God is NOT like a man –> NOT corporeal –> NOT like anything –> Transcendental.

By negating some of the commonly-held notions about God, for example, that he rules with a power like ours, only infinitely greater, knows with a knowledge that is like ours, only infinitely expansive, we purify our concept of God and, paradoxically, it is this process of negating things about God that tells us what God is. He is not A, not B, not C. Each successive negation tells us something more. Assume we have a Venn diagram that extends to infinity. asserting ‘A’ specifies a delimited portion of this space. Maimonides tells us that this is not allowed. You can’t say God is A because His circumscribes God and prevents him from being infinite. But every time we say ‘the set of all {some criterion}’, things that don’t fulfill the criterion are latent in the definition; they are what I leave out.

Let X be an infinite space. Let A be $x \in X: $ x satisfies some criterion.

Then, according to Maimonides, we are not allowed to make statements of the hind ‘God is A’. But we are allowed to say things like ‘God is not-A’. (of course, only one of these will be correct, and we’d have to use our judgement to decide what we can rightfully till the placeholder ‘A’ with.

As I understand it, the reason why Maimonides says this is simple: statements of the kind f..) ‘circumscribe’ God, bring the infinite within the grasp of a finite intellect. Statements of the 2nd kind don’t claim to define God fully; they only state what God is not; leaving the rest still an infinite region. Thus, Maimoni­des would have us radically re-interpret most of the religious language about God which ever he holds dear.

For example, when we say ‘God is living’. this really means ‘God is not dead’. Presumably, Maimonides thinks this is a very important distinction with far-reaching conclusions. Let’s consider two statements and their negations:

P: God is living; Q: God is dead Pn: God is not living; Qn: God is not dead

Traditional religious language would affirm P and deny Q. Maimonides also denies Q, but he does not affirm P either, strictly speaking. Instead, he thinks it is not correct to say P; instead, we must say instead Qn.

However, it is not really clear why Maimonides makes such a fuss about this. Shouldn’t the set of Xt X which satisfy P be exactly the same as the set which satisfies Qn ? If P and Q are negations of each other and in all his examples they do seem to be then P and Q together exhaust all possibilities, at least according to the Law of Excluded Middle. We have no reason to believe that Maimonides subscribed to an idiosyncratic theory of logic which did not hold the law of the excluded middle. So what would Maimonides’ answer to this objection be? Namely, what would he say to the objection that P and On are identical in all but name?

I believe that the answer lies in the use made by Maimonides of the conceptual machinery provided by the idea of negative attributes. He does not agree that the negative attributes are just a clever re-wording of the positive attributes. They are different, and they perform different functions than positive ones. According to Maimonides, each successive negative attribute gives us successively more information about God. It brings us closer and closer to a true understanding of the divine; the more you can negative about God, the more you know him. This can be so even though God is an infinite entity that cannot possibly be fully grasped.

…

Maimonides is one of the proponents of ‘apophatic’ theology, i.e., a ‘negative theology’ in which nothing can be predicated of God and only negative statements can be made about Him. He develops this idea in close connection with the rest of his theology largely in Part I of the Guide for the Perplexed. In fact, we can read the entire first part of the Guide as a demonstration of apophatic theology in practice, i.e., a process of getting to know God through a series of negative — rather than positive — statements.

In the Islamic theological debate between Ashari and Mutazili theologians, Maimonides takes a strong Mutazili position by denying the possibility of attributes in God. He does so developing a systematic analysis of what kinds of attributes can be predicated of a subject, and ruling out each of them in turn. These are:

  1. a definition
  2. part of a definition
  3. a quality, such as intellectual, moral, physical, or quantitative qualities.
  4. relational attributes
  5. attributes that describe actions.

After showing that the first four cannot possibly be predicated of God, Maimonides tells us that attributes of the fifth kind can indeed be predicated of God, as long as we keep in mind that 1) God does not contain potentiality, and therefore we can only speak about existent actions of God, not potential actions. 2) We must not think that there is a plurality of capacities within God from which he does different types of actions; “on the contrary, all the actions of God emanate from His essence”.

