle
reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out

Part 2, Chapter 27-28

end of the universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides states that it is not a principle of religion that the Universe will again be reduced to nothing; he believes that indications of this in the Torah are open to figurative interpretation. Maimonides understands that not everyone agrees with him;

those who follow the literal sense of the Scriptural texts reject our view, and assume that the ultimate certain destruction of the Universe is part of their faith, they are at liberty to do so. But we must tell them that the belief in the destruction is not necessarily implied in the belief in the Creation.

Commentary

This chapter exemplifies Maimonides’ view of the precise relationship between Scripture and reason.

Firstly, we see that Maimonides does not take Scripture at face value and instead treats it to rational scrutiny. Therefore, even though Revelation teaches that the Universe will be destroyed, he does not subscribe to this view.
Secondly, we see that if a certain speculative/philosophical viewpoint does not involve “a fundamental principle of our faith”, then he is willing to accept a difference of opinion. Here, for instance, he thinks that those who believe that the Universe will be destroyed are wrong, but he thinks it’s O.K. to believe what they believe.
Thirdly, Maimonides seems to believe that the willed actions of God are exempt from the laws of nature.

whatever owes its existence to the action of physical laws is, according to the same laws, subject to destruction … [but] according to our theory, taught in Scripture, the existence or non-existence of things depends solely on the will of God and not on fixed laws, and, therefore, it does not follow that God must destroy the Universe after having created it from nothing.

When convincing his readers of a certain point, Maimonides begins by establishing the possibility of that point of view. In this chapter, he first shows that “reasoning leads to the conclusion that the destruction of the Universe is not a certain fact”. This step is usually a rational step for Maimonides, and to establish the scientific possibility of things he does not rely on Scripture. ‘A is clearly possible, on the authority of Our Teacher Moses’ is not a formulation we are likely to see Maimonides use.

Part 2, Chapter 29

end of the universe, miracles, Creation

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter contains a long discussion about figurative expressions used in different Prophetic books of the bible; Maimonides’ goal is to explain that the Prophets often used language figuratively, and that their words should not be taken literally. His purpose in doing so is to show that whenever the Tanakh talks about the end of the universe, this is metaphorical and not literal.

Our opinion, in support of which we have quoted these passages, is clearly established, namely, that no prophet of sage has ever announced the destruction of the Universe, or a change of its present condition, or a permanent change of any of its properties.

Thus, Maimonides wants to ensure the reader that his philosophical opinion (that the Universe will not come to an end) is not contradicted by Scripture.

Maimonides makes an interesting detour into the subject of miracles in this chapter.

When I, however, said that no prophet ever announced “a permanent change of any of its properties,” I intended to except miracles. For although the rod was turned into a serpent, the water into blood, the pure and noble hand into a leprous one, without the existence of any natural cause that could effect these or similar phenomena, these changes were not permanent, they have not become a physical property. On the contrary, the Universe since continues its regular course. This is my opinion; this should be our belief.

“This is my opinion; this should be our belief” succinctly captures Maimonides’ approach to these things. He is supremely confident that he has deduced the correct opinions, and he wishes to convince his readers that they should adopt the same ones.

After stating that miracles — whose veracity he seems to have no doubt in — are ‘interruptions’ in the natural order of the Universe, which “since continues its regular course”, Maimonides explains a theory which still further ‘naturalizes’ miracles. It is not clear the extent to which the author agrees with this theory.

Our Sages, however, said very strange things as regards miracles … that the miracles are to some extent also natural: for they say, when God created the Universe with its present physical properties, He made it part of these properties, that they should produce certain miracles at certain times, and the sign of a prophet consisted in the fact that God told him to declare when a certain thing will take place, but the thing itself was effected according to the fixed laws of Nature. If this is really the meaning of the passage referred to, it testifies to the greatness of the author, and shows that he held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the laws of Nature, or a change in the will of God [as regards the physical properties of things] after they have once been established. He therefore assumes, e.g., that God gave the waters the property of joining together, and of flowing in a downward direction, and of separating only at the time when the Egyptians were drowned, and only in a particular place.

Thus, “the miracles are to some extent also natural” because God encoded these ‘miraculous’ events into the laws of nature, such that water always flows downward except when the Red Sea was parted, and so on. Moses just happened to know that the Sea would part at that place and time.

Maimonides seems to think that it is a mark of a writer’s “greatness” that he “held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the laws of Nature”. Usually, one is compelled by the need for believing in miracles to concede that the laws of nature do, indeed, change momentarily when a miracle happens. But if this theory is correct, then even when a ‘miracle’ happens, it was actually a pre-programmed, “natural”, blip in the natural order of things.

We have thus clearly stated and explained our opinion, that we agree with Aristotle in one half of his theory. For we believe that this Universe remains perpetually with the same properties with which the Creator has endowed it, and that none of these will ever be changed except by way of miracle in some individual instances, although the Creator has the power to change the whole Universe, to annihilate it, or to remove any of its properties. The Universe, had, however, a beginning and commencement, for when nothing was as yet in existence except God, His wisdom decreed that the Universe be brought into existence at a certain time, that it should not be annihilated or changed as regards any of its properties, except in some instances; some of these are known to us, whilst others belong to the future, and are therefore unknown to us. This is our opinion and the basis of our religion.

Thus, Maimonides agrees with Aristotle that the Universe is temporally eternal in the future (abad أبد) but disagrees with Aristotle about its temporal eternity in the past (azal); the Universe had a beginning, but as far as we can tell, its current properties will forever remain in existence. However, he allows for the possibility that God could choose to change any of the Universe’s properties if he so wished it, or choose to annihilate it, etc.

The opinion of Aristotle is that the Universe, being permanent and indestructible, is also eternal and without beginning. We have already shown that this theory is based on the hypothesis that the Universe is the necessary result of causal relation, and that this hypothesis includes a certain amount of blasphemy.

Maimonides prefaces his theory of exactly how Creation came about in this chapter, by first stating that we are not supposed to take the account in Genesis literally. He gives some reasons for this, and adds that “the literal meaning of the words might lead us to conceive corrupt ideas and to form false opinions about God”; instead, “we should examine the Scriptural texts by the intellect, after having acquired a knowledge of demonstrative science”.

Commentary

According to Maimonides, Aristotle held firstly that the universe is the necessary result of causal relation, and secondarily he therefore concluded that the universe is eternal. Maimonides’ beef is not with the secondary claim, which he would have had no trouble with accepting (despite what the Bible says) had the proofs for it been airtight. His problem is with the first claim, which “includes a certain amount of blasphemy”. Reading this passage carefully, we could conclude that the blasphemy arises from the first claim, not from the second claim.

But Maimonides is not one to reject a philosophical claim simply because it leads one to deny Holy Writ; why does he deny the first claim? This was discussed extensively in chapter 19 and others, where he shows that Aristotle failed to show that “everything is the result of a law of Nature”.

Part 2, Chapter 30

Genesis creation narrative

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter features a detailed exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis, and therefore represents Maimonides’ interpretation of what Scripture has to say about the beginning of the world. In my opinion, it does not necessarily represent Maimonides’ own views. This topic (Maimonides’ view of the creation) has been the subject of endless amounts of scholarly attention; Crescas’ Or Adonai probably addressed it; the Maimonidean controversy hinged crucially on the French Hebrew-reading public’s perception of what Maimonides thought about creation; and an example of recent scholarship in this direction is Sara Klein-Braslavy’s Maimonides as Biblical Interpreter.

Commentary

It’s difficult for me to parse this, probably because I am not familiar with the Biblical language which Maimonides wants to explain. In reading it, one is reminded of the author’s remark in the Introduction, where he stated regarding his arrangement of the book, “My object in adopting this arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at another time concealed.” There are a few different ways of looking at what, I think, Maimonides is trying to do here.

In one sense, Maimonides is trying to harmonize the Torah with Aristotelian physics; thus, he understand Genesis allegorically in such a way that the batini meaning is philosophically correct.
Another way to look at it, is to see that Maimonides is offering what is ultimately an ‘equivocal’ exegesis of Genesis; one which allows for the possibility of both creation and eternity. This seems, at least on the surface, to be the reason why Maimonides says “The true explanation of the first verse of Genesis is as follows: ‘In [creating] a principle God created the beings above and the things below.’”, after having explained that the word mabda’ مبدء (translated by Friedlander as beginning or principle) does not denote a temporal priority but only a conceptual priority. It seems that so far, Maimonides is setting up his explanation of Genesis to be compatible with a timeless ‘beginning’. However, the very next sentence he writes is “This explanation is in accordance with the theory of Creation”!
A traditionalist view might be that Maimonides is offering a defense of the theory of creation in time to a philosophically-minded audience.

What would a philosophically correct interpretation of Genesis 1 look like for Maimonides? Knowing that he believes that the question of eternity vs creation in time cannot be solved by human reason — see chapter 16 — in principle both theories are plausible. So it is possible that he would like to read Genesis in such a way that both views of looking at creation remain possible after understanding the true meaning of Genesis. It would not do for Genesis to be only compatible with creation-in-time, because as a philosopher Maimonides knows that creation has not been conclusively proven. Similarly, he does not think it necessary to read the inner meaning of Genesis as indicating an eternal universe, because, as he explained in chapter 25, “a mere argument in favour of a certain theory [i.e., eternity] is not sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning [i.e., creation in time] of a Biblical text, and explaining it figuratively”.

Part 2, Chapter 32

Prophecy

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

According to Maimonides, there are three beliefs about who can become a prophet.

“some ignorant people who … think [that] God selects any person he pleases”
“The philosophers hold that prophecy is a certain faculty of man in a state of perfection … if a person, perfect in his intellectual and moral faculties, and also perfect, as far as possible, in his imaginative faculty, prepares himself … he must become a prophet.
“The third view is that which is taught in Scripture, [and is identical to the second view, except that] “it may yet happen that [such a person] does not actually prophesy. It is in that case the will of God” that he didn’t actually become a prophet.

Thus, we see that Maimonides believes that prophecy is not an accident which could happen to anyone by the arbitrary will of God, but instead, it is a certain set of faculties, which are inherent in human beings, brought to their utmost perfection.

Although the faculty is common to the whole race, yet it is not fully developed in each individual, either on account of the individual’s defective constitution, or on account of some other external cause. This is the case with every faculty common to a class. It is only brought to a state of perfection in some individuals, and not in all; but it is impossible that it should not be perfect in some individual of the class

He is thus ‘naturalizing’ prophecy to some extent, in agreement with ‘the Philosophers’, although he is keen not to keep God entirely out of it. So he allows for an arbitrary ‘veto power’ which God can use to withold prophecy even from someone who is otherwise ‘qualified’ to be a Prophet.

Part 2, Chapter 33-35

Prophecy

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

These chapters serve to establish Moses’ superiority as a Prophet.

in my opinion, the term prophet is applied to Moses and other men homonymously. A similar distinction, I think, must be made between the miracles wrought by Moses and those wrought by other prophets, for his signs are not of the same class as the miracles of other prophets.

What exactly is the distinction between the miracles attributed to Moses and the miracles attributed to other Prophets? “no prophet will ever, like Moses, do signs publicly in the presence of friend and enemy, of his followers and his opponents”. Moreover, he also appears to ‘naturalize’ the miracles of other Prophets when he indicates that the miracle attributed to Joshua Joshua 10: 13 “indicates that that day appeared to the people at Gibeon as their longest day in the summer”.

Thus, most of his discussion about what Prophecy is, will not apply to Moses but to the ordinary Prophets. The claim is that Moses alone was spoken to directly by God; all other prophets received their revelation through the intermediary of an angel. This point seems to be made — at least in these chapters — by appeal to Scriptural authority, rather than using rational arguments.

This point seems to be made directly by the Pentateuch, in Numbers 12: 6-8: “With him I speak mouth to mouth, plainly and not in riddles, and he behold the likeness of יהוה”.

Part 2, Chapter 36

Prophecy

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimoindes provides the details for what he thinks Prophecy is. The terminology is quite Farabian, for he begins

Prophecy (النبوة al-nabuwwah ) is, in truth and reality, an emanation (فيض fayd) sent forth (يفيض yufayid) by the Divine Being [Atay has two readings: الله and الإله] through the medium of (بوساطة) the Active Intellect (العقل الفعال), in the first instance to man’s rational faculty (القوة الناطقة), and then to his imaginative faculty (القوة المتخيله); it is the highest degree and greatest perfection man can attain: it consists in the most Perfect development of the imaginative faculty.

The prophet’s ‘imaginative faculty’ is the same as the imaginative faculty we all have in kind, “the difference being one of quantity and not quality”. When ordinary people dream, they are participating in the same activity, but to a miniscule degree compared to a Prophet; Maimonides uses the analogy of an unripe fruit with a ripe fruit: “for the unripe fruit is really the fruit to some extent, only it has fallen from the tree before it was fully developed and ripe”.

