This chapter contains a long discussion about figurative expressions used in different Prophetic books of the bible; Maimonides’ goal is to explain that the Prophets often used language figuratively, and that their words should not be taken literally. His purpose in doing so is to show that whenever the Tanakh talks about the end of the universe, this is metaphorical and not literal.

Our opinion, in support of which we have quoted these passages, is clearly established, namely, that no prophet of sage has ever announced the destruction of the Universe, or a change of its present condition, or a permanent change of any of its properties.

Thus, Maimonides wants to ensure the reader that his philosophical opinion (that the Universe will not come to an end) is not contradicted by Scripture.

Maimonides makes an interesting detour into the subject of miracles in this chapter.

When I, however, said that no prophet ever announced “a permanent change of any of its properties,” I intended to except miracles. For although the rod was turned into a serpent, the water into blood, the pure and noble hand into a leprous one, without the existence of any natural cause that could effect these or similar phenomena, these changes were not permanent, they have not become a physical property. On the contrary, the Universe since continues its regular course. This is my opinion; this should be our belief.

“This is my opinion; this should be our belief” succinctly captures Maimonides’ approach to these things. He is supremely confident that he has deduced the correct opinions, and he wishes to convince his readers that they should adopt the same ones.

After stating that miracles — whose veracity he seems to have no doubt in — are ‘interruptions’ in the natural order of the Universe, which “since continues its regular course”, Maimonides explains a theory which still further ‘naturalizes’ miracles. It is not clear the extent to which the author agrees with this theory.

Our Sages, however, said very strange things as regards miracles … that the miracles are to some extent also natural: for they say, when God created the Universe with its present physical properties, He made it part of these properties, that they should produce certain miracles at certain times, and the sign of a prophet consisted in the fact that God told him to declare when a certain thing will take place, but the thing itself was effected according to the fixed laws of Nature. If this is really the meaning of the passage referred to, it testifies to the greatness of the author, and shows that he held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the laws of Nature, or a change in the will of God [as regards the physical properties of things] after they have once been established. He therefore assumes, e.g., that God gave the waters the property of joining together, and of flowing in a downward direction, and of separating only at the time when the Egyptians were drowned, and only in a particular place.

Thus, “the miracles are to some extent also natural” because God encoded these ‘miraculous’ events into the laws of nature, such that water always flows downward except when the Red Sea was parted, and so on. Moses just happened to know that the Sea would part at that place and time.

Maimonides seems to think that it is a mark of a writer’s “greatness” that he “held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the laws of Nature”. Usually, one is compelled by the need for believing in miracles to concede that the laws of nature do, indeed, change momentarily when a miracle happens. But if this theory is correct, then even when a ‘miracle’ happens, it was actually a pre-programmed, “natural”, blip in the natural order of things.

We have thus clearly stated and explained our opinion, that we agree with Aristotle in one half of his theory. For we believe that this Universe remains perpetually with the same properties with which the Creator has endowed it, and that none of these will ever be changed except by way of miracle in some individual instances, although the Creator has the power to change the whole Universe, to annihilate it, or to remove any of its properties. The Universe, had, however, a beginning and commencement, for when nothing was as yet in existence except God, His wisdom decreed that the Universe be brought into existence at a certain time, that it should not be annihilated or changed as regards any of its properties, except in some instances; some of these are known to us, whilst others belong to the future, and are therefore unknown to us. This is our opinion and the basis of our religion.

Thus, Maimonides agrees with Aristotle that the Universe is temporally eternal in the future (abad أبد) but disagrees with Aristotle about its temporal eternity in the past (azal); the Universe had a beginning, but as far as we can tell, its current properties will forever remain in existence. However, he allows for the possibility that God could choose to change any of the Universe’s properties if he so wished it, or choose to annihilate it, etc.

The opinion of Aristotle is that the Universe, being permanent and indestructible, is also eternal and without beginning. We have already shown that this theory is based on the hypothesis that the Universe is the necessary result of causal relation, and that this hypothesis includes a certain amount of blasphemy.

Maimonides prefaces his theory of exactly how Creation came about in this chapter, by first stating that we are not supposed to take the account in Genesis literally. He gives some reasons for this, and adds that “the literal meaning of the words might lead us to conceive corrupt ideas and to form false opinions about God”; instead, “we should examine the Scriptural texts by the intellect, after having acquired a knowledge of demonstrative science”.

Commentary

According to Maimonides, Aristotle held firstly that the universe is the necessary result of causal relation, and secondarily he therefore concluded that the universe is eternal. Maimonides’ beef is not with the secondary claim, which he would have had no trouble with accepting (despite what the Bible says) had the proofs for it been airtight. His problem is with the first claim, which “includes a certain amount of blasphemy”. Reading this passage carefully, we could conclude that the blasphemy arises from the first claim, not from the second claim.

But Maimonides is not one to reject a philosophical claim simply because it leads one to deny Holy Writ; why does he deny the first claim? This was discussed extensively in chapter 19 and others, where he shows that Aristotle failed to show that “everything is the result of a law of Nature”.