In his refutation of the idea that God has any attributes superadded to his essence, Maimonides is critical of what Oliver Leaman has called a `Superman’ view of God, declaring

It cannot be said, as they practically believe, that His existence is only more stable, His life more permanent, His power greater, His wisdom more perfect, and His will more general than ours, and that the same definition applies to both. This is in no way admissible, for the expression “more than” is used in comparing two things as regards a certain attribute predicated of both of them in exactly the same sense, and consequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].

So, according to Maimonides, if we are to apply the qualities usually attributed to God in the Abrahamic faiths, such as Life, Power, Wisdom, etc., we must do so with the recognition that we are using terms ‘equivocally’, i.e., with entirely different meanings than when we use these terms in ordinary usage about, e.g., a human being. Believing that God has Power in the same way that we have power, but to an infinite degree, would violate the simplicity and `beyond-compare-ness’ of God. The distinction being drawn by Maimonides here can be captured by the formula ‘a difference in kind, not in degree’, or by Spinoza’s distniction between ‘absolutely infinite’ and ‘infinite in its kind’, as in Ethics I def. 6.

Thus, while Maimonides does not go so far as to do away with these terms (Life, Power, Wisdom, etc.), he does render our usage of these terms quite empty of meaning. If these terms are to be used about God, they must carry some meaning, but Maimonides insists that the mental content of these words (pace Alexander Key) when applied to God is emphatically not the normal linguistic meaning. What, then, do these terms mean? We will see that Maimonides’ negative theology, provides the answer to this question.

Some of the problems that arise due to a rigorous application of the idea that God does not have attributes are exemplified by the term ‘existence’. God’s existence is usually the most important fact about Him; after all, religion requires the existence (rather than a non-existence) of a God. But in general, “existence is an attribute for the existent (أن الوجود عارض للموجود)”, and so, if we apply Maimonides’ principle, we would not be able to predicate ‘existence’ of God, since that would be an attribute. Maimonides does not shrink from this conclusion, and would agree that existence cannot be predicated of God. However, the shaykh al-ra’ees teaches that God is the entity for whom existence is identical with his essence, which is to say that his essence is existence. This means that there is no need to predicate existence of God (and, properly speaking, we cannot.) Well, Maimonides has found a way to keep this ostensible attribute for God without predicating it of God, since it is part of identical to his essence itself. But what about the others?

To that being … which has truly simple, absolute existence, and in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity is as inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God’s unity is not an element superadded, but He is One without possessing the attribute of unity.

Maimonides’ answer to the other typical attributes thus uses the following formula: God

  • is one without having the attribute of unity,
  • lives without having the attribute of life,
  • knows, without having the attribute of knowledge,
  • is omnipotent without having the attribute of omnipotence, and
  • is wise without having the attribute of wisdom.

Essentially, this transforms the attributes of unity, life, knowledge, power, and wisdom from qualities of God to attributes of action, the only kinds of attributes we can speak of regarding God. It must be remembered, however, that his ‘knowing’ is not the same as our knowing, his omnipotence is not a stronger version of our own power, and so on. Maimonides acknowledges the linguistic difficulties that his concept of God runs into, stating

The investigation of this subject, which is almost too subtle for our understanding, must not be based on current expressions employed in describing it, for these are the great source of error. It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in any language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject, and we can only employ inadequate language.

Know that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes (أعلم أن وصف الله عز و جل بالسوالب هو الوصف الصحيح): they do not include any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism (shirk شرك), and are inadequate … [I will then] explain how negative expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how they are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that we cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative attributes.

Thus, Maimonides’ arguments go something like this:

  1. God cannot have attributes added to his essence
  2. if God can be said to have Life, Power, Wisdom, etc., these words mean something very different from ordinary language: they describe actions, not qualities, and these actions bear no similarity to our normal uses of the terms.
  3. negative expressions can be used as attributes
  4. such negative attributes are the only ones that can be used to describe God

In Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides makes very strong statements regarding Negative Theology. The gist of his argument is this: no positive statements can be made about God, only negative ones. This is an important plank in his stance that God does not have any essential attributes; i.e., God is a uniate substance, simple and devoid of any multiplicity. For Maimonides, this ‘lack of multiplicity’ implies that God must not have any attributes.

If he cannot have any attributes, then how are we to understand the usual statements that are made about God, such as, e.g., that he is Living, Wise, and Powerful? For Maimonides, these three ‘attributes’ are

  1. used homonymously for God, such that when we say God is ‘wise’, we mean something very different compared to what we mean when we say that a person is wise.
  2. not to be understood in a positive sense at all!