He furnishes further proof that prophecy is grounded in the Earthly faculties of human beings by pointing out that even the historical Prophets “are deprived of the faculty of prophesying when they mourn, are angry, or are similarly affected”. And the reason why there are no more prophets in our midst is that the real — one could say material — conditions for Prophecy can not be met in this period of exile before the Messianic period (ayyam al-Masih).

These are the conditions which Maimonides gives:

the person must be physically fit
the person must have “studied and acquired wisdom”, so that “his intellect is as deveoped and perfect as human intellect can be”
of an equanimous temperament
he should be always engaged in contemplating metaphysical matters: “all his desires must aim at obtaining a knowledge of the hidden laws and causes that are in force in the Universe”
an absence of the base desires
lack of desire for “victory, increase of followers, acquiistion of honor”

such a person will undoubtedly perceive nothing but things very extraordinary and divine, and see nothing but God and His angels. His knowledge will only include that which is real knowledge, and his thought will only he directed to such general principles as would tend to improve the social relations between man and man.

Commentary

It is interesting that the fayd or overflow from the Active Intellect occurs first to the rational faculty and second to the imaginative faculty; and yet Maimonides does not claim that Prophecy is a perfection of the rational faculty, but instead claims it is a perfection of the imaginative faculty. He seems to have carefully avoided directly saying that Prophecy implies a perfection of the rational faculty, although the body of this chapter does appear to assume that the prophet has acquired “wisdom” and that “his intellect is as developed and perfect as human intellect can be”. Is a perfection of the imaginative faculty equivalent to a perfection of the intellect? Didn’t he tell us in GP.II.12 that “the imagination … is in fact identical with ‘evil inclination’”?

Spinoza, on the other hand, has no compunction in stating that “Joshua was no Astronomer”, and that many of the Prophets, including Moses, believed in an anthropomorphic God.

Part 2, Chapter 37

Prophecy

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The divine intellect, through whose influence we all get the ability to think, “overflows” more in some people than in others. When it does so, it may either overflow into only the logical faculty, or into only the imaginative faculty, or both. The schema set up by Maimonides looks like this:

Part 2, Chapter 38

Prophecy

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides continues his project of ‘naturalizing’ Prophecy by stating that the intuitive faculty (القوة الشعور) — which all of us possess to a certain extent — must have existed in the prophets to an extraordinary degree.

Thus you may yourself guess correctly that a certain person said or did a certain thing in a certain matter. Some persons are so strong and sound in their imagination and intuitive faculty that, when they assume a thing to be in existence, the reality either entirely or partly confirms their assumption. Although the causes of this assumption are numerous, and include many preceding, succeeding, and present circumstances, by means of the intuitive faculty the intellect can pass over all these causes, and draw inferences from them very quickly, almost instantaneously. This same faculty enables some persons to foretell important coming events.

Maimonides does not ‘rationalize’ prophecy entirely, though. According to him,

true prophets undoubtedly conceive ideas that result from premisses which human reason could not comprehend by itself; thus they tell things which men could not tell by reason and ordinary imagination alone” … he conceives ideas which are confirmed by reality, and are so clear to him as if he deduced them by means of syllogisms.

Another concern of the author, in this chapter, is to show that the Prophets’ perfection of the imaginative faculty was ancilliary to, and followed from, the perfection of their intellect (or logical faculty).

It is through the intellect that the [divine] influence reaches the imaginative faculty. How then could the latter be so perfect as to be able to represent things not previously perceived by the senses, if the same degree of perfection were withheld from the intellect … ?

Commentary

Maimonides is convinced that the Prophets were not merely endowed with imaginative or rhetorical prowess, but that their intellect too had reached a state of perfection. This is where Spinoza would have disagreed, for Spinoza had no compunction in stating that “Joshua was no astronomer”, and that the Prophets did not have sound philosophical knowledge.

Part 2, Chapter 40

the Law and Nature

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides makes some interesting remarks about the divine Law (al-shari’ah الشريعة) and its relationship to Nature. He says:

the Law, though not a product of Nature, is nevertheless not entirely foreign to Nature (أن الشريعة ، و أن لم تكن طبيعية فلها مدخل في الأمر الطبيعي)

There is a difference between “human legislation” and “divine Law”. For Maimonides, the Law of Moses is nothing like the usual legislation put forward by a ruler, which are ideas of the person’s own. He tells the reader how to determine which laws are simply human and which are divine:

Firstly, there are laws which are purely man-made and whose objectives are solely about establishing orderly relations between people; these are made by statesmen, lawgivers, etc. who have received the divine influence, but only as far as their imaginative faculty.

You will find that the sole object of certain laws, in accordance with the intention of their author, who well considered their effect, is to establish the good order of the state and its affairs, to free it from all mischief and wrong: these laws do not deal with philosophic problems, contain no teaching for the perfecting of our logical faculties, and are not concerned about the existence of sound or unsound opinions. Their sole object is to arrange, under all circumstances, the relations of men to each other, and to secure their well-being, in accordance with the view of the author of these laws. These laws are political, and their author belongs, as has been stated above, to the third class [mentioned in GP.II.37], viz., to those who only distinguish themselves by the perfection of their imaginative faculties.

Secondly, there are laws which, in addition to the foregoing, also aim to impart correct philosophical opinions:

You will also find laws which, in all their rules, aim, as the law just mentioned, at the improvement of the material interests of the people: but, besides, tend to improve the state of the faith of man, to create first correct notions of God, and of angels, and to lead then the people, by instruction and education, to an accurate knowledge of the Universe: this education comes from God; these laws are divine.

He cautions, however, that not all those who proclaim laws of the second kind are true prophets: to determine true prophecy, one would have to abstain from worldly concerns.

We must examine the merits of the person, obtain an accurate account of his actions, and consider his character. The best test is the rejection, abstention, and contempt of bodily pleasures: for this is the first condition of men, and a fortiori of prophets: they must especially disregard pleasures of the sense of touch, which, according to Aristotle, is a disgrace to us: and, above all, restrain from the pollution of sensual intercourse

Commentary

It is not difficult to ascertain what Maimonides meant by the last part of this chapter; he ends it with “Note what is meant by these words”. It is interesting that the authority which he quotes for the idea that the sense of touch is the ‘worst’ of the senses possessed by humans is Aristotle, and that the main criterion which he dwells on in determining what kind of prophecy is ‘true’ versus ‘plagiraized’ is sexual chastity.

Part 2, Chapter 41-46

Prophecy, interpretation of Scripture

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides sets out detailed analyses of the nature of Prophecy and the way in which it can be said that God communicated to the Prophets. He sets out a detailed taxonomy (with 11 types!) of Prophecy in chapter 45. These chapters aim to emphasize that whenever the Prophets speak of ‘God having spoken to them’, this is to be understood as having happened through the meidation of something — either angels or their own imaginative faculty — and not as the literal speech of God. Similarly, when a Prophet speaks about having done strange and, strictly speaking, impossible things, these are to be understood as having taken place in a vision, and not in actuality.

The correctness of this theory cannot be doubted, and only those do not comprehend it who do not know to distinguish between that which is possible, and that which is impossible. The instances quoted may serve as an illustration of other similar Scriptural passages not quoted by me. … After it has once been stated that the event described is to be understood figuratively, it must be assumed for certain that the whole is a prophetic vision.

Part 2, Chapter 47

Interpretation of Scripture

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides’ naturalization of prophecy and revelation goes to great lengths.

We find it also necessary to say a few words on the figures (الاستعارات al-isti’arat), hyperboles (ألإغياآت), and exaggerations (المبالغات al-mubalighat) that occur in Scripture [literally, ‘in the texts of the prophetic books’ في نصوص الكتب النبوة]. They would create strange ideas if we were to take them literally without noticing the exaggeration which they contain, or if we were to understand them in accordance with the original meaning of the terms, ignoring the fact that these are used figuratively.

What are some examples of what Maimonides would like to declare as figurative? The hint, of course, lies in the formula that one must “distinguish between that which is possible, and that which is impossible”. So we find that when God says in Ezekiel XXXII.33 “I will blot him out out from the book of life”, Maimonides is convinced that “we must not assume that God has a book in which He writes, or from which he blots out”.

The guiding principle for Maimonides is reason, as he exhorts his pupil:

Employ your reason, and you will be able to discern what is said allegorically, figuratively, or hyperbolically, and what is meant literally, exactly according to the original meaning of the words. You will then understand all prophecies, learn and retain rational principles of faith, pleasing in the eyes of God who is most pleased with truth, and most displeased with falsehood; your mind and heart will not be so perplexed as to believe or accept as law what is untrue or improbable, whilst the Law is perfectly true when properly understood. … If you adopt this method, you will not imagine the existence of things which God has not created, or accept principles which might partly lead to atheism, or to a corruption of your notions of God so as to ascribe to Him corporeality, attributes, or emotions, as has been shown by us, nor will you believe that the words of the prophets are false: for the cause of this disease is ignorance of what we have explained.

Part 2, Chapter 48

natural vs. divine causation

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides speaks about the relationship between natural causes and divine causes, and talks about why the Prophets sometimes ascribe God as the cause of things that are simply produced naturally:

It is clear that everything produced must have an immediate cause which produced it; that cause again a cause, and so on, till the First Cause (sabab al-awwal سبب الأول), viz. (a’ni أعني), the will and decree of God (مشية الله و إختياره) is reached. The prophets therefore omit sometimes the intermediate causes, and ascribe the production of an individual thing directly to God, saying that God has made it.

All sorts of things are ascribed in Scripture to God:

“events evidently due to chance”
“an animal’s desire for some of its natural wants”, such as the fish vomiting out Younus
“events caused by man’s free will”
“phenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as the melting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm”

But it is to be understood that there is no special ‘intervention’ going on here.

Part 3

Part 1, Introduction to Part III

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Here, Maimonides provides a different ‘objective’ for the book.

it is our primary object in this treatise to expound, as far as possible, the Biblical account of the Creation (Ma‘aseh bereshit) and the description of the Divine Chariot (Ma‘aseh Mercabah) in a manner adapted to the training of those for whom this work is written.

‘those for whom this work is written’ is a phrase that is well explained in GP.I.intro: someone who adheres to religious Law but is also trained in philosophy, and finds it “difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law”.

But for Maimonides, “these subjects belong to the mysteries of the Law”, and were known to the Sages, who made it clear that one is not supposed to divulge these “secrets” except with great caution, “although”, Maimonides says, “they are perfectly clear to the philosopher”. Thus, for Maimonides, there are certain profound truths, particulrly metaphysical ones, which can be known either through careful study of Revelation as mediated by ‘the Sages’, or through philosophical study; at one point, he refers to “person[s] favoured by Providence with reason to understand these mysteries”.

However, this kind of knowledge has “entirely disappeared from our nation, and nothing has remained of it. This was unavoidable, for the explanation of these mysteries was always communicated viva voce, it was never committed to writing”. He does not claim a mystical or revelatory source for his own knowledge of these ‘secrets’, nor does he claim that he is a link in the supposed chain of transmission from the Sages; ever the rationalist, Maimonides plainly admits that

my knowledge of them is based on reasoning, not on divine inspiration. I have not received my belief in this respect from any teacher, but it has been formed by what I learnt from Scripture and the utterances of our Sages, and by the philosophical principles which I have adopted. It is therefore possible that my view is wrong, and that I misunderstood the passages referred to.

Conveying once again his reluctance to expound openly what religion commands him to conceal, he states once again that his method of exposition has been deliberately cursory; “those … for whom this treatise has been composed will, on reflecting on it and thoroughly examining each chapter, obtain a perfect and clear insight into all that has been clear and intelligible to me.”

The following few chapters will be devoted to an explanation of the book of the prophet Ezekiel, which contains the ‘description of the Divine Chariot’; in Friedlander’s translation, “this sublime, important, and grand (الشريف الجليل العظيم) subject”.

Part 1, 1-7

commentary on Ezekiel

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides explains the visions of the Prophet Ezekiel, which he is convinced contain the most profound metaphysical mysteries. I am not familiar enough with the Biblical text to comment on these, so I will skip these seven chapters.

Part 1, Chapter 8

matter and form

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides states that transient bodies are subject to destruction only from the persepctive of their matter (من جهة مادتها) and not through their form (من جهة الصورة): the form of things is permanent, while their matter is transitory. Thus, if we think of bodies as consisting of (1) matter and (2) form, for Maimonides it is clear that the former is lowly while the latter is exalted; matter is always changing, always transforming, and always transient; but form, as form, is permanent.

