This chapter contains Maimonides’ famous assertion that he would have had no trouble with explaining away the Bible’s references to creation in time as metaphor, had the Aristotelian arguments for the eternity of the Universe amounted to conclusive proof. To show the reader that he means what he says, he points out that “[the] passages in Scripture [which] confirm the Creation … are not more numerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal being”; yet he has just spent dozens of chapters refuting the plain words of the text. He could have done similarly for the Biblical account of creation.

But the Eternity of the Universe has not been proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text, and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be supported by an equally good argument.

However, Maimonides has another, more fundamental reason to hold on to the literal Scriptural understanding that God created the Universe in time. For if he were to accept the theory of Eternity of the Universe, then the entire edifice of the Abrahamic worldview falls to the ground; for then.

If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws (انه على جهة اللزوم), that Nature does not change (و لا تتغير طبيعة أصلا), and that there is nothing supernatural (و لا يخرج شيء عن معتاده), we should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion, we should disbelieve all miracles and signs (و مكذب لكل معجز ضرورة), and certainly reject all hopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also explained figuratively.

So we learn that for Maimonides this is not an obscure question about the cosmological origins of the Universe, without any direct relation with our affairs here on earth. On the contrary, the answer to this question serves as the lynchpin on which “the foundation of our religion” stands; the “high rampart erected round the Law”.

Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that Revelation is possible,

and that any thorny philosophical questions arising from Scripture can be answered with the formula

He willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. Just as He created the world according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do not know why His will or wisdom determined” things the way God determined them.

Here, we can see that Maimonides does not try too hard to reconcile scripture with philosophocal truth. He finds an ‘out’: since it is possible that the Universe was brought into its current form by an all-powerful God, it is also possible that God spoke ‘mouth to mouth’ with Moses, and parted the Red Sea, and sent manna from heaven, and so on. Maimonides realizes that this is the only thread from which hangs the supposed truth of Scripture. For

if we assume that the Universe has the present form as the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions; and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying denial and rejection of the Biblical texts. … If the Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if only according to the Platonic hypothesis , all arguments of the philosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand, Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the Law in its entirety would be rejected (لسقطت الشريعة بجملتها), and we should be forced to other opinions (و أنقل الأمر لاراء أخرى).

Commentary No wonder there were Rabbinic authorities who wanted to burn this book! Because if the validity of the Law depends solely on the unprovability of the question of the eternity of the Universe, then it was hanging by a thin thread indeed. Philosophical opinion was almost entirely laid against the theory of the Creation, and I imagine that Maimonides’ insistence that this question was not open to demonstrative proof would have been severlely questioned by the Philosophers of his day. And here is the learned rabbi admitting that “if Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the entirety of the Law would be rejecrted”! And worse, he admits here that Scripture is not necessarily a source of philosophical truth, but the opinion held by the sages and the Prophets. Mouth to mouth God may have spoken to Moses on Mount Sinai, but Maimonides calls it mere opinion which can (and, we can infer from the rest of his writings, must) be discarded if found to be in contravention with philosophical truth.

Note: although I have used Friedlander’s translation throughout this work, I have taken the liberty to correct his translation on this page. Friedlander has: “the whole teaching of Scripture would be rejected”, but I believe the Arabic lends itself better to “the Law in its entirety would be rejected”. I am confident that ‘Law’ should be here and not Scripture, but I am not confident about the tense used here. For example, should it be “would be rejected” or “would have to be rejected”? The translation of Shlomo Pines may have dealt with this passage better.

Some issues in translation:

Source Text
Friedlander that there is nothing supernatural
Pines that the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything
Atai (و لا يخرج شيء عن معتاده)

following Shlomo Pines’ version, there are three problematic Aristotelian premises:

  1. the world exists in virture of necessity
  2. no nature changes at all
  3. the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything

and they lead to the following problems:

  1. destroys the Law in its principle
  2. necessarily gives the lie to every miracle
  3. reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out