A paradigmatic example for (2) is how Maimonides explains the expression ‘Living’ when used for God. According to him, this being is not like the four elements of sublunary matter (earth, air, fire, water); “we therefore say that it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead”.

Thus, when we say that God is living, what we are really saying (according to Maimonides) is that God is not dead. But this is a very strange statement to make, because either way it seems that we have made some positive statement about God. So Maimonides’ argument seems, at first glance, to be mere sophistry with words: he has replaced one positive statement about God,

(A) ‘that he is living’

with a different positive statement,

(A’) ‘that he is not dead’.

He is very serious about the deep chasm that exists between asserting A and A’ about God.

Asserting A’ is one step in the journey toward a true knowledge of God as He is, for Maimondies says in GP I.59, “by each additional negative attribute you advance toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he who does not negative [that attribute]”.

However, asserting A puts one in grave error. If we truly assert A, we begin to believe in an attribute-full God, and for Maimonides, “he who affirms attributes of God … unconsciously loses his belief in God” (GP I.60).

To a casual reader, however, it is very difficult to understand why Maimonides thinks A and A’ are so different from each other. Doesn’t one directly imply the other? Aren’t the two simply two different ways in which we can express exactly the same thought?

The key to understanding Maimonides’ intent here might lie in the distinction between necessary statements and sufficient statements. In mathematics, one can make two types of statements regarding an idea. If C is a necessary condition for Z, then C must be true for Z to be true. However, since C is only necessary but not sufficient, Z need not be true if C is true. If we have a necessary condition for Z, we can never be quite sure that we grasp Z because Z may or may not be true, no matter how many necessary conditions we are aware of and can verify. If we are aware of one necessary condition for Z, i.e., C, then we have some knowledge of Z but not absolute knowledge. We can check C to determine if Z is true or not. If C is true, then Z may be true; if C is false, then Z cannot be true.

Suppose we now learn of another necessary condition for Z, D. Then again, we have gained another piece of knowledge about Z, i.e., that D must be true for Z to be true. This is some knowledge, but it is not ‘positive’ knowledge; it is a kind of ‘negative’ knowledge. It circumscribes the possible things that Z can be. It does not really tell us what Z is with any certainty, but it does tell us with certainty what Z is not. It tells us that if D is false, then Z cannot be true. However, if D is true, then the field is wide open — we have come nowhere close to proving that Z is true. If D is true, Z may or may not be true.

If we think of each successive negative attribute as a kind of ‘necessary statement’ about God, we can begin to make more sense of what Maimonides means. He says that “there is no possibility of obtaining a knolwedge of the true essence of God … and the only thing that man can apprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positive attributes are inadmissible”. We can interpret this statement to mean that no sufficient statements can ever be made of God. Instead, all that we have are a succession of necessary statements, each of which circumscribes God and tells us with definitiveness (i.e., with a positive knowledge) what God is not, while only ‘pointing the way’, albeit indirectly, toward what God is. No positive knowledge about the essence of God is gained by each additional ‘negative attribute’, but we can still justly say that these do put us on a path toward true knowledge of God.

If we think of the set of natural numbers {1,2,3,…} and based on our knowledge of this set, we try to define the largest natural number, we run into a similar situation. Let us denote by ∞ something like ‘the largest natural number’. What can we positively assert about ∞? We can make the following necessary statement:

∞ > 10

i.e., we can be quite certain that the number we seek, ∞, is larger than 10. But this is only a necessary statement. This is a statement that confirms to us what ∞ is not; it is not 1,2,3,…,9,10. But what is it? Is it 11? No. Is it 12? No. In one sense, once we state that ∞ > 10, we circumscribe the possibility to some extent (we can rule out ten numbers), but once we do so we find that we are still no closer to finding out what ∞ really is. This state of affairs exists because we do not have access to any sufficient statements about ∞, but only necessary ones. We may be able to circumscribe ∞ further if we learn a subsequent necessary statement about ∞, i.e.,

∞ > 20

and we now know more about ∞ than the person who did not assert this necessary statement. In that sense we have come closer to a knowledge of ∞ than we had before. But in another sense, we have really not come any closer to defining what ∞ is, because we don’t have any sufficient statements about it.