Note: in this chapter, Friedlander seems to have translated the word maadda as ‘substance’, but ‘matter’ is probably more appropriate. I should check what Pines has.

It is therefore clear that all corruption, destruction, or defect comes from matter. Take, e.g., man … all weakness, interruption, or disorder of his actions … originate in the transient matter, not in the form. … Man’s shortcomings and sins are all due to the substance of the body and not to its form; while all his merits are exclusively due to his form. Thus the knowledge of God, the formation of ideas, the mastery of desire and passion, the distinction between that which is to be chosen and that which is to be rejected, all these man owes to his form; but eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, excessive lust, passion, and all vices, have their origin in the substance of his body.

Expressing a rather surprisingly Christian idea, Maimonides says:

It was impossible, according to the wisdom of God, that matter should exist without form … and it was necessary that the very noble form of man, which is the image and likeness of God, … should be joined to the substance of dust and darkness, the source of all defect and loss,

This is reminiscent of Mir:

عالم میں جاں کے مجھ کو تنزّہ تھا اب تو میں
آلودگیِ جسم سے ماٹی میں اٹ گیا

aalam mein jaan ke mujh ko tanazzuh thha ab to mein
aaloodgi -e- jism se maati mein at gaya

In the realm of spirits, I was sanctified; now, well, I —
am mingled in dust from the pollutedness of body

This idea has ethical implications in the Maimonidean worldview, which in this chapter sounds quite monastic. Because man is distinguished by this ‘God-like’ ability to conquer his passions, one’s ability to do so determines one’s “station”. The more one indulges in the desires of the flesh, the farther away one goes from his ‘true’, Godly nature. Chief among the culprits is the sense of touch, which Maimonides — following Aristotle — considers particularly distasteful. If we must tend to our bodily needs and desires, we should “reduce these wants, guard against them, feel grieved when satisfying them, abstain from speaking of them, discusissing them, and attending to them in company with others.”

So what should we be engaged in, instead? Maimonides has a philosopher’s reply:

His aim must be the aim of man as man, viz., the formation of ideas, and nothing else.

which he then qualifies with a theologian’s lens, because he then says:

The best and sublimest among them is the idea which man forms of God, angels, and the rest of the creation according to his capacity. … This is man’s task and purpose. Others, however, that are separated from God form the multitude of fools, and do just the opposite. They neglect all thought and all reflection on ideas, and consider as their task the cultivation of the sense of touch, that sense which is the greatest disgrace.

Part 1, Chapter 9

immateriality of God

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides emphasizes the immateriality of God.

The corporeal element in man is a large screen and partition that prevents him from perfectly perceiving abstract ideals: this would be the case even if the corporeal element were as pure and superior as the substance of the spheres; how much more must this be the case with our dark and opaque body. However great the exertion of our mind may be to comprehend the Divine Being or any of the ideals, we find a screen and partition between Him and ourselves.

Note: Friedlander has “the corporeal element in man”, but in Husein Atay’s Arabic edition there is only al-maadda hijab azeem, i.e. it seems from the Arabic that Maimonides is calling all matter a screen unto God.

Part 1, Chapter 10

problem of evil

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter serves as a preface to Maimonides’ discussions about the problem of evil.

He starts out by stating that it is only positive qualities which really ‘exist’, and negative qualities are simply the absence of those quantities. Thus, ‘motion’ exists and has to be produced, but ‘rest’ is like a default state that does “does not require any agent”. However, in common speech, we do say that “[he] who puts ou the light at night … has produced darkness, … although darkness [is a] negative property and requires no agent”. He finds a philological basis for this claim in Isaiah 45:7,”I form light and create darkness”; in this passage, Maimonides maintains, two different verbs are used for light and darkness. One has to make light, but one does not similarly make darkness because it is simply the absence of darkness; an agent has to bring about deprivation of light in order to ‘create’ darkness. Hence, “Only in this sense can non-existence be said to be produced by a certain action of an agent”.

It is now clear that … the action of an agent cannot be directly connected with a thing that does not exist: only indirectly is non-existence described as the result of the action of an agent, whilst in a direct manner an action can only influence a thing really in existence

We begin to get a feel for why Maimonides has laid down this conceptual framework when he states:

After this explanation you must recall to memory that, as has been proved, the [so-called] evils are evils only in relation to a certain thing, and that which is evil in reference to a certain existing thing, either includes the nonexistence of that thing or the non-existence of some of its good conditions. The proposition has therefore been laid down in the most general terms, “All evils are negations.”

Some examples he gives are illness, poverty, and ignorance, which are all “privations of properties”. Maimonides is confident that all evils are privations of some or the other positive property.

With this conceptual armory in hand, — i.e., the idea that only positive properties can be said to truly ‘exist’; negative ones don’t exist per se, but are privations of those properties; light exists, and darkness is its negation — he goes on to state with supreme confidence

After these propositions, it must be admitted as a fact that it cannot be said of God that He directly creates evil, or He has the direct intention to produce evil: this is impossible. His works are all perfectly good. He only produces existence, and all existence is good: whilst evils are of a negative character, and cannot be acted upon

In some sense, Maimonides has redefined ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in such a way that God is ontologically good by definition. However, evil does seem to exist in the world; how does Maimonides explain that?

Evil can only he attributed to Him … in so far as He produces the corporeal element such as it actually is: it is always connected with negatives, and is on that account the source of all destruction and all evil. Those beings that do not possess this corporeal element are not subject to destruction or evil: consequently the true work of God is all good, since it is existence. The book which enlightened the darkness of the world says therefore, “And God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31). Even the existence of this corporeal element, low as it in reality is, because it is the source of death and all evils, is likewise good for the permanence of the Universe and the continuation of the order of things, so that one thing departs and the other succeeds.

Part 1, Chapter 11

problem of evil

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Because ‘all evils are negations’, any wrongs committed by humans against each other “are likewise due to non-existence (‘adam), because they originate in ignorance (jahl), which is absence of wisdom (‘ilm)”. He finds scriptural support for this position in Isaiah’s prophecies about the end times, when:

conflict between people will cease
ignorance will be replaced with knowledge

The two are intimately tied with each other; conflict, interpersonal and inter-group wrongs, etc., are all the result of ignorance, and since all knowledge comes from and returns to God, they result from ignorance of God. This is why, when the end times come and humanity reconciles with itself, this must necessarily be accompanied by a reconciliation with God. This is why Isaiah says:

If men possessed wisdom [in Atay’s arabic this is ‘ilm, so I need to check Pines], which stands in the same relation to the form of man as the sight to the eye, they would not cause any injury to themselves or to others: for the knowledge of truth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents mutual injuries. This state of society is promised to us by the prophet in the words: “And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb,” etc.; “and the cow and the bear shall feed together,” etc.; and “the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp,” etc. The prophet also points out what will be the cause of this change: for he says that hatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men will then have a true knowledge of God. “They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea”

Note: It is interesting to note that for Maimonides, the key word in Isaiah 11.9 is “knowledge of the Lord”, but Sefaria’s translation uses “devotion to the Lord”. Need to check Pines’ translation for this.

Part 1, Chapter 12

problem of evil

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides undertakes to refute the commonly-held notion (خيال الجمهور, khayal al-jamhoor) that “evils in the world are more numerous than the good things”. The word he uses for evil is sharr شر and for good, khayr خير. He is, at the outset, very critical of this point of view , to the point of scornfulness, and castigates Al-Razi for his book on Metaphysics which, according to Maimonides, makes the same claim. I assume this is regarding Abu Bakr al-Razi and not Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.

Maimonides says that people fall into this error because they

judge the whole universe by examining one single person. For an ignorant man believes that the whole universe only exists for him; as if nothing else required any consideration. If, therefore, anything happens to him contrary to his expectation, he at once concludes that the whole universe is evil. If, however, he would take into consideration the whole universe, form an idea of it, and comprehend what a small portion he is of the Universe, he will find the truth. For it is clear that persons who have fallen into this widespread error as regards the multitude of evils in the world, do not find the evils among the angels, the spheres and stars, the elements, and that which is formed of them, viz., minerals and plants, or in the various species of living beings, but only in some individual instances of mankind.

He paints a rather petulant picture of those who complain that the world is more evil than it is good; he gives the example of someone who “became leprous in consequence of bad food”, or “was struck with blindndess” because he “indulges so much in sensuality”. These arguments seem to be leading toward the sort of resolution to the problem of evil which blames people for their own misfortunes. But before addressing the problem of evil head-on, Maimonides reminds the reader that “the whole mankind at present in existence, and a fortiori, every other species of animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the permanent universe”, and that we cannot complain about the entire universe being full of evil simply based on human experience. “It is of great advantage that man should know his station, and not erroneously imagine that the whole universe exists only for him. We hold that the universe exists because the Createor wills it so”, and not for our benefit.

Doubling down on the idea that God is good, and is not responsible for any evil, Maimonides says:

Man’s existence is nevertheless a great boon to him, and his distinction and perfection is a divine gift. The numerous evils to which individual persons are exposed are due to the defects existing in the persons themselves. We complain and seek relief from our own faults: we suffer from the evils which we, by our own free will, inflict on ourselves and ascribe them to God, who is far from being connected with them!

For Maimonides, evils are of three kinds, in increasing order of frequency of occurrence:

Those “caused to man by the circumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or that he possesses a body” (ما يصيب الأنسان من جهة طبيعة الكون والفساد ، أعني من حيث هو ذو مادة) — i.e., the occupational hazards of being a corporeal entity, e.g., being subject to old age and death, or to the occasional (less than one-thousandth, according to Maimonides) congenital defects, etc. These are an unavoidable part of being a living thing, and are due not to our form but due to matter, which is inherently subject to generation/destruction and therefore to ‘evils’ of this kind.
Those which “people cause to each other”, and
Those which “every one causes to himself by his own action”. “This class of evils originates in man’s vices, such as excessive desire for eating, drinking, and love; indulgence in these things in undue measure, or in improper manner, or partaking of bad food”

His explanation of the third type is far-reaching and tries to cover scenarios which one would not, necessarily, consider to be evils ‘of one’s own doing’. For example, he explains that if someone indulges in their vices habitually, the soul itself becomes afflicted, causing the person to make poor choices in life. Once again, he appears to be extremely harsh in his condemnation of those who feel that there is more evil in the world than there is good:

Those who are ignorant and perverse in their thought are constantly in trouble and pain, because they cannot get as much of superfluous things as a certain other person possesses. They as a rule expose themselves to great dangers, e.g., by sea-voyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose of obtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. When they thus meet with the consequences of the course which they adopt, they complain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin to blame the time, and wonder at the want of justice in its changes; that it has not enabled them to acquire great riches, with which they could buy large quantities of wine for the purpose of making themselves drunk, and numerous concubines adorned with various kind of ornaments of gold, embroidery, and jewels, for the purpose of driving themselves to voluptuousness beyond their capacities, as if the whole Universe existed exclusively for the purpose of giving pleasure to these low people.

In contrast,

those who observe the nature of the Universe and the commandments of the Law, and know their purpose, see clearly God’s mercy and truth in everything; they seek, therefore, that which the Creator intended to be the aim of man, viz., comprehension.

If only man would restrict himself to what he needs, and did not indulge in excessive desires, he would be in harmony with his true purpose, and evils would not befall him. He could then calmly go through life, observing both the natural precepts of the Universe and the divine precepts of the Law, desiring only that which is “necessary for the preservation of the individual [or] for that of the species”; his remaining energies would then be focused on “that which the Creator intended to be the aim of man, viz., comprehension.”

He uses an interesting analogy to “prove the correctness of this assertion”.

The more necessary a thing is for living beings, the more easily it is found and the cheaper it is; the less necessary it is, the rarer and clearer it is. E.g., air, water, and food are indispensable to man: air is most necessary, for if man is without air a short time he dies; whilst he can be without water a day or two. Air is also undoubtedly found more easily and cheaper [than water]. Water is more necessary than food; for some people can be four or five days without food, provided they have water; water also exists in every country in larger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. … No intelligent person, I think, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald as very necessary for man except as medicines: and they, as well as other like substances, can be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals

Committed to the idea of Divine Providence, he says that we should not mistake any inequality of material possessions, etc., to mean that God has unjustly favored some people over others:

There is no difference between individuals of a species in the due course of Nature; the difference originates in the various dispositions of their substances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of the substance of that species: the nature of the species is not more favourable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong or injustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garments embroidered with gold, while another has not those things, which are not necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has not thereby obtained control over anything that could be an essential addition to his nature, but has only obtained something illusory or deceptive. … In these … ways, you will see the mercy of God toward His creatures, how He has provided that which is required, in proper proportions, and treated all individual beings of the same species with perfect equality.

