This chapter is concerned with Maimonides’ teleology. What is the ultimate purpose (ghaayat غاية) of the universe? The chapter hints that a prevailing, common-sense religious answer to this question is that the entire Universe was made for mankind, and man that he might worship God. But Maimonides doesn’t agree with this conception, and comes to a very different answer as follows.

  • (A) When something is brought about by an agent with intention (qasd قصد), then the agent must have had a purpose (ghaayat غاية) for carrying out the act, and it makes sense to look for a final cause for such a thing.
  • (B) Things which are not the result of an agent need not have a (ghaayat غاية); thus, “we cannot ask what is the purpose of the existence of God”.

Now, Maimonides entertains two possible theories for the Universe; either it is eternal (the Aristotelian view) or it is created in time (the Mosaic view).

  1. If it is eternal, then it is not the result of an external agent but a self-subsisting causa sui, and so by (B) there is no final cause for the universe.
  2. If it were created in time,

    “some hold that the inquiry after the purpose of the Creation is necessary, and assume that the Universe was only created for the sake of man’s existence, that he might serve God. Everything that is done they believe is done for man’s sake; even the spheres move only for his benefit”.

    After stating this point of view, he says:

    On examining this opinion as intelligent persons ought to examine all different opinions, we shall discover the errors it includes.

    For Maimonides, these errors include the notion that more perfect things (the spheres) were created for the sake of less perfect things (the four elements of sublunary matter). But his attack on this point of view doesn’t just stop there.

    Even if the Universe existed for man’s sake and man existed for the purpose of serving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains, What is the end of serving God?

    After all, God does not become more perfect if he is worshipped more. If one answers that the end of serving God is to perfect ourselves, then Maimonides replies: “What is the object of our being perfect?”

    We must in continuing the inquiry as to the purpose of the creation at last arrive at the answer, It was the Will of God, or His Wisdom decreed it; and this is the correct answer.

Thus, for Maimonides, if we believe in a universe created in time by an act of Divine Will, there is no teleology, no final cause; instead, the only answer we have for “Why does the universe exists?” is of the throw-your-hands-in-the-air variety: God willed it so.

So far so good. In this summary, we have skipped over some of Maimonides’ points about teleology in the constituent parts of nature; e.g., he deals with the question of whether it is correct to say that some plants were made for animals, etc.

Maimonides stands very strongly against ascribing any final cause to the universe, and even to constituent parts of the universe, as seen in (*) below. He sums up his position thus:

I consider therefore the following opinion as most correct according to the teaching of the Bible, and best in accordance with the results of philosophy; namely, that the Universe does not exist for man’s sake, but that (*) each being exists for its own sake, and not because of some other thing. Thus we believe in the Creation, and yet need not inquire what purpose is served by each species of the existing things, because we assume that God created all parts of the Universe by His will; some for their own sake, and some for the sake of other beings, that include their own purpose in themselves. … We remain firm in our belief that the whole Universe was created in accordance with the will of God, and we do not inquire for any other cause or object. just as we do not ask what is the purpose of God’s existence, so we do not ask what was the object of His will, which is the cause of the existence of all things … This must be our belief when we have a correct knowledge of our own self, and comprehend the true nature of everything; we must be content, and not trouble our mind with seeking a certain final cause for things that have none, or have no other final cause but their own existence, which depends on the Will of God (mashiyat ilahiyah مشيئة إلهيه), or, if you prefer, on the Divine Wisdom (hikmat ilahiyah حكمة إلهيه).

Commentary

Maimonides inserts “if you prefer” at a very interesting point in the text. Running throughout the Guide is a certain tension between Wisdom and Will, which Maimonides claims are identical in the Godhead. “If you prefer” suggests that Maimonides is happy to concede to a reader that things are the way they are because of the wisdom of God, rather than due to the will of God; in this chapter, Maimonides seems to use the latter formulation. So are the two really equivalent?

I suspect that Maimonides is writing to an audience for whom the two are not necessarily identical. The Perplexity the resolution of which is the central project of the Guide can, I think be summed up in the formula: Wisdom versus Will. In Spinoza we have the negation of the latter and the taking-to-logical-conclusion of the former. Even for Avicenna, I think, the Universe mostly appears to work as a result of Divine Wisdom rather than Divine Will. For Maimonides, evidently, the Perplexity has been (internally) resolved; he does not feel any dissonance between the two ways of looking at the world, and is happy to let the reader pick any one of the two.