In this chapter, Maimonides argues — quite convincingly — that the eternity of the universe has been wrongly assumed by later Aristotleans to have been proven by Aristotle. While he concedes that it was certainly the theory held by Aristotle, he argues that the Philosopher himself didn’t consider the question to be firmly settled; he simply believed that the preponderance of the evidence supports the theory of its eternity and not of its creation in time.

Although this chapter is putatively devoted to a ‘refutation’ of what is widely held to be Aristotle’s theory, it is in fact full of the highest kind of praise for the First Teacher. For example, Maimonides writes:

Aristotle was well aware that he had not proved the Eternity of the Unvierse. … He knew that he could not prove his theory, and that his arguments and proofs were only apparent and plausible, … but Aristotle could not have considered them conclusive, after having himself taught us the rules of logic, and the means by which arguments can be refuted or confirmed (إذ و أرسطو هو الذي علم الناس طرق البرهان و قوانينه و شرائطه).

As proof, Maimonides gives the following examples:

  • In Physics VIII.1, Aristotle states that physicists in past times believed that motion is eternal. Maimonides says:

    Now if Aristotle had conclusive proofs for his theory, he would not have considered it necessary to support it by citing the opinions of preceding Physicists, nor would he have found it necessary to point out the folly and absurdity of his opponents. For a truth, once established by proof, does neither gain force nor certainty by the consent of all scholars, nor lose by the general dissent (emphasis added).

  • In another place, Aristotle states that he is going to juxtapose his theory (of eternity of the universe) against the opposing theories, and that he wants to give a fair hearing to the other side. “For if we were to state our opinion and our arguments without mentioning those of our opponents, our words would be received less favourably. He who desires to be just must not show himself hostile to his opponent; he must have sympathy with him, and readily acknowledge any truth contained in his words”. For Maimonides, this is straight from the horse’s mouth!

    Now, I ask you, men of intelligence, can we have any complaint against him after this frank statement? Or can any one now imagine that a real proof has been given for the Eternity of the Universe? Or can Aristotle, or any one else, believe that a theorem, though fully proved, would not be acceptable unless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted? We must also take into consideration that Aristotle describes this theory as his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotle ignorant of the difference between argument and proof? between opinions, which may be received more or less favourably, and truths capable of demonstration? or would rhetorical appeal to the impartiality of opponents have been required for the support of his theory if a real proof had been given? Certainly not.

Once again, Maimonides has the highest respect for Aristotle’s grasp on the issue; he simply wishes to put the issue in its proper place. According to Maimonides, it is later scholars who, believing they are adhering to Aristotle’s theory, have confused proofs and arguments; far be it from the First Philosopher to have made such a crucial mistake. Aristotle, in fact, readily seems to have admitted that “There are things concerning which we are unable to reason, or which we find too high for us …[such as] to decide whether the Universe is eternal or not.”