“All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth (Ps. 25:10) … for it is an act of great and perfect foodness that He gave us existence”.

Part 1, Chapter 13

purpose of creation; teleology

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter is concerned with Maimonides’ teleology. What is the ultimate purpose (ghaayat غاية) of the universe? The chapter hints that a prevailing, common-sense religious answer to this question is that the entire Universe was made for mankind, and man that he might worship God. But Maimonides doesn’t agree with this conception, and comes to a very different answer as follows.

(A) When something is brought about by an agent with intention (qasd قصد), then the agent must have had a purpose (ghaayat غاية) for carrying out the act, and it makes sense to look for a final cause for such a thing.
(B) Things which are not the result of an agent need not have a (ghaayat غاية); thus, “we cannot ask what is the purpose of the existence of God”.

Now, Maimonides entertains two possible theories for the Universe; either it is eternal (the Aristotelian view) or it is created in time (the Mosaic view).

If it is eternal, then it is not the result of an external agent but a self-subsisting causa sui, and so by (B) there is no final cause for the universe.
If it were created in time,

“some hold that the inquiry after the purpose of the Creation is necessary, and assume that the Universe was only created for the sake of man’s existence, that he might serve God. Everything that is done they believe is done for man’s sake; even the spheres move only for his benefit”.

After stating this point of view, he says:

On examining this opinion as intelligent persons ought to examine all different opinions, we shall discover the errors it includes.

For Maimonides, these errors include the notion that more perfect things (the spheres) were created for the sake of less perfect things (the four elements of sublunary matter). But his attack on this point of view doesn’t just stop there.

Even if the Universe existed for man’s sake and man existed for the purpose of serving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains, What is the end of serving God?

After all, God does not become more perfect if he is worshipped more. If one answers that the end of serving God is to perfect ourselves, then Maimonides replies: “What is the object of our being perfect?”

We must in continuing the inquiry as to the purpose of the creation at last arrive at the answer, It was the Will of God, or His Wisdom decreed it; and this is the correct answer.

Thus, for Maimonides, if we believe in a universe created in time by an act of Divine Will, there is no teleology, no final cause; instead, the only answer we have for “Why does the universe exists?” is of the throw-your-hands-in-the-air variety: God willed it so.

So far so good. In this summary, we have skipped over some of Maimonides’ points about teleology in the constituent parts of nature; e.g., he deals with the question of whether it is correct to say that some plants were made for animals, etc.

Maimonides stands very strongly against ascribing any final cause to the universe, and even to constituent parts of the universe, as seen in (*) below. He sums up his position thus:

I consider therefore the following opinion as most correct according to the teaching of the Bible, and best in accordance with the results of philosophy; namely, that the Universe does not exist for man’s sake, but that (*) each being exists for its own sake, and not because of some other thing. Thus we believe in the Creation, and yet need not inquire what purpose is served by each species of the existing things, because we assume that God created all parts of the Universe by His will; some for their own sake, and some for the sake of other beings, that include their own purpose in themselves. … We remain firm in our belief that the whole Universe was created in accordance with the will of God, and we do not inquire for any other cause or object. just as we do not ask what is the purpose of God’s existence, so we do not ask what was the object of His will, which is the cause of the existence of all things … This must be our belief when we have a correct knowledge of our own self, and comprehend the true nature of everything; we must be content, and not trouble our mind with seeking a certain final cause for things that have none, or have no other final cause but their own existence, which depends on the Will of God (mashiyat ilahiyah مشيئة إلهيه), or, if you prefer, on the Divine Wisdom (hikmat ilahiyah حكمة إلهيه).

Commentary

Maimonides inserts “if you prefer” at a very interesting point in the text. Running throughout the Guide is a certain tension between Wisdom and Will, which Maimonides claims are identical in the Godhead. “If you prefer” suggests that Maimonides is happy to concede to a reader that things are the way they are because of the wisdom of God, rather than due to the will of God; in this chapter, Maimonides seems to use the latter formulation. So are the two really equivalent?

I suspect that Maimonides is writing to an audience for whom the two are not necessarily identical. The Perplexity the resolution of which is the central project of the Guide can, I think be summed up in the formula: Wisdom versus Will. In Spinoza we have the negation of the latter and the taking-to-logical-conclusion of the former. Even for Avicenna, I think, the Universe mostly appears to work as a result of Divine Wisdom rather than Divine Will. For Maimonides, evidently, the Perplexity has been (internally) resolved; he does not feel any dissonance between the two ways of looking at the world, and is happy to let the reader pick any one of the two.

Part 1, Chapter 15

impossibilities

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The philosophical content of this chapter consists in Maimonides’ strong refutation — indeed, scorn — of the naive religious idea that we should expect an all-powerful God to be able to make the impossible possible. Some examples of the logical impossibilities that are not in God’s power include:

for one substratum to have two opposite properties at the same time
for substance to become accident or vice versa
“that God should produce a being like Himself, or annihilate, corporify, or change Himself.”
“to produce a square with a diagonal equal to one of the sides”

on these matters, he proclaims agreement between himself and “the philosophers”. But there are some points of disagreement on this score.

The first disagreement cited by Maimonides refers to an obscure theological question answered in the affirmative by the Mutazilah: can an accident exist independent of substance? Maimonides does not reveal his own opinion, but pointedly says that the former “have not arrived at this conclusion by philosophical research alone, but it was mainly by the desire to defend certain religious principles, which speculation had greatly shaken.” While Maimonides does not directly criticize such accomodationism, it appears that he does not agree with the methodology of the Mutazilah here, consistent with his general criticism of the mutakallemin.

The second disagreement refers to creation out of nihilo;

the creation of corporeal things, otherwise than from a substance, is possible according to our view, whilst the philosophers say that it is impossible.

These trivial points are followed by a more careful and nuanced paragraph about what it means to call something impossible. I should probably check the Pines translation and think about this more carefully. He says:

I wonder whether this gate of research is open, so that all may freely enter, and whilst one imagines a thing and considers it possible, another is at liberty to assert that such a thing is impossible by its very nature; or whether the gate is closed and guarded by certain rules, so that we are able to decide with certainty whether a thing is physically impossible. I should also like to know, in the latter case, whether imagination or reason has to examine and test objects as to their being possible or not; likewise how things imagined, and things conceived intellectually, are to be distinguished from each other. For it occurs that we consider a thing as physically possible, and then some one objects, or we ourselves fear that our opinion is only the result of imagination, and not that of reason. In such a case it would be desirable to ascertain whether there exists some faculty to distinguish between imagination and intellect, [and if so,] whether this faculty is different from both, or whether it is part of the intellect itself to distinguish between intellectual and imaginary objects. All this requires investigation, but it does not belong to the theme of this chapter.

What stands out from this passage is Maimonides’ belief that the imagination is not a useful tool for deciding whether something is possible or impossible; only the intellect can ascertain this for sure.

Part 1, Chapter 16

providence + God's knowledge of particulars + problem of evil

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Why do bad things happen to good people?

Either God knows all particulars, and therefore knows all the individual acts of suffering that take place in this world
Or God does not know particulars.

If 1 holds, then we have three possibilities:

(A) God arranges and manages human affairs well, perfectly and faultlessly;
(B) He is overcome by obstacles, and is too weak and powerless to manage human affairs;
(C) He knows [all things] and can arrange and manage them, but leaves and abandons them, as too base, low, and vile, or from jealousy

Now, the philosophical argument goes, 1(B) goes against God’s omnipotence, and 1(C) goes against God’s good-ness. So the only remaining options are 1(A) and 2. But

Since we, however, notice that events do not follow a certain order, that they cannot be determined by analogy, and are not in accordance with what is wanted, we conclude that God has no knowledge of them in any way or for any reason,

1(A) cannot be. Thus the only alternative left is 2: God does not know particulars. Indeed, this appears to have been the primary resolution to the problem of evil offered by mediaeval Arabic philosophers. On this point, however, Maimonides vehemently disagrees. “This is the argument which led the philosophers to speak such blasphemous words”.

He lists some of their egregious positions:

God cannot perceive individual species but only genii, since individual species can only be perceived by the senses
there are an infinite numnber of individuals, whereas knowledge requires the object-of-knowledge to be circumscribed, which cannot be done
if God knows things before they come to being, “this implies that there can be knowledge of a thing that does not exist”, or that “the knowledve of an object in potentia is identical with the knowledge of that same object in reality”, since God does not change.
some “went as far as to ontend that God knows nothing beside Himself, because they believe that God cannot have more than one knowledge”.

He mounts a many-pronged attack:

Firstly, he argues that by using this process of elimination, the philosophers ascribe an even greater imperfection to God (ignorance of particulars) than the imperfection which they held to be inadmissible (that God neglects or forgets things)
Secondly, he points out that the argument that ‘God cannot perceive individual species but only genii, since individual species can only be perceived by the senses’ falls flat, since God does not require senses to perceive at all

and leaves the rest to a later chapter.

Part 1, Chapter 17

Providence; problem of evil

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

There are five theories about Divine Providence (al-‘inayat العناية):

Epicurus’ position: There is no providence; everything is governed by chance.
Aristotle’s opinion: God’s providence extends to the realm of the heavenly spheres, but the sublunary world is subject to chance. Those things that have permanence are subject to providence; those that are transitory are not.
The Ashari position: No part of the Universe is subject to chance; everything, large or small, happens by God’s will, intention and plan (irada, qasd, tadbeer بإرادة و قصد و تدبير)
The Mutazilite position: Humans have free will; God’s acts follow from wisdom, and he does not afflict the good (لا يجوز عليه الجور la yajuz ‘alayh al-jawr)
The Mosaic position: good and bad happens to all people according to their just deserts.

In a magisterial passage, Maimonides states

I do not consider it proper to blame the followers of any of the [last named] three theories on Providence, for they have been driven to accept them by weighty considerations

These ‘weighty considerations’ include

for Aristotle, “that which appears to be the nature of things”, i.e., natural philosophy
The Ashariyah did not want to ascribe to God ignorance of particulars
The Mutazilites did not want to ascribe to God injustice

He summarizes the varying theories’ explanation for good and evil in human affairs as follows:

Theory	Explanation
Aristotle	chance
Ashariyah	Divine Will
Mu’tazila	Divine Wisdom
Mosaic	the merits of man

It will probably help if I gather Maimondes’ thoughts about the other systems in one place.

Epicurean position

There is no Providence at all for anything in the Universe; all parts of the Universe, the heavens and what they contain, owe their origin to accident and chance; there exists no being that rules and governs them or provides for them. This is the theory of Epicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atoms, that these have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by mere accident. There have been atheists among the Israelites who have expressed the same view; it is reported of them: “They have denied the Lord, and said he is not” (Jer. 5:12). Aristotle has proved the absurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated by chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that rules and governs the Universe

Aristotle’s position

According to Maimonides, Aristotle’s point of view

is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity, of the Universe, and with his opinion that everything different from the existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of those who turned away from our Law, and said: “God hath forsaken the earth” (Ezekiel 9.9).

In the Aristoetlian point of view, the species of any particular organism in the sublunary part of the universe is subject to Providence and consequently has permanence, but individuals are subject to chance. There is an ‘order’ to nature that guarantees that, e.g., all the individuals of a species will have the material resources they need in order to grow and flourish; but chance dictates that sometimes, some individuals are harmed ‘randomly’; Providence does not govern individuals. We can sum this up by saying ‘God does not know particulars’.

Ashari position

According to this theory, there is nothing in the whole Universe, neither a class nor an individual being, that is due to chance; everything is the result of will, intention, and rule… each leaf falls according to the Divine decree; it is God who caused it to fall at a certain time and in a certain place; it could not have fallen before or after that time or in another place, as this has previously been decreed. The Ashariyah were therefore compelled to assume that motion and rest of living beings are predestined, and that it is not in the power of man to do a certain thing or to leave it undone. The theory further implies a denial of possibility in these things: they can only be either necessary or impossible.

The Ashari point of view contains ‘evident absurdities’; for one thing, it denies the role of causality in our world by positing God as the direct actor whenever any putatively natural act occurs. It also leads to a fatalism that denies agency to human beings by reducing all of their actions and intentions to the actions and intentions of God. It then follows that Divine commandments to humans are meaningless, since everything as pre-ordained by God anyway. Any evil in the world turns out to be a direct result of God’s actions. He completes the rather poor picture he is painting of the Ashari position by saying:

When we see a person born blind or leprous, who could not have merited a punishment for previous sins, they say, It is the will of God; when a pious worshipper is tortured and slain, it is likewise the will of God; and no injustice can be asserted to Him for that, for according to their opinion it is proper that God should afflict the innocent and do good to the sinner.

In critizing this position, Maimonides charges that “It is … possible, according to the Ashariyah, that God inflicts pain on a good and pious man in this world, and keeps him for ever in fire, which is assumed to rage in the world to come, they simply say it is the Will of God”. This was indeed the position of Ghazali, who believed that ‘justice’ is a human concept and we cannot place human-defined limits on Divine actions. No matter what happens, it is just according to God’s plkan, even if it doesn’t seem that way to us.

Mu’tazila position

Man has free will; it is therefore intelligible that the Law contains commands and prohibitions, with announcements of reward and punishment. All acts of God are due to wisdom; no injustice is found in Him, and He does not afflict the good. The Mu’tazila profess this theory, although they do not believe in man’s absolute free will. They hold also that God takes notice of the falling of the leaf and the destruction of the ant, and that His Providence extends over all things… they believe on the one hand that God knows everything, and on the other that man has free will. By a little consideration we discover the contradiction.

According to Maimonides, if a pious person were afflicted with pain in this world, “The Mu’tazilites would consider this as injustice, and therefore assume that every being, even an ant, that is stricken with pain [in this world], has compensation for it, as has been mentioned above; and it is due to God’s Wisdom that a being is struck and afflicted in order to receive compensation.”

The Mosaic position

In explicating the ‘Mosaic’ position, Maimonides tells us that the (Mosaic) Law tells us:

that God has decreed absolute free will for us: “ it is due to the eternal divine will that all living beings should move freely, and that man should have power to act according to his will or choice within the limits of his capacity”
Because “all his ways are judgement” (Deut.32.4), any evil that comes to humans arises ultimately from our own actions and does not originate from God. All good that comes to us is a reward, and all evil that befalls us is a punishment.
that reward for good and punishment for evil extends to everyone, even if no Prophet had enjoined that particular good or forbidden that particular evil; “he who does a good thing without being commanded, receives nevertheless his reward”.
Sometimes, bad things seem to happen for no reason; these are ‘afflictions of love’; “According to this doctrine it is possible that a person be afflicted without having previously committed any sin, in order that his future reward may be increased”. (this is the Mu’tazila position)
Providence does not extend to irrational beings; there is no concept of reward or punishment for them.

Maimonides’ own position (?)

My opinion on this principle of Divine Providence I will now explain to you. In the principle which I now proceed to expound I do not rely on demonstrative proof, but on my conception of the spirit of the Divine Law, and the writings of the Prophets. The principle which I accept is far less open to objections, and is more reasonable than the opinions mentioned before.

In the sublunary world, Divine Providence does not extend to individual members of a species, just to the genera … except for humans; mankind is the only species for which there is Divine Providence for every single individual.

I do not believe that it is through the interference of Divine Providence that a certain leaf drops [from a tree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a certain fly, that this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in that moment; it is not by a particular Divine decree that the spittle of a certain person moved, fell on a certain gnat in a certain place, and killed it; nor is it by the direct will of God that a certain fish catches and swallows a certain worm on the surface of the water. In all these cases the action is, according to my opinion, entirely due to chance, as taught by Aristotle

Why are humans special? Because “Divine Providence is connected with Divine intellectual influence”, and because humans are made in the image of God and with a divine intellect, they also receive Providence, what in commong English we have come to call ‘karma’.

It may be by mere chance that a ship goes down with all her contents … or the roof of a house falls upon those within; but it is not due to chance, according to our view, that in the one instance the men went into the ship, or remained in the house in the other instance: it is due to the will of God, and is in accordance with the justice of His judgments, the method of which our mind is incapable of understanding.

Part 1, Chapter 18

Providence; problem of evil

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides further fleshes out his views on Divine Providence. He explains that the Law teaches that there is a ‘hierarchy’ of Providence, i.e., a hierarchy of the degree to which people are affected by, and receive, the Divine فيض. This hierarchy means that the closer a person gets to God, the more he receives the Divine influence that protects and nurtures him; the farther he strays from closeness-to-God and adopts his earthly, animal nature, the farther away he becomes from Divine Providence and the more he becomes subject to chance the way non-human animals always are. At the top of this hierarchy are the Prophets, to whom God promised his specific favours; these favours are not available to everyone, but are according to “the merits of man”.

He claims that this view of Providence is in agreement with ‘philosophical research’, citing Farabi, Aristotle, and Plato. It is interesting to note that he does not here mention the degree to which a person strives to follow the Law, but instead the degree to which a person ‘approaches God’, emulating Godly characteristics and perfecting virtue. These terms appear to be used in a religion-neutral sense in this chapter, even if the examples of those closest to God are, unsurprisingly, the Hebrew Prophets; indeed, “Divine Providence is in each case proportional to the person’s intellectual development” (al-inayat tabi’at lil-‘aql العناية تابعة للعقل).

Finally, Maimonides is concerned with showing that he is opposed to the position held by “some philosophical schools” بعض مذاهب الفلأسفة, that Providence extends to the species but not to the individual. For Maimonides, this is true for animals and plants, etc., but not for humans. One piece of his argument is the point that only individuals exist in reality, and species only exist in our minds, and that the Divine فيض extends to humans not through some abstract Intelligence but through each of our individual Intelligences.

Part 1, Chapter 19

Problem of evil, God's knowledge of particulars

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides sets up the background for eventually telling us his theory about one of the standard problems of classical Islamic philosophy: God’s Knowledge of Particulars. This is a subset of the more general problem knows as ‘The Problem of Evil’, and boils down to the question: If God is good, capable of disposing of all the world’s affairs, and knows all things, how does evil exist in the world? Maimonides captures this way of thinking in the rather derisive formulation that

[some people] imagine that God takes no notice of earthly affairs … simply because human affairs are not arranged as every person would think it desirable. Seeing that these are not in accordance with their wish, they say, “The Lord does not see us”.

One of the classical answers to this problem, held by some of the esteemed Islamicate philosophers of the time, went as follows: ‘God knows universals, not particulars.’ This answer to the question is anathema for Maimonides. “Some thinkers assume, …, haughtily and exultingly, that God knows certain things and is ignorant of certain other things. They did so because they imagined that they discovered a certain absence of order in man’s affairs”.

The language used here, “they imagined that they discovered …” suggests that Maimonides rejects the very premise of this line of argument; he does not believe that there is truly ‘an absence of order in man’s affairs’. He cites the Books of the Prophets to show that these objections against the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God are not new, and that the Tanakh offers what — at least for Maimonides — is a satisfactory answer to this problem.

A typical example that he cites from the Prophets goes like this:

David likewise shows how general this view [i.e., the fact that wicked people are seen in happiness, ease, and peace; thus it is of no use to do good and suffer for it] was in his time, and how it led and caused people to sin and to oppress one another. At first he argues against this theory, and then he declares that God is omniscient. He says as follows: ‘‘They slay the widow and the stranger, and murder the fatherless. Yet they say, The Lord shall not see, neither shall the God of Jacob regard it. Understand, ye brutish among the people, and ye fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth nations, shall not he correct? or he that teacheth man knowledge?’’

Essentially, he argues that if God created the organ of sight (and perhaps we can add, the very possibility of sight), then he, as the maker of the organ, must have had the idea of sight in his Mind (such as it is) — the tissues of the eye cannot simply have come together by chance unless they were being directed to the purpose of sight, and this could only have been done by a being who knew what sight is. This argument doesn’t seem too convincing, because possessing the idea of sight seems quite distinct from literally ‘seeing all things’.

For Maimonides, the reason why we fall into such traps is “that God endowed us with the intellect which is the means of our comprehension, and which on account of its insufficiency to form a true idea of God has become the source of great doubts: that He therefore knows what our defects are, and how worthless the doubts are which originate in our faulty reasoning.” (emphasis added)

Commentary: The usual Islamic (and perhaps also Christian) answer to the problem of evil relies crucially on bodily resurrection, and the idea that the scores are settled in the end, even if ‘this life’ may seem unfair. It remains to be seen whether Maimonides is able to solve the problem without recourse to an afterlife. Also, the language of ‘true idea of God’ seems quite reminiscent of Spinoza …

Part 1, Chapter 20

Problem of evil, God's knowledge of particulars

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides argues that most of the objections to God’s omniscience arise because we use our understanding of human knowledge to evaluate God’s knowledge. But according to him, “the knowledge attributed to [God’s] essence has nothing in common with our knowledge, just as that essence is in no way like our essence.”

For example, our knowledge of things changes with time; in order for us to know different things at different times, a change has to come into our knowledge. But for God,

various events are known to Him before they take place; He constantly knows them, and therefore no fresh knowledge is acquired by Him. e.g., He knows that a certain person is non-existent at present, will come to existence at a certain time, will continue to exist for sometime, and will then cease to exist. When this person, in accordance with God’s foreknowledge concerning him, comes into existence, God’s knowledge is not increased; it contains nothing that it did not contain before, but something has taken place that was known previously exactly as it has taken place.

This is very different from how human knowledge works; therefore, Maimonides would have us think that the usual objections to God’s omniscience are misplaced. For example, some philosophers think that God can only know constants and not transients, or universals and not particulars, or species but not individuals. Maimonides does not admit any of these impediments to God’s knowledge: God truly is omniscient. The catch is that his knowledge is a mysterious thing that we cannot understand, and any analogy with our own knowledge is inadequate and deficient.

Part 1, Chapter 21

God's knowledge of things

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter has a very Neoplatonic bent to it, and it is hard to mistake the influence of Philo’s ideas, even if Maimonides did not actually read Philo. The crux of this chapter’s argument is that “there is a great difference between the knowledge which the producer of a thing possesses concerning it, and the knowledge which other persons possess concerning the same thing”. He describes a hypothetical machine, and points out the qualitative difference between how an ordinary person’s intellect comes to interact with the machine — bit by bit, incompletely, and always increasing — and how the maker of the machine conceives of the object.

We can summarize Maimonides’ argument like this: our knowledge of things is “derived from the things themselves”, whereas God’s knowledge of those same things is not derived from the things. Instead, it’s the other way round for God: “the things are in accordance with His eternal knowledge, which has established their actual properties”. In other words, the intelligible world ‘follows from’ the Mind of God, the eternal logos.

If we were to try to understand [how God knows all things], it would be the same as if we tried to be the same as God, and to make our knowledge identical with His knowledge. Those who seek the truth, and admit what is true, must believe that nothing is hidden from God; that everything is revealed to His knowledge, which is identical with His essence; that this kind of knowledge cannot be comprehended by us; for if we knew its method, we would possess that intellect by which such knowledge could be acquired. Such intellect does not exist except in God, and is at the same time His essence.

Part 1, Chapter 22-23

Book of Job

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

These two chapters form a commentary on the Book of Job, described by Maimonides as a ‘strange and wonderful’ (الغريبه العجيبه) story which he beleives to be fictional. Maimonides is compelled to put pen to paper because the story of Job represents a common source of perplexity to all thinkers, i.e. the phenomenon that “a simple and perfect person, who is upright in his actions, and very anxious to abstain from sin, is afflicted by successive misfortunes”. In answer to these ‘perplexities’, the Book of Job “includes profound ideas and great mysteries, removes great doubts, and reveals the most important truths”. Friedlander’s translation appears to be somewhat slopppy here, for the Arabic corrsponding to the last two phrases in this quote is “و تبينت به مشكلات العظيمة، و اتضحت منه حقائق لا غاية بعدها”.

According to Maimonides, the Book of Job illustrates a (possible) hierarchy of human suffering: 1) destruction of property; 2) loss of children; 3) bodily pain, in order of the likelihood that people can bear each kind of suffering.

Some of us deny God, and believe that there is no rule in the Universe, even if only their property is lost. Others retain their faith in the existence of justice and order, even when suffering from loss of property, whereas loss of children is too much affliction for them. Others remain firm in their faith, even with the loss of their children; but there is no one who can patiently bear the pain that reaches his own person: he then murmurs and complains of injustice either in his heart or with his tongue.

Some of Maimonides’ observations:

“Job, as well as his friends, were of opinion that God Himself was the direct agent of what happened, and that the adversary [i.e., Satan] was not the intermediate cause”
Even though Job is shown to be a good person, he is not described in the story as a wise person; had he been wise, “he would not have any doubt about the cause of his suffering.”
Satan does not have power over the soul of man, whatever other powers he may have.
He agrees with a certain quotation from the Talmud: “ ‘The adversary (satan), evil inclination (yeẓer ha-ra’) [translated, ostensibly by Hussein Attai, as ya’mal al-suu’ يعمل السوء], and the angel of death, are one and the same being.’ … It has thus been shown to you that one and the same thing is designated by these three different terms, and that actions ascribed to these three are in reality the actions of one and the same agent”
There is an ‘evil inclination’ and an inclination toward good in all of us; “the evil inclination we receive at our birth: for “at the door sin croucheth” Gen. 4:7, as is distinctly said in the Law, “And the imagination of the heart of man is evil from his youth” ibid. 8:21. The good inclination, however, comes when the mind is developed.”

There are some general opinions or principles held to be true by Job as well as his friends, e.g., the idea that when a wicked person is in prosperity, one expects an impending change, and similarly, when a good person suffers, one expects to see the situation change, presumably according to the justice of God. Essentially, Job’s friends are convinced that “those who act well receive reward, and those who act wickedly are punished. When a wicked and rebellious person is seen in prosperity, it may be assumed for certain that a change will take place; he will die, or troubles will afflict him and his house. When we find a worshipper of God in misfortune, we may be certain that God will heal the stroke of his wound.” It is not at all clear whether Maimonides himself believes this statement. Nevertheless, Maimonides recognizes that the underlying question is an important one, i.e., why do bad things happen to good people?

One possible response to seeing bad things happen to good people, says Maimonides, is Job’s (let us say naive, but entirely reasonable) poetic exclamation in Job IX 22-24, XXI 23-26 and others that good and evil seem to be equal before God, that affliction comes to both, that God does not care either way and has abandoned his creation. Maimonides tells us that the Sages of the Talmud have condemned Job for his blasphemous statements. However, he then proceeds to tell us that Job holds the above views at first:

It is the opinion which suggests itself as plausible at first thought, especially in the minds of those who meet with mishaps, well knowing that they have not merited them through sins. This is admitted by all, and therefore this opinion was assigned to Job. But he is represented to hold this view only so long as he was without wisdom, and knew God only by tradition, in the same manner as religious people generally know Him. As soon as he had acquired a true knowledge of God, he confessed that there is undoubtedly true felicity in the knowledge of God; it is attained by all who acquire that knowledge, and no earthly trouble can disturb it. So long as Job’s knowledge of God was based on tradition and communication, and not on research, he believed that such imaginary good as is possessed in health, riches, and children, was the utmost that men can attain: this was the reason why he was in perplexity, and why he uttered the above-mentioned opinions, and this is also the meaning of his words: “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent because of dust and ashes” XLII 5, 6; that is to say he abhorred all that he had desired before, and that he was sorry that he had been in dust and ashes; comp. “and he sat down among the ashes” II 8. On account of this last utterance, which implies true perception, it is said afterwards in reference to him, “for you have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath.”

What are some of the other opinions described in the Book of Job?

Eliphaz believes that whatever afflictions Job is enduring must be punishment for some shortcoming; that if Job seems at first glance to be basically good, he need not be good to the extent that God expects him to be good. Maimonides says that “Eliphaz never abandoned his belief that the fate of man is the result of justice, that we do not know all our shortcomings for which we are punished, nor the way how we incur the punishment through them”.

Bildad likewise “defends in this question the theory of reward and compensation”, but from a different angle: he consoles Job that God will compensate him for his misfortunes. “He therefore tells Job that if he is innocent and without sin, his terrible misfortunes will be the source of great reward, will be followed by the best compensation, and will prove a boon to him as the cause of great bliss in the future world … This opinion concerning, Providence is widespread, and we have already explained it.” For this ‘opinion’ Maimonides cites Job VIII 6-8.

Zofar takes a different approach, and does not use the ‘theory of reward and compensation’ at all. “Divine Will is the source of everything that happens: no further cause can be sought for His actions, and it cannot be asked why He has done this and why He has not done that. That which God does can therefore not be explained by the way of justice or the result of wisdom. His true Essence demands that He does what He wills; we are unable to fathom the depth of His wisdom, and it is the law and rule of this wisdom that whatever He does is done because it is His will and for no other cause”.

For Maimonides, each of these maps to a different, then current, theory, about Providence: “The view ascribed to Job is the theory of Aristotle. Eliphaz holds the opinion taught in Scripture, Bildad’s opinion is identical with that of the Mu’tazilah, whilst Zofar defends the theory of the Asha’riyah. These were the ancient views on Providence” — but then a new character comes along, Elihu, with a new theory; “for this reason he is placed above the others, and described as younger in years but greater in wisdom”.

Person	Theory
Job (initially)	Aristotle
Eliphaz	Scripture
Bildad	Mu’tazila
Zofar	Ashariya
Elihu	?

But what is Elihu’s theory? It’s difficult to say, but evidently Maimonides seems to agree most with his theory, for after relaying a lengthy account of Elihu’s solution to the problem, he adds “If you pay to my words the attention which this treatise demands, and examine all that is said in the Book of Job, all will be clear to you, and you will find that I have grasped and taken hold of the whole subject; nothing has been left unnoticed”.

According to Maimonides, Elihu’s explanations are supposed to culminate in the knowledge that the way in which God ‘rules’ and ‘manages’ the world does not, at all, have the same meaning as when we ‘rule’ or ‘manage’ things as human beings.

The term ‘rule’ has not the same definition in both cases: it signifies two different notions, which have nothing in common but the name. In the same manner, as there is a difference between works of nature and productions of human handicraft, so there is a difference between God’s rule, providence, and intention in reference to all natural forces, and our rule, providence, and intention in reference to things which are the objects of our rule, providence, and intention. This lesson is the principal object of the whole Book of Job; it lays down this principle of faith, and recommends us to derive a proof from nature, that we should not fall into the error of imagining His knowledge to be similar to ours, or His intention, providence, and rule similar to ours. When we know this we shall find everything that may befall us easy to bear; mishap will create no doubts in our hearts concerning God, whether He knows our affairs or not, whether He provides for us or abandons us. On the contrary, our fate will increase our love of God.

Commentary

Maimonides’ confident assertion that the Book of Job is a fictionalized account is in spite of his acknowledgement that some ‘Sages’ (الحكماء) — perhaps some of the contributors to the Talmud, i.e., the ‘KHaZaL’? — have believed in the historical existence of Job.

I believe that in this chapter, it is worthwhile to carefully parse Maimonides’ own views from the text, because much of the text relates the opinions of the characters in the Book of Job, or the opinions of the Sages of the Talmud, etc.

At first glance, there seems to be some sophistry to this explanation. But I think what Maimonides is getting at here is that the world works in mysterious ways; the natural chains of causes that lead to things happening in the world are not so simple that we can understand them mechanistically the way we can understand things that we create and manage. When we ask ‘does God know that I am going through this?’, Maimonides thinks we are asking the wrong question, because God’s knowledge of our affairs is nothing like our knowledge. Similarly, when we ask whether God is providing for us or abandoning us, we are asking the wrong question because the way God works in the world is nothing like the way we do things.

Part 1, Chapter 24

The doctrine of trials (الإختبار)

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter deals with the class of problems which includes the trial of Abraham concerning the sacrifice of his son Isaac. Maimonides gives us an explanation for why Abraham had to undergo the trial of sacrificing his son; the explanation is a bit long-winded, but the important thing to know is that the explanation, for Maimonides, is not that God wanted to ‘test’ Abraham; he seems to think this is nonsensical because God already knows everything, so a different explanation must be sought. His explanation is two-fold:

Firstly, it confirms the truth of prophecy, because what Abraham was asked to do is the ultimate sacrifice; no one would actually proceed to act on a dream or vision on which he had the slightest doubt.
Secondly, it shows us how far we must go to fulfill the Divine commandments and the Divine Law, which have to be followed not for the hope of reward or fear of punishment (Maimonides seems to think that these carrot-and-stick approaches are unlikely to work for someone who is asked to kill his own son …) but because the fear or reverence of God is the whole point of the Law.

This is the way how we have to understand the accounts of trials; we must not think that God desires to examine us and to try us in order to know what He did not know before. Far is this from Him; He is far above that which ignorant and foolish people imagine concerning Him, in the evil of their thoughts. Note this.

Commentary

I’m interested in what word Friedlander seems to have translated as ‘fear’. The Hebrew appears to be ‘וְהַנּוֹרָא֙’ which, according to the dictionaries I can see, is a conjugation of the verb ירא, and whose meanings include something like ‘to stand in awe of’.

Part 1, Chapter 25

The ultimate purpose of the Universe

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides starts this chapter by proposing a classification of (human) actions.

Purposeless (‘abas’ عبث): Actions that are not directed to any purpose, e.g., fiddling with your hands while thinking of something else.
In vain (batil ﺏﺎﻄﻟ): Actions that do not achieve their purpose, e.g., if you look for something without finding it.
Unimportant (la’b ﻞﻌﺑ): Actions that are directed to “an object that is not necessary and is not of great use … mere pastimes”.
Useful (jayyid hasan جيد حسن): Actions that are “necessary or useful for the purpose which is to be attained”. Maimonides uses the word ‘good’ interchangeably with the word ‘useful’ here.

All of God’s actions, however, must be of the fourth category alone; as Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw everything that he had made, and behlod, it was very good.” Whatever God has made is necessary and useful for its intended purpose, i.e., the old Aristotelian maxim that nature has made nothing in vain, so that “everything that is not the product of human industry serves a certain purpose, which may be known or unknown to us”.

Maimonides strongly opposes the occasionalist theory that everything in the Universe is the “direct result of the Will of God”, with no relations of cause and effect between the various phenomena. “According to this opinion we cannot ask why has He made this and not that; for He does what pleases Him, without following a fixed system.” If this were true, then all of God’s actions would be purposeless, which would mean that God’s actions are inferior to man’s.

No notice need be taken of the nonsensical idea that monkeys were created for our pastime. Such opinions originate only in man’s ignorance of the nature of transient beings, and in his overlooking the principle that it was intended by the Creator to produce in its present form everything whose existence is possible; a different form was not decreed by the Divine Wisdom, and the existence [of objects of a different form] is therefore impossible, because the existence of all things depends on the decree of God’s wisdom

People are led to believe in the purposelessness of things in nature when they start by looking at the whole Universe. “They ask what is the purpose of the whole Universe? they necessarily answer, like all those who believe in the Creation, that it was created because God willed it so, and for no other purpose. The same answer they apply to all parts of the Universe”. This is an erroneous analogy, however, notwithstanding the Scriptural passages that seem to imply that God arbitrarily created all things in the world, e.g., Psalms 135:6, “The Lord hath done whatever he pleased”. The Universe is not only the result of God’s will, but also his wisdom.

The object of His will is only that which is possible, and of the things possible only such as His wisdom decrees upon. When God desires to produce the best work, no obstacle or hindrance intervenes between Him and that work. This is the opinion held by all religious people, also by the philosophers; it is also our opinion. For although we believe that God created the Universe from nothing, most of our wise and learned men believe that the Creation was not the exclusive result of His will; but His wisdom, which we are unable to comprehend, made the actual existence of the Universe necessary. The same unchangeable wisdom found it as necessary that non-existence should precede the existence of the Universe.

All parts of natural products are well arranged, in good order, connected with each other, and stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect; nothing of them is purposeless, trivial, or in vain; they are all the result of great wisdom. … This idea occurs frequently; there is no necessity to believe otherwise; philosophic speculation leads to the same result; viz., that in the whole of Nature there is nothing purposeless, trivial, or unnecessary, especially in the Nature of the spheres, which are in the best condition and order, in accordance with their superior substance

In his attack against the idea that God made some parts of the Universe without purpose and according to an arbitrary will, Maimonides diagnoses that there are two possible reasons why people may be led to think this:

“firstly, man has an erroneous idea of himeself, and believes that the whole world exists only for his sake”; if one believes this, then it does seem like, say, the meerkat serves no purpose.
“secondly, he is ignorant both about the nature of the sublunary world, and about the Creator’s interntion to give existence to all beings whose existence is possible, because existence is undoubtedly good.” These errors “lead many to imagine that some of God’s works are trivial, others purposeless, and others in vain.”

Summary

God intended to give existence to all beings whose existence is possible

Part 1, Chapter 26

Purpose of the commandments

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides makes his famous assertion that he will try to give reasons for all 613 commandments. He explains the intellectual background on this question to the reader, i.e., he introduces the reader to the debate about whether the commandments stem from God’s wisdom or from his will: whether they serve a certain purpose or if their purpose is beyond our ken. He is firmly on the former side. Maimonides’ rigorous commitment to intellectual honesty shines when he says “Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day”.

Part 1, Chapter 27

Objectives of the Law

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

The objectives of the Law (qasd al-shari’ah قصد الشريعة) are twofold: the well-being of the soul and the well-being of the body. By well-being of the soul, Maimonides means something very specific: “correct opinions (aaraa’ sahihah آراء صحيحة) according to their capacity”. By the well-being of the body, Maimonides means something quite general: not just bodily health, but also social health, i.e., “a proper management of the relations in which we live one to another”. Of these two, the well-being of the soul is the more important one, but the conditions for perfecting the well-being of our souls can only be created when the well-being of the body is guaranteed, “for a person that is suffering from great hunger, thirst, heat, or cold, cannot grasp an idea even if communicated by others, much less can he arrive at it by his own reasoning”.

The well-being of the body requires proper management of social relations because Maimonides believes, like a good Aristotelian, that man is a social animal (أن الإنسان مدني بالطبع), and his material needs cannot be satisfied by himself alone; he needs society, and society needs laws that prevent us from simply doing what we like.

The well-being of the soul consists in a perfection of knowledge. A man will attain this kind of perfection when knows all that it is possible for humans to know (يعلم كل ما في طاقة الإنسان ) about existent things (al-mawjudat الموجودات). This kind of perfection does not require any good works, good morals, or even actions; it is purely an intellectual good, arrived at through things like speculation (nazar نظر) and research (bahas بحث).

Even though the well-being of the soul is the more important goal, he concedes that most of Scripture is concerned with the secondary goal of the well-being of the body; it is the one that is “most carefully and most minutely” addressed in the Law.

Commentary “Secondly, it seeks to train us in faith, and to impart correct and true opinions when the intellect is sufficiently developed”. What does it mean to ‘train us in faith’? The whole edifice of human knowledge rests on axioms and definitions, which ground our knowledge in, essentially, faith in some simple statements that everybody agrees to assent to. Once you have set up your definitions and the necessary minimum set of axioms, then – and only then – can we make statements with any certainty. The certainty that we have about the laws of physics, for example, hinges on some implicit assumptions, taken as axiomatic, such as the principle of sufficient reason, or the idea that the world exhibits order rather than randomness. The certainty that we have about mathematical truths, likewise, rests on the axioms and definitions that must precede any true statement in mathematics; at least some of those axioms must be truly axiomatic, i.e., must be taken on faith. This practice of taking some starting principles ‘on faith’ and then working out, using our logical faculties, the necessary and true consequences of those starting principles, is indispensable to the practice of Science and is the only way to achieve any kind of certainty in the world. For Maimonides, it seems, Scripture gives us practice in this way of looking at things: it teaches us to have faith in a certain set of ground rules upon which we can use our reason to build.

Would Maimonides have acknowledged the equivalence of many different ‘ways of looking at the world’, i.e., many different sets of starting principles? Probably not, but the germ seems to be present in his thought nevertheless, especially given what he says in chapter 28 about some of the beliefs taught in Scripture.

Part 1, Chapter 28

Objectives of the Law

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides tells the reader that, as far as “correct opinions” are concerned, the Law only tells us the basics (i.e., to believe in an all-powerful God), but leaves out the details. The basics are “given in the form of final results, but they cannot be understood fully and accurately except after the acquisition of many kinds of knowledge”, and Maimonides implies that acquiring these other kinds of knowledge is also a divine commandment. For scriptural support, he states that the commandment to “Love the Lord” (Deut. 11:13) includes gaining knowledge about “all that exists” and to thereby understand what Maimonides calls God’s wisdom.

There are four types of Scriptural commandments that should need no further explanation. If a commandment:

directly tends to remove injustice
teaches good conduct that furthers the well-being of society
imparts a truth which ought to be believed on its own merit
imparts a truth the belief in which is indispensable for facilitating (1) or (2)

then, says Maimonides, we have no occasion to ask more “why” questions. But, he acknowledges, there are some parts of Scripture whose literal meaning does not further any of the aforementioned goals; “people are in doubt, and of divided opinions, some believing that they are mere commands, and serve no purpose whatever, whilst others believe that they serve a certain purpose, which, however, is unknown to man”. In this category Maimonides includes examples of some ritual commandments. However, he is pretty confident that he can somehow connect these ritual commandments to the actual goals of Scripture, too.

Commentary

In this chapter we find the clearest indication that I can see – as clear as an esoteric book like this can be – that Maimonides believes that some of the beliefs in Scripture (i’tiqadat إعتقدات) only ‘point us in the right direction’ and are not correct opinions to hold in themselves. So he says

in other cases, that truth is only the means of securing the removal of injustice, or the acquisition of good morals; such is the belief that God is angry with those who oppress their fellow-men, as it is said, “Mine anger will be kindled, and I will slay,” etc. (Exod. 22:23); or the belief that God hears the crying of the oppressed and vexed, to deliver them out of the hands of the oppressor and tyrant, as it is written, “And it shall come to pass, when he will cry unto me, that I will hear, for I am gracious” (Exod. 22:27)

Thus, Maimonides is convinved that the belief that God gets angry with those who oppress others, or the belief that God listens to our prayers, are useful beliefs to hold because they help accomplish some of the aims of scripture. But does God actually listen to the cries of the afflicted, or smite the wicked?

Part 1, Chapter 29-30

The Nabatean Agriculture

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides sets out a spiritual Origin Story for the prophet Abraham, setting his intellectual revolution in the context of the beliefs held by the ‘Sabeans’ around him. The Sabeans, according to Maimonides, believed in the eternity of the Universe and considered the heavens to be divinities in themselves, with the Sun being the chief diety. The beliefs of the Sabeans, as related by Maimonides, are essentially those of ‘primitive religion’, or ‘paganism’, and were broadly identical to those of other ‘pagan’ peoples that populate(d) the earth; in particular, he mentions “the savage Turks in the extreme North, and the Indians in the extreme South”. For Maimonides, the gradual replacement of these primitive belief systems with Abrahamic ones is part of the systematic progression of the human condition, and accords with the Divine prophecy in Genesis 12:3 where God promises to bless those that bless Abraham and curse those who curse him.

It was Abraham who “became convinced that there is a spiritual Divine Being, which is not a body, nor a force residing in a body, but is the author of the spheres and the stars”. For Maimonides, this conviction went hand in hand with a rejection of the theory of the Eternity of the Universe and therefore a belief in a created Universe.

These chapters contain a detailed account of a purported book, ‘The Nabatean Agriculture’, by a certain Ibn Wahshiya. Maimonides’ belief is that “the principal purpose of the whole Law was the removal and utter destruction of idolatry, and all that is connected therewith, even its name, and everything that might lead to any such practices”, and in these chapters he tells the reader exactly what these practices were, in order to later justify some of the precepts of the Law, whose original purpose was to counteract these practices.

Maimonides takes an adimrably sociological approach to religion — at least, to pre-Abrahamic religion — and its relationship to superstition. He makes a connection between the development of agriculture and its attendant uncertainties, to the superstitious beliefs about how heavenly bodies regulate famine and plenty. For example,

The wise, pious, and sin-fearing men among them reproved the people and taught them that agriculture, on which the preservation of mankind depended, would become perfect and satisfy man’s wishes, when he worshipped the sun and the stars. If man provoked these beings by his rebelliousness, the towns would become empty and waste. The idolaters also held cattle in esteem on account of their use in agriculture, and went even so far as to say, that it is not allowed to slay them, because they combine in themselves strength and willingness to do the work of man in tilling the ground. … [thus] idolatry was connected with agriculture, because the latter is indispensable for the maintenance of man, and of most animals. The idolatrous priests then preached to the people who met in the temples, and taught them that by certain religious acts, rain would come down, the trees of the field would yield their fruit, and the land would be fertile and inhabited

It was to correct these superstitious beliefs that God sent Moses and the Law. Thus, Scripture teaches

that the worship of the stars would be followed by absence of rain, devastation of the land, bad times, diseases, and shortness of life. But abandonment of that worship, and the return to the service of God, would be the cause of the presence of rain, fertility of the ground, good times, health and length of life. Thus Scripture teaches, in order that man should abandon idolatry, the reverse of that which idolatrous priests preached to the people, for, as has been shown by us, the principal object of the Law is to remove this doctrine, and to destroy its traces.

Commentary Does Maimonides really believe that praying to ‘God’ will bring rain and plenty whereas praying to ‘the Heavens’ will bring drought and famine? Wouldn’t that mean replacing one superstition with another? It seems that, in a subtle way, Maimonides is gently teaching the reader that praying one way or another for the rain doesn’t actually do anything, and if Scripture teaches that it does, it is only because Scripture is concerned with stamping out idolatry and therefore simply teaches the opposite of the idolatrous practices that predated Abraham.

Part 1, Chapter 31

Does the Law serve a purpose?

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides comes down hard against those who believe that we should not look for reasons behind the Divine commandments.

Every one of the six hundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcate some truth, to remove some erroneous opinion, to establish proper relations in society, to diminish evil, to train in good manners or to warn against bad habits. All this depends on three things: opinions, morals, and social conduct. … these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every one of the Divine commandments.

Part 1, Chapter 32

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter begins with “On considering the Divine acts, or the processes of Nature, we get an insight into…”. The Arabic goes “إذا تاملت الأفعال الإلهي أعني الأفعال الطبيعية”. Even though this phraseology gives us a tantalizing piece of a larger philosophy, one that would be developed most fully by Spinoza, the content of this chapter is quite different.

In this chapter, Maimonides begins by making the scientific observation that Nature prefers to develop things gradually — for example, when babies are born, their ability to consume solid food does not come pre-programmed, so to speak, but must be developed over time. Similarly, he conetnds that spiritual development, too, cannot happen all of a sudden, and must take place in stages. This is why certain ritualistic practices were enjoined in the Torah — animal sacrifice, the temple, etc. — as a continuation of pre-Mosaic practices as a means of gradually teaching man to worship the One God in the correct way. Simply put, because people were used to these forms of worship, they were “allowed to continue”; to have ordered a sudden breach from the old forms of worship “would have been contrary to the nature of man, who generally cleaves to that to which he is used”.

He transferred to His service that which had formerly served as a worship of created beings, and of things imaginary and unreal, and commanded us to serve Him in the same manner; viz., to build unto Him a temple (Exod. 25:8); to have the altar erected to His name; (ibid. 20:21); to offer the sacrifices to Him; (Lev. 1:2) … He has forbidden to do any of these things to any other being … By this Divine plan it was effected that the traces of idolatry were blotted out, and the truly great principle of our faith, the Existence and Unity of God, was firmly established; this result was thus obtained without deterring or confusing the minds of the people by the abolition of the service to which they were accustomed and which alone was familiar to them.

Maimonides is aware that this way of viewing history — schockingly modern — will be peculiar to a religious reader, who will find it strange that God commanded ritual forms of worship not for their own sake but merely as means to an end. However, Maimonides is convinced that his explanation for the ritual forms of worship is the correct one, and he makes an analogy with the Israelite’s exodus from Egypt:

“God led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt; but God led the people about, through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea,” etc. (Exod. 25:8). Here God led the people about, away from the direct road which He originally intended, because He feared they might meet on that way with hardships too great for their ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order to obtain thereby His original object.

Part 1, Chapter 33

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter reveals most clearly Maimonides’ ascetic tendency; according to him, the objective of the Law is “to make man reject, despise, and reduce his desires as much as is in his power. He should only give way to them when absolutely necessary”. This is because our base desires

counteract the ulterior perfection of man, impede at the same time the development of his first perfection, and generally disturb the social order of the country and the economy of the family. For by following entirely the guidance of lust, in the manner of fools, man loses his intellectual energy, injures his body, and perishes before his natural time; sighs and cares multiply; there is an increase of envy, hatred, and warfare for the purpose of taking what another possesses. The cause of all this is the circumstance that the ignorant considers physical enjoyment as an object to be sought for its own sake. God in His wisdom has therefore given us such commandments as would counteract that object, and prevent us altogether from directing our attention to it, and has debarred us from everything that leads only to excessive desire and lust

Part 1, Chapter 34

generalized benefit

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides believes that the Law is intended for the generalized benefit of society, and admits that a Law so apportioned may indeed, sometimes, lead to unfelicitous effects for the odd individual case. He does not consider this to be a defect of the Law, because he considers this to be unavoidable in any system that tries to maximize benefit for all. He appeals to Nature to make this case, by stating that “in Nature the various forces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases they cause also injury”.

We must consequently not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the instruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive from the specific forms in Nature all that they require. For all this comes from one God, is the result of one act; “they are all given from one shepherd” Eccles. 12:11. It is impossible to be otherwise; and we have already explained that that which is impossible always remains impossible and never changes (و قد بينا أن الممتنع طبيعة لا تتغير أبدا w qad bayana ‘ana almumtanie tabieat la tataghayar abadan) (see the opening of chapter 15).

Part 1, Chapter 35 to 50

purpose of individual laws

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In these chapters, Maimonides executes the somewhat Herculean task of explaining every one of the 613 commandments he was able to find in the Torah. He divides them all into 14 types, and devotes a chapter to each of the 14 types. A 15th chapter looks at some additional parts of the Torah, especially its historical details and particularly genealogies. We will skip over this…

Part 1, Chapter 51

parable of the king's palace

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

Maimonides begins this chapter with a parable or metaphor – mathal, in which he sets up the following scene:

There is a king (sultan), and the king’s subjects can be divided into the following categories. Each category seems ‘concentric’, so that

Those who are abroad; the remaining categories are all ‘in the country’.
Those who have their backs turned toward the king
Those who desire nearness to the king, among whom:
Some have not yet seen even ‘the face of the wall of the house’. Of the remaining,
Some who have arrived at the house but are still in search of an entrance,
while others have entered and are at the lobby (dahliz);
still others have entered the king’s chambers;
and only a subset of these have been able to speak with the king, at varying degrees of closeness.

When Maimonides explains his parables, he first does so using the categories of religion.

corresponds to those who have no religion, “neither one based on speculation nor one received by tradition”
corresponds to those who hold false doctrines/opinions (آراء غير صحيحة), either based on faulty reasoning or based on following the wrong person
corresponds to the ahl al-shari’ah,
of which category 4 is the jumhur, or multitude, among them.
corresponds to the fuqaha’, who learn ‘correct opinions’ by tradition (اللذين يعتقدون الأراء الصحيحة تقليدا) and do not attempt to establish them by proofs
corresponds to those who have “delved into speculation regarding the fundamentals of religion” (خاضوا في النظر في أصول الدين)
“those who have succeeded in finding a proof for everything that can be proved, who have a true knowledge of God, so far as a true knowledge can be attained, and are near the truth, wherever an approach to the truth is possible”
a subset of the seventh, perhaps.

He also sets up an alternative hierarchy, seemingly based on degrees of philosophical study rather than degrees of religious attainment:

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Those who have studied Logic and Mathematics
Physics
Metaphysics

That these two hierarchies are, for Maimonides, one and the same, is indicated by the way he says

There are some who direct all their mind toward the attainment of perfection in Metaphysics, devote themselves entirely to God, exclude from their thought every other thing, and employ all their intellectual faculties in the study of the Universe, in order to derive therefrom a proof for the existence of God, and to learn in every possible way how God rules all things; they form the class of those who have entered the palace, namely, the class of prophets.

At the culmination of this hierarchy is placed the prophet Moses, to whom Maimonides gestures without name but with a great deal of reverence and awe:

One of these has attained so much knowledge, and has concentrated his thoughts to such an extent in the idea of God, that it could be said of him, “And he was with the Lord forty days,” etc. (Exod. 34:28); during that holy communion he could ask Him, answer Him, speak to Him, and be addressed by Him, enjoying beatitude in that which he had obtained to such a degree that “he did neither eat bread nor drink water” (ibid.); his intellectual energy was so predominant that all coarser functions of the body, especially those connected with the sense of touch, were in abeyance.

Next follows Maimonides’ exhortation to worship God in what he thinks is the correct way. For he does not only specify this ‘intellectual worship of God’ as a superior form of worship; he goes further, by disparaging an intellectually uninformed worship of God thus:

Those, however, who think of God, and frequently mention His name, without any correct notion of Him, but merely following some imagination, or some theory received from another person, are, in my opinion, like those who remain outside the palace and distant from it. They do not mention the name of God in truth, nor do they reflect on it. That which they imagine and mention does not correspond to any being in existence: it is a thing invented by their imagination.

So what is the correct way to approach the worship of God?

The true worship of God is only possible when correct notions of Him have previously been conceived. When you have arrived by way of intellectual research at a knowledge of God and His works, then commence to devote yourselves to Him, try to approach Him and strengthen the intellect (aql, I assume), which is the link that joins you to Him.

Lastly, Maimonides talks about the link between this intellectual love/worship and Divine Providence; he believes that Providence only looks over someone when they are actively engaged in contemplating the Divine; and since as human beings we often have to tend to other things, we are not always watched over by this Providence. For Maimonides, this explains much of the problems of theodicy; Providence only applies to those who worship God in the ‘right way’, and that too only when they are actively doing so. At all other times, one is just as exposed to the vagaries of chance as the rest of the sublunary world is. Thus, life becomes for Maimonides a constant search for that tenuous connection with the Divine; our mundane, earthly concerns ever pulling us away from Him.

And let us pray to God and beseech Him that He clear and remove from our way everything that forms an obstruction and a partition between us and Him, although most of these obstacles are our own creation, as has several times been shown in this treatise. Comp. “Your iniquities have separated between you and your God” (Isaiah 59:2 ).

The Youtube Channel Seekers of Unity has a couple of great video about this chapter:

From Joseph Soloveitchik

Out of the levels identified by Maimonides, we can discern three categories of approaching the knowledge of God (ignoring the first two levels, which are for people who do not approach the knowledge of God). These are:

Normative-Halakhic: Those for whom “the experience of God is a normative one”, i.e., a view of God as the “supreme ethical arbiter”, “a normative authority who dictates actions”. This includes levels (4) and (5) in my list above.
Cosmic-Intellectual: Those for whom “the experience of God is a cosmic one … one finds in the cosmos the fingerprints of God”.
Mystical:Ecstatic: Those who have a “mystical experience of God”: an experience of “ heshek, of passionate love”

Part 1, Chapter 52

love and fear of God

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter is a Maimonidean exposition of the traditional religious ideas of the fear and love of God; the two ways of relating to God that arise from jalal and jamal respectively. Up to this point, we have learned that Maimonides teaches us about a God who is in nature quite different from the ‘traditional’ religious conception of God, for this is not a God who is moved to anger or pleasure or any other emotion. He is not a vengeful God, for example; what place, then, is there for the fear of God, much less for the love of God, in such a theology?

Maimonides’ answer has to do with the Intellect; drawing an analogy once again with a king and with how humans usually relate to a mighty king, he says:

We do not … occupy ourselves when we are alone and at home in the same manner as we do in the presence of a great king. If we … desire to attain human perfection, and to be truly men of God, we must … bear in mind that the great king that is over us, and is always joined to us, is greater than any earthly king, greater than David and Solomon. The king that cleaves to us and embraces us is the Intellect (al-‘aql العقل) that emanates upon us (faaiz ‘alaina الفائض علينا — Friedlander uses “influences us” here), and forms the link (الصلة) between us and Him most high.

It is in contemplation of this king — ‘aql — that man should live his life in a state of piety, humility, modesty and reverence. For this reason, “the great men among our Sages would not uncover their heads because they believed that God’s glory was round them and over them; for the same reason they spoke little.” And it is the attainment of this englightened state of mind that is the objective of the Law, because it provides a formula through which “some few pious men may attain human perfection. They will be filled with respect and reverence towards God”

The two objects [of the Law], love and fear of God, are acquired by two different means. The love is the result of the truths taught in the Law, including the true knowledge of the Existence of God; whilst fear of God is produced by the practices prescribed in the Law.

Part 1, Chapter 53

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

This chapter goes back to an exposition of different Biblical terms; it is unclear why it is included at this point in the book. We know it was written in serial form, so it is possible that the author just ‘forgot’ to include this exposition with the rest of his Torah commentary in part 1. But it’s possible that this was intentional, I guess.

The three Biblical terms that he is interested in here are (in Friendlander’s words)

Loving-kindness hasad, הסד, which in Hussein Attai’s Arabic has been transliterated حسد and translated إحسان by him.
Judgement, mishpat משפט, which in Hussein Attai’s Arabic has been trasnliterated شفط and translated الحكم by him.
Righteousness, tsedakah, צדקה, which in Hussein Attai’s Arabic has been trasnliterated صدقة and translated العدالة by him.

I may have the order wrong…

These three words are attributed to God in the Torah, but, according to Maimonides, only as ‘attributes of action’, not as essential attributes. Thus God is kind (Exodus 34:6) , he is righteous (Deuteronomy 32:4), and he acts with justice (Genesis 18:25).

Part 1, Chapter 54

the meaning of wisdom

Arabic (Huseyin Attai, 1962) | English (Michael Friedländer, 1885) | Hebrew (Ibn Tibbon, 1204) | Arabic (Munk, 1856)

In this chapter, Maimonides clarifies that hikmat, Hebrew חוכמה, in Scripture can mean one of four things:

“knowledge of those truths which lead to the knowledge of God”
technique, i.e., wisdom in terms of knowing how to do or make something
“acquisition of moral principles”
“cunning and subtlety”

and he explains that “a person that has a true knowledge of the whole Law is called wise in a double sense”, i.e., he is wise because of reason 1 and because of reason 3. As we can imagine, Maimonides affords the clearly higher rank to (1) than to (3):

as the truths contained in the Law are taught by way of tradition, not by a philosophical method, the knowledge of the Law, and the acquisition of true wisdom, are treated in the books of the Prophets and in the words of our Sages as two different things; real wisdom demonstrates by proof those truths which Scripture teaches us by way of tradition. It is to this kind of wisdom, which proves the truth of the Law, that Scripture refers when it extols wisdom, and speaks of the high value of this perfection, and of the consequent paucity of men capable of acquiring it, in sayings like these: “Not many are wise” Job 32:9; “But where shall wisdom be found” ibid. 28:12.

For Maimonides, there is a “right order”, or hierarchy, in which man must acquire wisdom:

“we must first learn the truths by tradition”
“after this we must be taught how to prove them”
“and then investigate the actions that help to improve man’s ways.”

Maimonides then switches gears to talking about four different kinds of perfection.

Perfection as regards worldly posessions and power, e.g., becoming a rich and powerful person
Perfection of the body, i.e., the shape, constitution, and even-temperedness of man’s body
Perfection of morals, i.e., the degree of excellency of man’s character
Perfection of the intellect, leading to ‘correct metaphysical notions about God.

The first three, to varying degrees, stem from the body; the fourth depends not on the body — concern of which man shares with other animals — but on the intellect.

The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man: the possession of the highest, intellectual faculties; the possession of such notions which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regards God. With this perfection man has obtained his final object; it gives him true human perfection; it remains to him alone; it gives him immortality [Pines has “permanent perdurance”], and on its account he is called man. Examine the first three kinds of perfection, you will find that, if you possess them, they are not your property, but the property of others; according to the ordinary view, however, they belong to you and to others. But the last kind of perfection is exclusively yours; no one else owns any part of it, “They shall be only thine own, and not strangers’ with thee” (Prov. 5:17). Your aim must therefore be to attain this (fourth) perfection that is exclusively yours, and you ought not to continue to work and weary yourself for that which belongs to others, whilst neglecting your soul till it has lost entirely its original purity through the dominion of the bodily powers over it.

For Maimonides, the ordering of these four kinds of perfection explains the order in Jeremiah, when the Prophet says: “Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me” Jer. 9:22.

But this is not all; Maimonides isn’t done! He points out that Jeremiah doesn’t stop at the above passage, but continues in the next verse, 9.23, to extol man to act with the three characteristics of God that Maimonides identified in chapter 53; “We are thus told in this passage that the Divine acts which ought to be known, and ought to serve as a guide for our actions, are, ḥesed, “loving-kindness,” mishpat, “judgment,” and ẓedakah, “righteousness.”” Maimonides reads great significance into every word of this verse, particularly into the phrase in the artz, אֶרֶץ, أرض: “[the use of this phrase] teaches, as has been taught by the ‘Master of those who know’ (سيد العالمين) in the words, “The earth is the Lord’s” (Exod. 9:29), that His providence extends to the earth in accordance with its nature, in the same manner as it controls the heavens in accordance with their nature.”

Thus, chapter 54 suggests that the way to “know God” in this post-Eden world is to emulate the characteristics of God, in fulfillment of Moses’ request to “show me now thy ways” Exodus 38:13.

the perfection, in which man can truly glory, is attained by him when he has acquired — as far as this is possible for man — the knowledge of God, the knowledge of His Providence, and of the manner in which it influences His creatures in their production and continued existence. Having acquired this knowledge he will then be determined always to seek loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, and thus to imitate the ways of God.

Commentary This chapter represents the fruition of Maimonides’ painstaking explanation to his ‘Perplexed’ pupil, who was not sure about where to place the Law in relation to what we can call Science. Maimonides is not so conflicted; he in fact is very clear about the relative importance he ascribes to these two things. “The religious acts prescribed in the Law, viz., the various kinds of worship and the moral principles which benefit all people in their social intercourse with each other, do not constitute the ultimate aim of man, nor can they be compared to it, for they are but preparations leading to it.”

For what it is, Maimonides has a two-part answer. The first part, given his philosophical bent of mind, is to be expected: acquiring knowledge of God. the second part, however, is a bit surprising: it is ‘imitate the ways of God’. This seems to run counter to much of what he has said about what God is and what the actions of God mean, but it rings very Ghazalian in his synthesis of philosophy and sufism.